STEVEN D. MERRYDAY, District Judge.
Mindy Westlund sues Laboratory Corporation of America ("LabCorp"), a clinical laboratory, for violating the federal False Claims Act and the Florida Whistleblower Act. According to Westlund (a LabCorp salesperson), LabCorp falsely promises doctors that a large private insurer will pay for a LabCorp medical test. Allegedly, after the private insurer refuses to pay for the test Medicare sometimes pays instead. A December 29, 2011, order (Doc. 38) dismisses Westlund's second amended complaint because, among other reasons, Westlund never explains how LabCorp's lying to a doctor prompts a false claim against the federal government. The third amended complaint ("the complaint") (Doc. 42) alleges only that LabCorp retaliated against Westlund for whistleblowing. LabCorp moves (Doc. 45) to dismiss.
The Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act ("FERA"), 123 Stat. 1617, 1624-25 (2009), amends the False Claims Act's retaliation clause, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h), although the amendment affects conduct occurring only on or after May 20, 2009. LabCorp's allegedly wrongful acts began by early 2008 and continued until at least May 2009. Whether or when the alleged conduct ceased is obscure. Westlund therefore invokes only the old Section 3730(h), which states:
Section 3730(h) protects an employee only if pursuing a potential claim under Section 3729 and only if the employer knows that a qui tam action might arise from the employee's acts. Hoyte v. Am. Nat. Red Cross, 518 F.3d 61, 66-70 (D.C. Cir. 2008) ("the relator must [investigate] matters that reasonably could lead to a viable False Claims Act case"); McKenzie v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 219 F.3d 508, 516-17 (6th Cir. 2000) ("internal reporting may constitute protected activity, [but] the internal reports must allege fraud on the government"); Shekoyan v. Sibley Int'l, 409 F.3d 414, 422-23 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ("an employee does not engage in protected conduct if he merely informs a supervisor of the problem"); Luckey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 183 F.3d 730, 733 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[mere] saber-rattling is not protected conduct"); Robertson v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 32 F.3d 948, 951 (5th Cir. 1994) ("the employee [must notify] the employer that she [i]s concerned about the company defrauding the government"); see also Childree v. UAP/GA CHEM, Inc., 92 F.3d 1140, 1145-46 (11th Cir. 1996).
The complaint describes Westlund's pre-suit alarums as follows:
(Doc. 42, Ex. 1 at 4-5) (emphasis and errors in original).
Westlund never alleges that she investigated potential fraud under the False Claims Act (or that she investigated anything), never alleges that she expressed concern to LabCorp about potential fraud against the government, and never alleges that she told LabCorp about the possibility of a qui tam action. What Westlund said to her employer remains indefinite — she alleges only that she "questioned" and "raised concerns." Nothing in the complaint shows that LabCorp knew of Westlund's protected conduct before the unsealing of this qui tam action in June, 2011. In fact, besides the filing of this action, the complaint alleges no protected conduct. Consequently, no purported threat or harassment by LabCorp before June, 2011, violates Section 3730(h).
The complaint alleges also, however, that Westlund suffered retaliation after this action was unsealed:
(Doc. 42, Ex. 1 at 6) (emphasis and errors in original). If the trivial slights in the first two paragraphs are discarded, a claim for retaliation might nonetheless arise from the reduction of Westlund's workload.
To plead retaliation Westlund must allege the pursuit of a potential action under the False Claims Act. The one authority that Westlund cites in support of her Section 3730(h) claim, Graham County Soil & Water Conservation District v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 545 U.S. 409 (2005), says nothing to the contrary. Graham states that Section 3730(h) "protects an employee's conduct even if the target of an investigation or action . . . was innocent," but Graham also acknowledges that Section 3730(h) requires an employee to act "in furtherance of" an action under the False Claims Act. 545 U.S. at 416 & n.1; see Hoyte 518 F.3d at 69.
Although the Section 3730(h) claim survives Westlund's failure to plead fraud with particularity, the Section 3730(h) claim succumbs to Westlund's more basic failures. Westlund never cites which subsection of Section 3729 LabCorp supposedly violated. Westlund never establishes "the direct link between [a] false statement and the Government's decision to pay or approve a false claim." United States ex rel. Vigil v. Nelnet, Inc., 639 F.3d 791, 799-800 (8th Cir. 2011). Westlund never explains (as an order warns her she must) how "LabCorp's lie and the government's payment for a valid service amounts to fraud actionable under the False Claims Act." (Doc. 38 at 2) In sum, Westlund never shows — never attempts to show — the reasonableness of her novel and tenuous theory of liability under the False Claims Act.
The motion (Doc. 45) to dismiss is GRANTED, Westlund's Section 3730(h) claim (Count I) is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE, supplemental jurisdiction over Westlund's state law whistleblower claim (Count II) is DECLINED, and this action is DISMISSED. The clerk is directed to terminate any pending motion and close the case.
ORDERED.