MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

HERMAN N. JOHNSON, JR., Magistrate Judge.

On February 20, 2020, the court dismissed without prejudice Plaintiff David Hawthorne's breach of settlement agreement claim against the Defendant for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). (Doc. 47). In finding a lack of jurisdiction, the court concluded Hawthorne, a federal employee, failed to aver a viable cause of action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16, the provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, which governs discrimination in federal government employment. (Doc. 47 at 16-21). Rather, Hawthorne averred a breach of contract claim based upon his allegations the Defendant breached a settlement agreement, and the court sustains no subject matter jurisdiction over such a cause of action. (Id.)

On February 24, 2020, Hawthorne filed a Motion for the Court to Set Aside Its Final Judgment Order Pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1)1 On the Grounds of a Mistake. (Doc. 48). Hawthorne contends the court should relieve him of the final judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) because 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3 vests the court with jurisdiction over his cause of action. (Doc. 48).

Rule 60(b)(1) permits a court to "relieve a party . . . from a final judgment, order, or proceeding" as a result of "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1). Ostensibly, Hawthorne stakes the basis for Rule 60(b)(1) relief upon his purportedly erroneous reliance upon § 2000e-16 to evoke a cause of action warranting jurisdiction rather than § 2000e-3. Hawthorne errs in his assessment.

Section 2000e-3, which principally establishes retaliation claims for employees, does not provide a cause of action for federal government employees: "§ 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended [and codified at § 2000e-16], provides the exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment." Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 835 (1976); see also Grier v. Sec'y of Army, 799 F.2d 721, 724 n.2 (11th Cir. 1986) ("Section 717 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16, is the `exclusive pre-emptive administrative and judicial remedy for the redress of federal employment discrimination.'") (quoting Brown, 425 U.S. at 835) (citing Canino v. U.S. E.E.O.C., 707 F.2d 468, 472 (11th Cir. 1983)). Congress' provision of the exclusive, § 2000e-16 remedy constitutes a waiver of "sovereign immunity [benefitting] a federal employee [who] seeks relief for unlawful [discriminatory] employment practices. . . ." Thompson v. McHugh, 388 F. App'x 870, 872 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).2

Concomitantly, § 2000e-3 grants no such remedy for federal employees.3 Borgo v. Goldin, 204 F.3d 251, 255 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (§ 2000e-3 applies only to private employers); Cade v. Astrue, No. 2:11-cv-03498-PMD-BM, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128612, at *7 n.3 (D.S.C. Sept. 15, 2014) (Although a federal employee "cite[d] . . . § 2000e-3 as the basis for her Title VII claim, this section applies to retaliation against employees in the private sector."). By extrapolation, therefore, § 2000e-3 grants no waiver of sovereign immunity, and thus, no subject matter jurisdiction over Hawthorne's claim. Therefore, the court cannot afford Hawthorne Rule 60(b)(1) relief because his purported error still occasions no authority for the court's exercise of jurisdiction. See Pease v. Pakhoed Corp., 980 F.2d 995, 998 (5th Cir. 1993) ("It is well established that Rule 60(b) requires the movant to demonstrate that he possesses a meritorious cause of action"); Local 59 v. Superline Transp. Co., 953 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1992) (A meritorious claim or defense requirement "guards the gateway to Rule 60(b) relief. . . . [A] litigant, as a precondition to relief under Rule 60(b), must give the trial court reason to believe that vacating the judgment will not be an empty exercise."); Boyd v. Bulala, 905 F.2d 764, 769 (4th Cir. 1990) (A "threshold condition for granting [Rule 60(b)] relief is that the movant demonstrate that granting that relief will not ... have been a futile gesture, by showing that she has a meritorious defense or claim").

As a result, Hawthorne's claim remains a contract breach issue which does not manifest any basis for subject matter jurisdiction due to the federal government's sovereign immunity. See Thompson, 388 F. App'x at 873 ("Because [plaintiff's] contract rescission claim is not a claim falling with the scope of Title VII's waiver of sovereign immunity, Title VII does not provide a basis for exercising jurisdiction."); Munoz v. Mabus, 630 F.3d 856, 864 (9th Cir. 2010) ("Because [plaintiff's breach of settlement agreement claim is essentially a contract action against the federal government whose resolution requires no interpretation of Title VII itself, his claim cannot seek jurisdictional refuge in Title VII. . . ."); Frahm v. United States, 492 F.3d 258, 262 (4th Cir. 2007) ("Congress has, admittedly, waived sovereign immunity in Title VII suits where the federal government is the employer. However, this statutory waiver does not expressly extend to monetary claims against the government for breach of a settlement agreement that resolves a Title VII dispute."); Lindstrom v. United States, 510 F.3d 1191, 1194 (10th Cir. 2007) (Title VII permitted the plaintiff "only [to] sue on the underlying discrimination claim and not to enforce the settlement agreement.").

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing analysis, the court maintains its previous decision to dismiss this case without prejudice. The court therefore DENIES Hawthorne's Rule 60(b)(1) motion.

DONE and ORDERED.