GREGORY J. KELLY, Magistrate Judge.
Abigail Caballero (the "Claimant"), appeals to the District Court a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner") determining that Claimant was not disabled prior to November 20, 2015. Doc. No. 1. Claimant argues that the Administrative Law Judge (the "ALJ") erred in: 1) not consulting a medical expert when determining Claimant's disability onset date; and 2) applying incorrect legal standards to the opinions of Dr. Frank J. Yanez. Doc. No. 21 at 14-17, 19-22. Claimant requests that the Commissioner's decision be reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 28. For the reasons set forth below, it is
On June 1, 2011, Claimant filed an application (the "First Application") for Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB"). R. 168. In the First Application, Claimant alleges an onset date of January 31, 2011. Id. On June 21, 2011, the First Application was initially denied. R. 69. On October 3, 2011, the First Application was denied upon reconsideration. R. 79. On October 28, 2011, Claimant filed a request for hearing before the ALJ. R. 85. On November 28, 2012, Claimant attended a hearing before the ALJ. R. 27-44. On January 9, 2013, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. R. 10-21. On March 7, 2013, Claimant filed a request for review of the ALJ's decision. R. 7-9. On May 29, 2014, the Appeals Council denied Claimant's request for review. R. 1-6. On July 10, 2014, Claimant appealed the Commissioner's decision to this Court. See Caballero v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec, 6:14-cv-1110-DAB (Doc. No. 1). On July 30, 2015, U.S. Magistrate Judge David A. Baker ordered that the case be reversed and remanded for further proceedings. Id. (Doc. No. 19).
On August 11, 2014, while Claimant's appeal was pending with Judge Baker, Claimant filed a separate application (the "Second Application") for DIB and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"). R. 681. In the Second Application, Claimant alleges an onset date of October 29, 2011. Id. On November 4, 2014, the Second Application was initially denied. R. 607, 613. On April 3, 2015, the Second Application was denied upon reconsideration. R. 617, 623. On September 1, 2015, the Appeals Council remanded the First Application to the ALJ for further proceedings, pursuant to Judge Baker's order. R. 598. The Appeals Council recognized the pendency of the Second Application, and ordered the ALJ to consolidate the First and Second Applications. R. 600.
On March 10, 2016, Claimant attended a second hearing before the ALJ. R. 457-485. On April 12, 2016, the ALJ issued a partially favorable decision finding Claimant became disabled on November 20, 2015. R. 432-448. On June 17, 2016, Claimant filed this appeal. Doc. No. 1.
The Commissioner's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla — i.e., the evidence must do more than merely create a suspicion of the existence of a fact, and must include such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the conclusion. Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982) and Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). Where the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the District Court will affirm, even if the reviewer would have reached a contrary result as finder of fact, and even if the reviewer finds that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's decision. Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991); Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1991). The Court must view the evidence as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the decision. Foote, 67 F.3d at 1560. The District Court "`may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner].'" Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983)).
In a January 12, 2016 treatment note, Dr. Joseph Kavanagh found that Claimant was injured in a motor vehicle accident on November 20, 2015 (the "Accident Date"). R. 977. Dr. Kavanagh's finding is central to the ALJ's decision.
The ALJ determined that January 31, 2011 was Claimant's alleged onset date.
At step four, the ALJ made two findings as to Claimant's residual functional capacity ("RFC"), one pre-Accident Date and one post-Accident Date. R. 437, 445. First, the ALJ found that before the Accident Date Claimant had the RFC to perform light work with certain exertional and nonexertional limitations. R. 437. In making such a finding, the ALJ made detailed findings regarding the medical evidence before the Accident Date. R. 438-445. For example, the ALJ recognized a May 9, 2011 treatment note from Dr. Marc Gerber finding that Claimant was able to sit, stand, and transfer without difficulty. R. 312, 440. The ALJ gave significant weight to a May 2011 medical source statement of Dr. Gerber, finding that Claimant reached maximum medical improvement and was capable of light duty work. R. 310, 440. The ALJ also gave significant weight to an October 2014 medical source statement from Dr. Carol Grant, noting Claimant's full range of motion in the shoulders and ambulation without an assistive device. R. 442, 873-874. The ALJ also considered evidence (and the conditions stated therein) given after the January 9, 2013 unfavorable decision on the First Application, finding that "the record does not support a finding that these conditions have presented the [Claimant] with even minimal limitations . . ." R. 440.
In the second half of the ALJ's step four analysis, the ALJ found that post-Accident Date the Claimant had the RFC to perform light work with certain exertional and non-exertional limitations.
At step four, the ALJ found that Claimant has been unable to perform any past relevant work since her alleged onset date. R. 446. At step five, the ALJ found that pre-Accident Date, there were a significant number of jobs in the national economy that Claimant could have performed. R. 447. The ALJ found that post-Accident Date, there are no jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy that the Claimant can perform. R. 447-448. Accordingly, the ALJ found that Claimant was not disabled pre-Accident Date, but was disabled post-Accident Date. R. 448.
Claimant argues that the ALJ committed reversible error by failing to call a medical expert to establish Claimant's onset date of disability. Doc. No. 21 at 14-17. In the Joint Memorandum, Claimant cites Social Security Ruling ("SSR") 83-20 as standing for the proposition that a medical expert should have been consulted. Id. at 14-15. The Commissioner argues that a medical expert was not needed, because the ALJ found the medical evidence established that Claimant became disabled post-Accident Date. Id. at 17-19.
"SSR 83-20 describes what the ALJ must consider when establishing the onset date of disability." Nixon v. Astrue, Civil Action No. 1:11-CV-2032-JSA, 2012 WL 5507310, at * 4 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 14, 2012). In many cases, a claimant's onset date is critical because "it may affect the period for which the individual is entitled to or eligible for any benefits." Touchton v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 6:14-cv-709-Orl-TBS, 2015 WL 12859393, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Jul. 13, 2015) (citing SSR 83-20, 1983 WL 31249, at * 1 (1983)). When making a determination about a claimant's disability onset date, the Court considers "the claimant's alleged onset date, the claimant's work history, and medical and other evidence." Id. According to SSR 83-20, medical evidence should "serve . . . as the
"[C]ourts have generally interpreted SSR 83-20 to require that an ALJ obtain the opinion of a medical expert
In Goldsby, the Court found that the ALJ did not need to consult a medical expert to determine a claimant's disability onset date because the medical evidence was sufficient:
Goldsby, 2013 WL 1176179 at * 5 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court found that sufficient medical evidence made the use of a medical expert unnecessary to determine the claimant's onset date. Id. The Court noted the ALJ's reliance on the medical evidence before and during the alleged period of disability. Id. The undersigned finds Goldsby persuasive.
As noted above, the ALJ provided a detailed analysis of the medical evidence during Claimant's alleged duration of disability before the Accident Date. R. 439-445. The ALJ noted a May 9, 2011 treatment note from Dr. Gerber finding that Claimant was able to sit, stand, and transfer without difficulty. R. 312, 440. The ALJ gave significant weight to a May 2011 medical source statement from Dr. Gerber, finding that Claimant reached maximum medical improvement and was capable of light duty work. R. 310, 440. The ALJ also gave significant weight to an October 2014 medical source statement from Dr. Grant, noting Claimant's full range of motion in the shoulders and ambulation without an assistive device. R. 442, 870-874. Thus, similar to Goldsby, the ALJ considered the medical evidence during Claimant's alleged period of disability, and found that Claimant was not disabled prior to the Accident Date. R. 435-R. 438-445.
The ALJ did not arbitrarily choose the Accident Date as Claimant's disability onset date. Nixon, 2012 WL 5507310 at * 4-7; Powell, 2013 WL 752961 at *5. The ALJ recognized Dr. Kavanagh's finding that Claimant was injured in a motor vehicle accident, and found Claimant's history of the motor vehicle accident to be a severe impairment. R. 435, 977. Furthermore, the ALJ considered the medical evidence post-Accident Date. R. 445-446. As noted above, the ALJ considered Dr. Kavanagh's findings that Claimant had a "noted loss of normal curvature of the cervical spine" and "bulging at C3-4 and C4-5" areas of the spine. R. 445, 977. The ALJ also considered a December 2015 treatment note indicating that Claimant's prognosis was guarded and uncertain. R. 445, 985. Based on such evidence, the ALJ found "that the record indicated that [Claimant] became more limited as a result of this additional impairment." R. 445. Thus, because the ALJ explicitly considered the medical evidence both before and after the Accident Date, the undersigned finds no error in ALJ's determination of Claimant's disability onset date. See Goldsby, 2013 WL 1176179 at * 5.
On April 19, 2011, Claimant made her first visit to Dr. Yanez. R. 402. Claimant would visit Dr. Yanez multiple times from April 2011 to May 2015. R. 367-405, 411-427. See also Doc. No. 21 at 6-13. The parties do not dispute that Dr. Yanez is a treating physician. Doc. No. 21 at 19-27. After each visit, Dr. Yanez recorded his impressions in a treatment note. R. 367-405, 411-427. While treating Claimant, Dr. Yanez completed four Physical Capacity Examinations (the "PCEs").
In his opinion, the ALJ addressed Dr. Yanez's treatment notes:
R. 441-442 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, the ALJ summarized Dr. Yanez's treatment notes and noted that they generally reflected a normal range of motion in Claimant's neck, spine, and extremities. Id. The ALJ then weighed the PCEs, noting that he is "unable to give these opinions more than some weight:"
R. 443 (emphasis added).
Claimant argues that the ALJ failed to apply the proper legal standards to the PCEs. Doc. No. 21 at 19-22. Specifically, Claimant argues that the ALJ's decision is not based on substantial evidence because the ALJ ignored certain portions of Dr. Yanez's treatment notes when finding that they contradicted the PCEs. Id. at 20-22. The Commissioner argues that the ALJ applied the proper legal standards to the PCEs because the ALJ found the PCEs conclusory and unsupported by Dr. Yanez's own treatment notes. Id. at 22-27.
Weighing the opinions and findings of treating, examining, and non-examining physicians is an integral part in determining whether a claimant is disabled. In Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178-79 (11th Cir. 2011), the Eleventh Circuit held that whenever a physician offers a statement reflecting judgments about the nature and severity of a claimant's impairments, including symptoms, diagnosis, and prognosis, what the claimant can still do despite his or her impairments, and the claimant's physical and mental restrictions, the statement is an opinion requiring the ALJ to state with particularity the weight given to it and the reasons therefor. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(a)(2), 416.927(a)(2); Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 278, 279 (11th Cir. 1987)).
Absent good cause, the opinion of a treating physician must be accorded substantial weight. Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 703 (11th Cir. 1988). However, there are a few situations in which good cause allows an ALJ to give a treating physician's opinion less than substantial weight. Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2011). Specifically:
Id. Thus, good cause exists to give a treating physician's opinion less than substantial weight when the opinion is not bolstered by the evidence, evidence supports a contrary finding, or the opinion is conclusory or inconsistent with the physician's medical records. Id.
The ALJ applied the proper legal standards to the PCEs. The ALJ explicitly addressed how the PCEs were contradicted by Dr. Yanez's own treatment notes. R. 443. Specifically, the ALJ found that the functional limitations in the PCEs are contradicted by Dr. Yanez's own treatment notes, which the ALJ found generally showed a normal range of motion in Claimant's neck, spine, and extremities. R. 441-442, 443. The ALJ also noted that the environmental restrictions found in the PCEs are contradicted by Claimant's denial of heat and cold intolerance. R. 443. Under Winschel, such reasons are good cause for giving the PCEs less than substantial weight. Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179. Accordingly, the undersigned finds no error in the ALJ's treatment of the PCEs.
Claimant states that the ALJ "cherry-picked" the evidence when finding that Dr. Yanez's treatment notes contradicted the PCEs. Doc. No. 21 at 20. Claimant provides a list of evidence reflecting favorably on her disability, arguing that such evidence was overlooked when the ALJ gave only some weight to the PCEs. Id. at 21-22. Nevertheless, the undersigned declines the invitation to reweigh the evidence. As stated above, when the ALJ applies the proper legal standards, this Court will affirm the decision, even if the Court would have reached a contrary result as finder of fact, and even if the Court finds that the evidence preponderates against the ALJ's decision. Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1991). Here, the undersigned finds that the ALJ applied the proper legal standards to the PCEs. See supra pgs. 9-12. Accordingly, the undersigned affirms the ALJ's decision.
For the reasons stated above, it is
1. The final decision of the Commissioner is
2. The Clerk is directed to award judgment to the Commissioner and to close the case.
