MEMORANDUM

Certain cases on the 02-md-875 Maritime Docket (MARDOC), listed on the attached "Exhibit A"

EDUARDO C. ROBRENO, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court are thirty-two1 motions to dismiss due to lack of personal jurisdiction in cases originally filed in the District Court for the Virgin Islands. The cases were later transferred to the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and consolidated as part of the maritime multidistrict asbestos litigation ("MARDOC").2 The plaintiffs in these cases are various merchant marines and their representatives, survivors, and spouses. The eighteen affected defendants assert that the Court may not exercise personal jurisdiction over them as they lack sufficient contacts with the Virgin Islands. In their responses, and in addition to several novel arguments the Court has previously rejected, the plaintiffs allege that the Court has general jurisdiction over the defendants. They do not assert that the Court may exercise specific jurisdiction — either through the Due Process Clause of the Constitution or through the Virgin Islands long-arm statute — as there are no cases in which the plaintiffs' damages arise from the defendants' contacts in the forum.

There are essentially three types of defendants that filed motions: (1) those with no contacts in the Virgin Islands; (2) those that have no contacts themselves, but who are related to other entities with contacts; and (3) those that have some level of forum contacts. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over all of the moving defendants. Therefore, the thirty-two motions will be granted.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion to Dismiss Based on Lack of Personal Jurisdiction Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 (b) (2)

In considering a Rule 12(b) (2) motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, "[t]here are specific analytical steps [the Court] must take in determining whether personal jurisdiction can be asserted over a nonresident defendant," and "Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is the starting point." Pennzoil Prods. Co. v. Colelli & Assoc., Inc., 149 F.3d 197, 200 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing Mellon Bank (East) PSFS, Nat. Ass'n v. Farino, 960 F.2d 1217, 1221 (3d Cir. 1992)). Rule 4(e) allows for personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants to the extent authorized under the law of the state in which the district court sits. In the MDL setting, the transferee court applies the personal jurisdiction law of the state where the case was filed. See Marshall Investments Corp. v. Krones A.G., 572 F. App'x 149, 152, n.4 (3d Cir. 2014) (providing that "[w]hen a case is transferred under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 for consolidated pretrial proceedings, the transferee court must `apply the same state substantive law . . . that would have been applied by a state court in the jurisdiction in which a case was filed.'") (quoting Menowitz v. Brown, 991 F.2d 36, 40 (2d Cir. 1993)). Thus, in the present cases, the proper forum law is that of the U.S. Virgin Islands, where the cases were initially brought.

In deciding a motion to dismiss, the Court "must accept all of the plaintiff's allegations as true and construe disputed facts in favor of the plaintiff." Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 368 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). However, since the defendants have objected to personal jurisdiction, the plaintiffs bear the burden of proof in establishing it. Id.; see also Francis v. Bridgestone Corp., CV 2010-030, 2013 WL 5276365, at *2 (D.V.I. Sept. 18, 2013) (citing D'Jamoos ex rel. Weingeroff v. Pilatus Aircraft Ltd., 566 F.3d 94, 102 (3d Cir. 2009)).

B. Personal Jurisdiction

"The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment sets the outer boundaries of a state tribunal's authority to proceed against a defendant." Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2853 (2011) (citing Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207 (1977)). Courts recognize two forms of persoMal jurisdiction: general and specific. As recently summarized by the Supreme Court:

Id. at 2851. Thus, a court may assert specific jurisdiction over a party in an action arising from its forum contacts, or general jurisdiction when the action is based solely on the quantity and quality of the party's forum contacts rather than on their relationship to the action.

1. Specific Jurisdiction

In this case, the plaintiffs do not allege that their injuries occurred in the Virgin Islands or arose from the defendants' contacts there. Thus, the plaintiffs do not, and cannot, assert that the Court has specific jurisdiction over the defendants either through the Due Process Clause or the Virgin Islands long-arm statute, 5 V.I.C. § 4903. See J. Mcintyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2780, 2788 (2011) (holding that "submission [to jurisdiction] through contact with and [sic] activity directed at a sovereign may justify specific jurisdiction `in a suit arising out of or related to the defendant's contacts with the forum.'") (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414, n.8 (1984)); Urgent v. Technical Assistance Bureau, Inc., 255 F.Supp.2d 532, 535-36 (D.V.I. 2003) (providing that the Virgin Islands long-arm statute "is coextensive with the maximum perimeters of the due process clause"). Therefore, this Court need only address whether it has general jurisdiction over the defendants.

2. General Jurisdiction

As described above, general jurisdiction is premised on a defendant's forum contacts that are unrelated to the plaintiff's injury. In recent years, the Supreme Court has substantially curtailed the application of general jurisdiction over corporate defendants. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. ___, 134 S.Ct. 746, 758 (2014) (recognizing that "general jurisdiction has come to occupy a less dominant place in the contemporary scheme"). The Court in Daimler asserted that "only a limited set of affiliations with a forum will render a defendant amenable to" general jurisdiction. Id. at 760. Specifically, general jurisdiction will only lie where a corporation "is fairly regarded as at home" which typically will mean its "place of incorporation and principal place of business" as these are "paradigm bases for general jurisdiction." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) . The Court stressed the importance of being able to easily ascertain the places where a corporation is subject to jurisdiction; a goal met by these two locations. Id.

However, the Court further explained that "in an exceptional case," "a corporation's operations in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that State." Id. at 761, n.19. Although, merely "engag[ing] in a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business" in a jurisdiction is not sufficient to render a corporation at home there. Id. at 761. As an example of an exceptional situation, the Court cited to Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co. which they described as "the textbook case of general jurisdiction." Id. at 755-56 & 761, n.19.

In Perkins, the plaintiff filed suit in Ohio against a Philippine mining corporation. 342 U.S. 437, 438-39 (1952). At the time of the suit, the mining corporation had ended all business activities except for those in Ohio where the president maintained his office, kept the company files, generally supervised the company, and from which he wrote business related correspondences and distributed salary checks. Id. at 447-48. The Court concluded that it had general jurisdiction over the defendant because, as they later explained, "`Ohio was the corporation's principal, if temporary, place of business.'" Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 756 (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780, n.11 (1984)). Thus, an "exceptional case" authorizing general jurisdiction is one in which the defendant's forum contacts are so pervasive that they may substitute for its place of incorporation or principal place of business. See Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd. v. Ritter, 13-50941, ___ F.3d ___, 2014 WL 4799716, at *2 (5th Cir. Sept. 26, 2014) (providing that it is "incredibly difficult to establish general jurisdiction in a forum other than the place of incorporation or principal place of business").

III. DISCUSSION

As previously noted, there are three categories of defendants that have filed the present motions: (1) those with no contacts in the Virgin Islands; (2) those that have no contacts themselves but are related to other entities with contacts; and (3) those that have some level of contacts.

A. Defendants with no Virgin Islands Contacts

There are six defendants that have no contacts with the Virgin Islands.3 Specifically, in addition to being incorporated and having their principal places of business elsewhere, they assert that they have never been residents of the forum and: (1) have no offices and are not licensed to do business; (2) have no agents or sales staff; (3) own no property of any kind; (4) do not solicit business or advertise; (5) have no telephone number; (6) have no bank accounts, loans, or financial ties; and (7) have never paid taxes, in the Virgin Islands. These defendants also assert that they have never owned or operated vessels in Virgin Islands waters.

In that no plaintiff can allege specific jurisdiction, and given that these defendants lack any contacts with the forum through which the Court might establish general jurisdiction, it is clear that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them. Therefore, their motions will be granted.

Indeed, the plaintiffs do not allege otherwise. Instead, in their responses they merely raise several of the arguments that the Court has considered and rejected in its August 26, 2013 personal jurisdiction opinion. Bartel, 965 F. Supp. 2d at 622-23. Specifically, the plaintiffs note the "inherent complexity of maritime asbestos cases," that transfer of the cases rather than dismissal would be in the interest of justice, and that the transferee court is not prohibited from transferring the cases under Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998). Id. The Court finds no reason why it should depart from its prior rulings on these issues.

B. Defendants that have no Contacts with the Virgin Islands but Are Related to Other Entities that have Forum Contacts

There are six additional defendants that the plaintiffs allege are either subsidiaries or parents of other companies that have some contacts with the Virgin Islands.4 The defendants themselves have no actual contacts with the forum and are similarly situated to the six defendants described above.5

In order for these defendants to be subject to general jurisdiction in the Virgin Islands based upon the jurisdictional contacts of a related entity, the plaintiffs must show that the defendant "substantially controls and dominates [the entity at issue] so that the independence of the separate corporate entities was disregarded." Francis v. Bridgestone Corp., CIV. 2010/30, 2011 WL 2650599, at *8 (D.V.I., July 6, 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "`[T]he level of control necessary to substantiate an alter ego relationship must exceed the usual supervision that a parent exercises over a subsidiary.'" Id. at *9 (quoting In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 674 F.Supp.2d 580, 598 (M.D. Pa. 2009)). Indeed, "`[p]laintiffs must prove that the parent controls the day-to-day operations of the subsidiary such that the subsidiary can be said to be a mere department of the parent.'" Id. (quoting In re Enter. Rent-A-Car Wage & Hour Emp't Practices Litig, 735 F.Supp.2d 277, 318 (W.D. Pa. 2010)); see also Daimler, 124 S. Ct. at 759 (refusing to directly address the issue but noting that "several Courts of Appeals have held, that a subsidiary's jurisdictional contacts can be imputed to its parent only when the former is so dominated by the latter as to be its alter ego"). Even if the plaintiffs were able to show that the defendants exercise such control over the other entities so that they may be considered the defendant's "alter egos," they must still establish that the entities' forum contacts are sufficient for general jurisdiction under Daimler. Id. at *8.

The plaintiffs have failed to allege that any of the entities with Virgin Islands contacts are alter egos of the defendants. They merely state that the defendant is the parent or subsidiary of another entity and then list that entity's forum contacts. This is insufficient to establish alter ego as the plaintiffs do not contend that the defendants exercise any degree of heightened control over the other entities. Thus, these motions will also be granted. Given the plaintiffs' failure to even plead this basic requirement, the Court need not delve into the forum contacts of the related entities.

C. Defendants that have Some Direct Contacts with the Virgin Islands

The final six defendants do have some undisputed contacts with the Virgin Islands that are unrelated to the plaintiffs' claims. However, the Court concludes that none of the defendants can be said to have such substantial and continuous contacts with the Virgin Islands that it is "essentially at home" there as it would be if it were incorporated or had its principal place of business there. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the motions of these last six defendants will be granted.

In Daimler, two Argentinians filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California against DaimlerChrysler Aktiengesellschaft ("Daimler"), a German Corporation. Id. at 751. They "alleged that during Argentina's 1976-1983 `Dirty War,' Daimler's Argentinian subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz Argentina (MB Argentina) collaborated with state security forces to kidnap, detain, torture, and kill certain MB Argentina workers." Id. The plaintiffs argued that the Court had general jurisdiction over Daimler based on the California contacts of one of its subsidiaries, Mercedes-Benz U.S.A., L.L.C. ("MBUSA"), a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in New Jersey. Id.

MBUSA, which was the exclusive importer of Mercedes-Benz vehicles into the United States, had

Id. at 752. For the purposes of their analysis, the Court assumed MBUSA's contacts were imputable to Daimler under the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal's agency test.6 Id. at 760. Nonetheless, the Court held that all of the forum contacts attributable to Daimler were insufficient to find that it was "at home" in California as it was neither incorporated in the forum nor had its principal place of business there. Id. at 760-62. Immediately below, the Court will describe the forum contacts attributed to these six defendants and explain why the Court lacks jurisdiction over them pursuant to Daimler.

1. TOTE Services, Inc.

First, the plaintiffs seek to establish general jurisdiction over defendant TOTE Services, Inc. ("TOTE Services"). See 11-45890 Doc. 103. They attempt to impute the contacts from its "sister company" Sea Star Line Terminals ("Sea Star") which, along with TOTE Services, is owned by a parent corporation, TOTE, Inc. They also raise some additional direct forum contacts. Specifically, the plaintiffs contend that:

11-45890 Doc. 108, pp. 12-13. Exhibit A-18 indicates that Tote Services' "managed fleet" currently includes the "Sea Star Lines in the Florida trade." 11-45890 Doc. 108-20, p. 4. Exhibit A-19 merely indicates that Sea Star has terminals on St. Thomas and St. Croix. 11-45890 Doc. 108-21. Exhibit A-10, the only other exhibit describing TOTE Services' direct forum contacts is its declaration providing that "[b]eginning in February 2008 through approximately 2010, Defendant managed a foreign flag vessel, the M/V SUNSHINE SPIRIT, which operated on a trade route from Peurto [sic] Rico to the Virgin Islands." 11-45890 Doc. 108-10, p. 2. In that the plaintiffs have failed to allege or prove that Sea Star is the alter ego of Tote Services, Sea Star's contacts may not be imputed to it.

Thus, the Court is left with only two references that TOTE Services managed vessels that docked in the Virgin Islands. Under Daimler, such management alone would not make TOTE Services "at home" in the Virgin Islands as it is not the equivalent of being incorporated in the Virgin Islands or having its principal place of business there. 134 S. Ct. at 760-61. TOTE Services still lacks any other discernable contacts with the forum. It is a Delaware corporation with a New Jersey principal place of business. Moreover, the plaintiffs do not dispute that the defendant has never been a resident of the Virgin Islands, and has no offices, is not licensed to do business, has no agents or sales people, owns no property, has never solicited business or advertised, has no telephone number, has no bank accounts, loans, or financial ties, and never paid taxes, there. Therefore, the Court concludes that it lacks personal jurisdiction over TOTE Services.

2. Sea-Land Service, Inc.

The plaintiffs also seek to establish general jurisdiction over Sea-Land Service, Inc. ("Sea-land") based on the extent of its forum contacts. See 02-md-875 Doc. 4342. The only evidence provided by the plaintiffs to support this contention is that:

02-md-875 Doc. 4417, p. 4. The plaintiffs do not dispute that Sea-Land is a Delaware corporation with a Florida principal place of business that has never been a forum resident, and has no offices, is not licensed to do business, has no agents or sales people, owns no property, never solicited business or advertised, has no telephone number, has no bank accounts, loans, or financial ties, and has never paid taxes, in the Virgin Islands. Even if Sea-Land regularly docked at ports in the Virgin Islands, such commerce is still insufficient to establish that it was "at home" there. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761. Thus, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Sea-Land.

3. American Trading Transportation Company, Inc.

Third, the plaintiffs seek to establish general jurisdiction over American Trading Transportation Company, Inc. ("Attransco"). See 02-md-875 Doc. 4347. The plaintiffs contend that:

02-md-875 Doc. 4424, pp. 3-4. It is undisputed that in plaintiffs' Exhibit A-19, Attransco admitted that it operated vessels in Virgin Islands waters "on occasion" and that they "visited ports or piers" there. 02-md-875 Doc. 4424-5, p. 2. It is also undisputed that six of the Coast Guard records in plaintiffs' Exhibit A-21 show voyages to or from the Virgin Islands aboard Attransco vessels. 02-md-875 Doc. 4424-7. However, it is equally undisputed that Attransco is a Maryland corporation with a Maryland principal place of business, was never a resident of the Virgin Islands, and has no offices, is not licensed to do business, has no agents or sales staff, owns no property, never solicited business or advertised, has no telephone number, has no bank accounts, loans, or financial ties, and has never paid taxes, there. Under Daimler, Attransco lacks the type of contacts that would make it at home in the forum. 134 S. Ct. at 760-61. Therefore, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Attransco.

4. Transoceanic Cable Ship Company, LLC.

The fourth defendant in this category is Transoceanic Cable Ship Company, LLC. ("Transoceanic"). See 11-45885 Doc. 111. In support of their assertion that the Court has general jurisdiction over this defendant, the plaintiffs assert that:

11-45885 Doc. 117, pp. 3-4. First, the plaintiffs do not allege that plaintiff Edward Cowart served upon the C.S. Long Lines while it was in Virgin Islands waters. Indeed, as noted by Transoceanic, Mr. Cowart sailed on that vessel from December 3, 1977 to December 10, 1977 on a voyage leaving from and returning to Honolulu, Hawaii. 11-435885 Doc. 111-2, p. 2. Like Attransco, the only direct contact this defendant had with the Virgin Islands is that it operated vessels in their territorial waters and docked there. Thus, Transoceanic lacks contacts that are so substantial that it is "essentially at home in the forum State." Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 (internal quotation marks omitted). It is a New York corporation with a New Jersey principal place of business and it has never been a resident of the Virgin Islands. Moreover, according to Transoceanic, it has no offices, is not licensed to do business, has no agents or sales people, owns no property, has not solicited business or advertised, has no telephone number, has no bank accounts, loans, or financial ties, and has never paid taxes, in the Virgin Islands. Even if the defendant regularly sailed in Virgin Islands waters, that contact would not be sufficient to establish general jurisdiction over it under Daimler. See id. (providing that "engag[ing] in a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business" is not sufficient to render a corporation at home in a given jurisdiction) . Under the circumstances, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Transoceanic.

5. Amerada Hess Corp.

The fifth defendant over which the plaintiffs assert that general jurisdiction exists is Amerada Hess Corp. ("Amerada Hess"). See 02-md-875 Doc. 4536. In support of their argument, they contend that:

02-md-875 Doc. 4604, p. 4. The defendant admits that it has a facility in the Virgin Islands.7 02-md-875 Doc. 4615, p. 2. However, it claims that it is not at home in the forum because it is a Delaware corporation with a New York principal place of business. The Court agrees. Establishing one refinery in the forum — one of many that the defendant owned — is not equivalent to its place of incorporation or principal place of business. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20 (providing that "[g]eneral jurisdiction [ ] calls for an appraisal of a corporation's activities in their entirety, nationwide and worldwide. A corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them"). Moreover, in that the plaintiffs have failed to allege that the defendant's subsidiary is merely an alter ego, it's contacts with the forum may not be imputed to Amerada Hess. Thus, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Amerada Hess.

6. Alcoa Steamship Company, Inc.

The final defendant that the plaintiffs allege has sufficient ties to the forum to establish general jurisdiction is Alcoa Steamship Company, Inc. ("Alcoa"). See 11-45890 Doc. 99. Like Amerada Hess, Alcoa has had significant contacts with the Virgin Islands over the years. However, given the Supreme Court's reluctance to extend general jurisdiction as well as the staleness of many of the contacts, the Court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction over Alcoa. In support of their position, the plaintiffs assert that:

11-45890 Doc. 112, pp. 4-5.

Alcoa's contacts with the Virgin Islands, as described by the plaintiffs, may be grouped and summarized in the following manner: (1) it is currently licensed to do business and has an agent for service of process in the forum; (2) it sails vessels in Virgin Islands waters and docks at their ports; (3) it may have paid taxes there; (4) between 1944 and 1953 it occasionally ran newspaper advertisements regarding its cruises to the Virgin Islands; and (5) from 1941 to 1964 it had local offices in the forum.8 Many of Alcoa's contacts are over fifty years old. These are of little consequence in determining whether it currently has sufficient jurisdictional contacts in the forum as:

Simons v. Arcan, Inc., CIV. A. 12-01493, 2013 WL 1285489, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 28, 2013) (quoting Gregoire v. Schleicher & Co. Int'l, AG, CIV. A. 90-4720, 1991 WL 168644, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 1991).

Alcoa's remaining contacts: that it is licensed to do business in the forum; has an agent for service; and sails vessels in Virgin Islands waters and docks at their ports, may even show a "substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business." Daimler, 134 S.Ct. at 761. However, this alone is not enough to establish that Alcoa "is fairly regarded as at home" in the forum. Id. at 760-61; see also Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416-18 (providing, inter alia, that even regular purchases from a Texas helicopter manufacturer and sending personnel for connected training was insufficient to establish general jurisdiction) . Alcoa is a New York corporation with a Pennsylvania principal place of business. It claims never to have been a resident of the Virgin Islands and currently has no offices, agents, property, telephone numbers, and no bank accounts, loans, or financial ties, there. While the Supreme Court in Daimler did not limit general jurisdiction strictly to the defendant's corporate home or principal place of business, it made clear that jurisdiction would otherwise lie only in "an exceptional case." Id. at 761, n.19. Alcoa's contacts with the forum are not so significant that they could substitute for its place of incorporation or principal place of business. Thus, the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over Alcoa.

IV. CONCLUSION

The plaintiffs do not allege, and cannot allege, that the Court has specific jurisdiction (based on the long-arm statute or constitutional due process) over any of the defendants as their claims do not arise from the defendants' activities in the Virgin Islands. The plaintiffs also have failed to adequately plead facts which would allow the Court to exercise general jurisdiction over any of these defendants under the restrictive holding in Daimler. As a result, all of the defendants' motions to dismiss listed on Exhibit A will be granted.

An appropriate order follows.

Exhibit A