ORDER

JAMES C. MAHAN, District Judge.

Presently before the court is plaintiff Rugged Oaks Investment's motion to remand to state court. (ECF No. 73). Defendant Bank of New York Mellon ("BNYM") filed a response (ECF No. 75), to which plaintiff replied (ECF No. 76).

I. Facts

This case involves a dispute over property that was subject to a homeowners' association ("HOA") superpriority lien for delinquent assessment fees.

Plaintiff filed the original complaint in state court on January 13, 2015, asserting one claim for quiet title/declaratory relief against defendants Eileen Nelson, David Nelson, BNYM, CitiBank (West) FSB, the Internal Revenue Service (the "IRS"), AACA/Account Management Services, the City of Las Vegas, Unifund CCR Partners, as assignee of Palisades Acquisition XVI, SouthWestUSA Bank, NV DHHS Division of Welfare & Supp Services, LVN Corporation, and MTC Corporation d/b/a Trustee Corps. (ECF No. 1-2).

The IRS removed the action to federal court on February 11, 2015, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442 and 1444. (ECF No. 1). After over a year of proceedings, the parties that remain in the instant action are plaintiff and defendant BNYM.1

In the instant motion, plaintiff moves to remand, contending that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. (ECF No. 43).

II. Legal Standard

A plaintiff may challenge removal by timely filing a motion to remand. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Remand to state court is proper if the district court lacks jurisdiction. Id.

Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 374 (1978). "A federal court is presumed to lack jurisdiction in a particular case unless the contrary affirmatively appears." Stock West, Inc. v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). Thus, federal subject matter jurisdiction must exist at the time an action is commenced. Mallard Auto. Grp., Ltd. v. United States, 343 F.Supp.2d 949, 952 (D. Nev. 2004).

III. Discussion

In the instant motion, plaintiff asserts remand is appropriate based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that "[t]here is no federal question before the [c]ourt, no diversity and the only question remaining for trial is whether the sales price was in some manner inadequate in a manner that could invalidate the foreclosure sale." (ECF No. 73 at 3). In particular, plaintiff contends that summary judgment against the IRS was entered and, without the IRS, no basis for subject matter jurisdiction exists. (ECF No. 73 at 2). The court disagrees.

"The judicial power of the federal courts extends to any controversy to which the United States is a party." Hood v. United States, 256 F.2d 522, 525 (9th Cir. 1958) (citing United States Constitution, art. III, § 2, cl. 2). Moreover, 28 U.S.C. § 1442 accords the United States the right to remove certain cases at its sole option without regard to the amount in controversy. See id. Further, 28 U.S.C. § 1444 provides that "[a]ny action brought under section 2410 of this title against the United States in any State court may be removed by the United States to the district court of the United States for the district and division in which the action is pending." 28 U.S.C. § 1444.2

Here, federal subject matter jurisdiction existed at the time the action was commenced on January 13, 2015, because the IRS, a named defendant in plaintiff's complaint, removed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442 and 1444 on February 11, 2015. (ECF No. 1). Thus, removal was proper. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

Indeed, summary judgment against the IRS was later entered—ore specifically, on March 17, 2016, the court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment against the IRS, in part based on the IRS filing a notice of non-opposition thereto. (ECF No. 51). The next day, a clerk's judgment was entered against the IRS. (ECF No. 52).

Plaintiff, however, fails to explain how summary judgment against the IRS renders remand proper seven months later—nor does plaintiff cite any binding authority in support of its contention that summary judgment against the IRS somehow divests the court of jurisdiction over the remaining case.

Despite plaintiff's unsupported contentions to the contrary, the court has discretion in deciding whether to continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction or remand the state claim to state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c); Retail Prop. Trust v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 768 F.3d 938, 962 (9th Cir. 2014).

In the instant case, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state claim. Thus, plaintiff's motion to remand will be granted.

IV. Conclusion

Accordingly,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that plaintiff's motion to remand (ECF No. 73) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED.