OPINION AND ORDER1

JAMES R. KLINDT, Magistrate Judge.

I. Status

Donna Brown ("Plaintiff") is appealing the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration's final decision denying her claim for disability insurance benefits ("DIB"). Plaintiff's alleged inability to work is a result of "depression"; "bipolar"; and "nerve problems in both legs." Transcript of Administrative Proceedings (Doc. No. 11; "Tr."), filed October 24, 2011, at 168. Plaintiff also alleges she suffers from pain in her back, arms, legs, and shoulders. Tr. at 213, 228. On June 24, 2008, Plaintiff filed an application for DIB, alleging an onset date of May 1, 2007. Tr. at 108-12. Plaintiff's application was denied initially, see Tr. at 55-57, and was denied upon reconsideration, see Tr. at 65-67.

On May 13, 2010, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") held a hearing at which Plaintiff and a vocational expert ("VE") testified. Tr. at 28-51. At the time of the hearing, Plaintiff was 49 years old. Tr. at 33. The ALJ issued a Decision on June 30, 2010, finding Plaintiff not disabled through the date of the Decision. Tr. at 10-22. On July 1, 2011 the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, Tr. at 1-3, thereby making the ALJ's Decision the final decision of the Commissioner. On August 11, 2011, Plaintiff commenced this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) by timely filing a Complaint (Doc. No. 1), seeking judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision.

Plaintiff raises one issue on appeal. See Memorandum in Support of Complaint (Doc. No. 16; "Pl.'s Mem."), filed November 2, 2011. Plaintiff argues that the VE's testimony is not supported by substantial evidence; therefore, according to Plaintiff, it was improper for the ALJ to rely on that testimony. Pl.'s Mem. at 4-7. After a thorough review of the entire record and consideration of the parties' respective memoranda, the Commissioner's final decision is due to be affirmed for the reasons explained herein.

II. The ALJ's Decision

When determining whether an individual is disabled,2 an ALJ must follow the five-step sequential inquiry set forth in the Code of Federal Regulations ("Regulations"), determining as appropriate whether the claimant (1) is currently employed or engaging in substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe impairment; (3) has an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one listed in the Regulations; (4) can perform past relevant work; and (5) retains the ability to perform any work in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920; see also Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1237 (11th Cir. 2004). The claimant bears the burden of persuasion through step four and, at step five, the burden shifts to the Commissioner. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987).

Here, the ALJ followed the five-step sequential inquiry. See Tr. at 12-21. At step one, the ALJ observed that Plaintiff "has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since May 1, 2007, the alleged onset date." Tr. at 12 (emphasis and citation omitted). At step two, the ALJ found Plaintiff suffers from "the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the cervical and lumbar spine, obesity, and affective mood disorder." Tr. at 12 (emphasis and citation omitted). At step three, the ALJ ascertained Plaintiff "does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1." Tr. at 13 (emphasis and citation omitted).

The ALJ determined Plaintiff's residual functional capacity ("RFC") as follows:

Tr. at 15 (emphasis omitted). At step four, the ALJ found Plaintiff "is unable to perform any past relevant work" as a school bus driver. Tr. at 20 (emphasis and citation omitted). At step five, after "considering [Plaintiff's] age, education, work experience, and [RFC]," the ALJ found "there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that [Plaintiff] can perform," Tr. at 20 (emphasis and citation omitted), including food checker (sedentary), office helper (light), and cashier II (light), Tr. at 21 (emphasis and citation omitted). The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff "has not been under a disability . . . from May 1, 2007, through the date of th[e D]ecision." Tr. at 21 (emphasis and citation omitted).

III. Standard of Review

This Court reviews the Commissioner's final decision as to disability pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). Although no deference is given to the ALJ's conclusions of law, findings of fact "are conclusive if . . . supported by `substantial evidence' . . . ." Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001) (citing Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320, 1322 (11th Cir. 1998)). "Substantial evidence is something `more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance.'" Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005) (quoting Hale v. Bowen, 831 F.2d 1007, 1011 (11th Cir. 1987)). The substantial evidence standard is met when there is "`such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Falge, 150 F.3d at 1322 (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). It is not for this Court to reweigh the evidence; rather, the entire record is reviewed to determine whether "the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence." Cornelius v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 1143, 1145 (11th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation and citations omitted); see also McRoberts v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1988); Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir. 1987). The decision reached by the Commissioner must be affirmed if it is supported by substantial evidence — even if the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's findings. Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158-59 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam).

IV. Discussion

As noted above, Plaintiff raises one issue on appeal. Plaintiff contends the VE's testimony is not supported by substantial evidence; therefore, according to Plaintiff, the ALJ erred in relying on that testimony. Pl.'s Mem. at 4-7. Plaintiff specifically takes issue with the jobs the VE identified that Plaintiff can perform, which are food checker (sedentary), office helper (light), and cashier II (light). See id. In addressing this issue, Plaintiff makes two separate arguments: (1) the light duty jobs, office helper and cashier II, exceed the standing and walking limitations imposed by the ALJ in the hypothetical; and (2) the VE erred when she cited a sedentary job, food checker, but discussed a light duty job, food and beverage checker—neither of which Plaintiff can perform because both jobs exceed the ALJ's limitations imposed in the hypothetical. See id.

As to the first argument, Plaintiff contends she cannot perform light duty jobs, because the Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT") defines light duty jobs as "requir[ing] the ability to stand and/or walk the majority of the day — about two-thirds of the day or slightly less than six hours per day," and the ALJ's hypothetical limited Plaintiff to stand and/or walk for two to four hours per day. Id. at 5. Regarding the second argument, Plaintiff points out the VE's error in citing to a sedentary job (food checker) yet discussing a light duty job (food and beverage checker). Id. at 6. Plaintiff argues that she cannot perform either of those jobs because (1) the food checker job (sedentary) requires a great deal of contact with the general public, which contradicts the ALJ's limitation that Plaintiff only have superficial contact with the public; and (2) the food and beverage checker job (light) requires the ability to stand and walk for more hours in a day than what the ALJ's hypothetical permits Plaintiff to do. Id. at 5-6.

The Commissioner counters by arguing that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision that Plaintiff could perform other work and that she is not disabled. Memorandum in Support of the Commissioner's Decision (Doc. No. 17; "Def.'s Mem."), filed February 23, 2012, at 4. The Commissioner points out that "[a] limitation on the ability to walk/stand does not preclude all work at the light exertional level." Def.'s Mem. at 6. The Commissioner argues that "[a]lthough classified as light work, both office helper and cashier II jobs have a significant number of jobs that can be done with a sit/stand option to accommodate the RFC." Id. at 7. The Commissioner also argues that the VE's citation of the incorrect DOT section for food and beverage checker is mere harmless error and furthermore, the VE identified a sufficient number of jobs within the other categories that supports the ALJ's Decision. Id. at 8. The Commissioner concludes that the ALJ properly relied on the VE's testimony, and "Plaintiff failed to prove that she could not perform the jobs cited." Id. at 7.

The pertinent portions of the exchange between the ALJ and the VE occurred as follows:

Tr. at 48-50 (emphasis added). After concluding his questioning of the VE, the ALJ asked the VE if her testimony was consistent with the DOT with the exception of the sit/stand option as explained. Tr. at 51. The VE answered affirmatively. Tr. at 51. Plaintiff's attorney at the hearing did not object to the VE testifying as an expert, Tr. at 46, and did not question the VE about any alleged inconsistencies, see Tr. at 51.

If an ALJ chooses to rely on a VE's testimony, the ALJ is required "to ask the VE whether there is a conflict [between the VE's testimony and the DOT,] and if the VE identifies a conflict the ALJ is required then — and only then — to address the conflict." Garskof v. Astrue, No. 5:07-cv-288-Oc-GRJ, 2008 WL 4405050, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 26, 2008) (unpublished); see SSR 00-4p, 2000 WL 1898704, at *2 (noting that "[w]hen there is an apparent unresolved conflict between VE . . . evidence and the DOT, the [ALJ] must elicit a reasonable explanation for the conflict before relying on the VE"). If no conflict is identified, "the ALJ does not violate SSR 00-4p by relying upon the opinion of the VE — so long as the ALJ asked the VE to identify any conflicts — and the ALJ is not required independently to identify whether there is any inconsistency." Garskof, 2008 WL 4405050, at *6. Even if a conflict is identified, a "VE's testimony `trumps' the DOT." Jones v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 423 F. App'x 936, 938 (11th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (citing Jones v. Apfel, 190 F.3d 1224, 1230 (11th Cir. 1999)); see also Hurtado v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 425 F. App'x 793, 795-96 (11th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (noting that a "VE is an expert on the kinds of jobs a person can perform, while the DOT simply provides generalized overviews of jobs and not the specific requirements of a job"); Jones v. Charter, 72 F.3d 81 (8th Cir. 1995) (noting that "[t]he DOT gives the approximate maximum requirement for each position, rather than the range").

Upon review of the testimony, the undersigned finds no error in the ALJ's reliance on the VE's testimony. The VE, an expert on the types of jobs a person can perform, identified three jobs Plaintiff can perform after considering the ALJ's hypothetical. Regarding the two light duty jobs, the VE specifically explained that the office helper job "allow[s] for sitting and standing opportunities because of the varied variety of tasks." Tr. at 50. The VE also reduced the number of positions available in the national economy on the cashier II job to account for Plaintiff's limitations, specifically recognizing that the reduced numbers "allow for alternating positions." Tr. at 50. Near the end of the VE's testimony, the ALJ asked the VE if her testimony was consistent with the DOT "with the exception of, as you explained, the sit/stand option?" Tr. at 51. The VE, recognizing the sit/stand option "is not addressed in the DOT," answered affirmatively. Tr. at 51. As the expert, the VE's testimony "trumps" the DOT. See Jones, 423 F. App'x at 938. Plaintiff has not provided any legal authority or other evidence to contradict the VE's testimony that Plaintiff can perform these jobs. Plaintiff's representative at the hearing, the same attorney representing her before this Court, did not object to the VE serving as an expert, Tr. at 46, and did not question the VE about any inconsistency, Tr. at 51. Consistent with the Regulations, the ALJ noted, in his Decision, pursuant to SSR 00-4p, that "the [VE's] testimony is consistent with the information contained in the [DOT]." Tr. at 21. The VE's testimony is supported by substantial evidence, and the ALJ committed no error in relying on that testimony.

Regarding the VE's alleged error in citation, the VE cited to a job listed as food checker and provided the corresponding DOT number 211.482-014. Tr. at 49. Plaintiff and the Commissioner recognize that the VE likely erred in citing to the food checker position, because it appears the VE actually described the position of food and beverage checker (DOT number 211.482-018), a light duty position. This error is harmless given that the VE cited to two other jobs with sufficient numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform, i.e. office helper (272,000 jobs nationally; 14,000 jobs in Florida) and cashier II (283,000 jobs nationally; 9,230 jobs in Florida). See generally Brooks v. Barnhart, 133 F. App'x 669, 671 (11th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (upholding ALJ's finding that 840 "jobs constituted a significant number in the national economy"); Allen v. Bowen, 816 F.2d 600, 602 (11th Cir. 1987) (finding 174 local jobs, 1600 jobs in the state, and 80,000 jobs nationally to be sufficient to constitute substantial evidence). Therefore, no error is found in the ALJ's Decision.

V. Conclusion

The ALJ's reliance on the VE's testimony was in accordance with proper legal standards, and the VE's testimony relating to jobs existing in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform is substantial evidence supporting the ALJ's Decision. The VE's error in citation is harmless given the remainder of the VE's testimony. After a thorough review of the record, the undersigned is convinced that the Commissioner's final decision is supported by substantial evidence. After due consideration, it is

ORDERED:

1. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) AFFIRMING the Commissioner's final decision.

2. The Clerk of Court is further directed to close the file.

DONE AND ORDERED.