JEAN C. HAMILTON, District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, filed March 24, 2016. (ECF No. 21). The motion is fully briefed and ready for disposition.
At all times relevant to this action, Plaintiff Reginald Bush was a professional football player employed by the San Francisco 49ers. (First Amended Petition (hereinafter "Complaint" or "Compl."), ¶ 1). On November 1, 2015, Plaintiff played as a running back for the 49ers in a game against the St. Louis Rams that took place at the Edward Jones Dome in St. Louis, MO. (Id., ¶¶ 6, 10). According to Plaintiff, while trying to slow down out-of-bounds after a play had concluded in the first quarter, Plaintiff slipped on a concrete surface surrounding the turf playing field at the Dome. (Id., ¶¶ 7, 11-13). Plaintiff maintains the resultant injury to his left knee ended his football season. (Id., ¶ 13).
In or around January, 2016, Plaintiff filed a petition against the St. Louis Regional Convention and Sports Complex Authority and the St. Louis Convention & Visitors Commission in the Circuit Court for the City of St. Louis, Missouri. (ECF No. 1-4, PP. 1-6). In the instant Complaint, filed January 15, 2016, Plaintiff added the St. Louis Rams, LLC as a Defendant, asserting claims against them for premises liability (Count III) and negligence (Count IV). (ECF No. 7). Plaintiff seeks damages "in the form of lost wages, medical expenses, loss of future earnings, and pain and suffering," together with punitive damages for the Rams' "complete indifference to or conscious disregard" for his safety and that of others. (Id., ¶¶ 43, 44, 48, 49).
The Rams removed the suit to this Court on February 24, 2016. (ECF No. 1). As grounds for the removal, the Rams note that Plaintiff and the Rams are both bound by a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") governing the terms and conditions of employment of National Football League ("NFL") players. (Id., ¶ 4).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), "any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending." "`The presence of even one federal claim gives the defendant the right to remove the entire case to federal court.'" Green v. Arizona Cardinals Football Club LLC, 21 F.Supp.3d 1020, 1025 (E.D. Mo. 2014) (quoting Williams v. Ragnone, 147 F.3d 700, 703 (8
Section 301 of the LMRA applies to "`[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization,' 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), or, in other words, suits for breaches of CBAs." Williams v. National Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 873 (8th Cir. 2009). "Section 301 completely preempts state law claims that are `substantially dependent upon analysis' of a CBA, Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 220, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985), because `the application of state law . . . might lead to inconsistent results since there could be as many state law principles as there are States.'" Green, 21 F.Supp.3d at 1025 (quoting Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 406, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988); Williams, 582 F.3d at 874). "However, the [Supreme] Court has established that section 301 does not preempt state law claims merely because the parties involved are subject to a CBA and the events underlying the claim occurred on the job." Williams, 582 F.3d at 874 (citations omitted).
In applying the section 301 preemption doctrine, the Court begins with the "claim itself," Trustees of the Twin City Bricklayers Fringe Benefit Funds v. Superior Waterproofing, Inc., 450 F.3d 324, 331 (8th Cir. 2006), and applies a two-step approach in order to determine if the claim is sufficiently "independent" to survive complete preemption. Williams, 582 F.3d at 874.
Green, 21 F.Supp.3d at 1025-26 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
As noted above, the Court begins its section 301 preemption analysis with the claim itself, negligence.
Keeping in mind the two-step approach to preemption, the Court now must evaluate whether the CBA is the source of Plaintiff's claims, or whether the claims are substantially dependent upon an interpretation of the CBA. Green, 21 F.Supp.3d at 1027. The Rams argue that an analysis of the CBA and its incorporated documents is necessary to determine the scope of the above duty. Specifically, the Rams assert the following sections of the CBA require interpretation in order to resolve Plaintiff's claims:
(ECF No. 1-2, PP. 188-89, 193, 210, 230). The Rams further assert the following section of the NFL Player Contract requires interpretation in order to resolve Plaintiff's claims:
(Id., P. 277). The Rams maintain Plaintiff's claims against them, particularly for "lost wages, medical expenses, [and] loss of future earnings" require interpretation of these provisions, "both in determining the Rams' relative duty to monitor and warn [Plaintiff] about the `playing surface' and `stadium facility,' and its obligation, if any, to provide [Plaintiff] with medical care and compensation as a result of the injury he sustained while a member of the opposing team." (Rams' Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Remand, P. 7).
Upon consideration, the Court finds an interpretation of the above provisions is not essential to Plaintiff's case. For example, with respect to Article 39, Sections 1 and 3, the Court finds that neither the cost of medical services rendered by Club physicians (to be paid for by the Club, i.e., the 49ers), nor the provision of preventive, medical, surgical, or rehabilitative care for players by clubs is at issue in Plaintiff's suit. In other words, Plaintiff does not claim he failed to receive contractually mandated care; instead, he claims he was not warned of a dangerous condition existing at the stadium. The same holds true for any responsibilities imposed on the Accountability and Care Committee; in other words, the Court finds the Rams' duty to warn exists independently of the Committee's responsibility to develop a standardized preseason and postseason physical examination, and to develop an educational protocol to inform players of the primary risks associated with playing professional football.
With respect to Articles 41 and 44 of the CBA, and section 9 of the NFL Player Contract, the Court finds those provisions speak to the player's ability to perform under his contract, or otherwise to recover from, his own NFL team. Plaintiff is not a player with the Rams, and so the provisions do not apply.
The strongest argument put forth by the Rams involves Article 50, Section 1. As noted above, that provision requires the establishment of a Joint Committee for the purpose of discussing, among other things, the player safety and welfare aspects of playing equipment, playing surfaces, and stadium facilities. The Joint Committee does not have the power to commit or bind any of the signatories to the CBA, however, nor does the CBA establish a contractually agreed upon standard of care applicable to Plaintiff's claims. Upon consideration the Court agrees with Judge Perry's analysis of the provision set forth in Green, as follows:
Green, 21 F.Supp.3d at 1028. Thus, the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the duties at issue here arise out of the common law duty of care sports teams owe to their invitees, and not out of any particular terms in the CBA. Id. A substantial dependence upon an analysis of the CBA thus cannot serve as a basis for removal, and so Plaintiff's Motion to Remand must be granted.
Accordingly,