GINA M. GROH, Chief District Jugde.
Currently pending before the Court are Plaintiff Patricia Markle's Motion in Limine to Limit the Opinions of Thomas M. Zizic, M.D. [ECF 42] and Motion in Limine to Strike the April 15, 2015 Expert Report of Daniel L. Selby [ECF 43]. For the following reasons, the Court
Patricia Markle brought this Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") action against the United States, raising a single claim of medical negligence. She alleges a Depo-Provera injection caused her Nicolau syndrome, avascular necrosis and other permanent injuries.
On April 24, 2015, Markle filed the instant motions in limine. Her motions seek to limit the opinions of Thomas M. Zizic, M.D., the United States' medical expert, and strike the April 15, 2015 expert report of Daniel L. Selby, the United States' damages expert, on the ground that the United States did not timely disclose this information. The scheduling order required that the United States make expert disclosures by December 12, 2014, that the parties complete discovery by February 20, 2015 and that the parties make Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(3) pretrial disclosures by April 24, 2015.
A party must disclose witnesses who will offer expert opinions at trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(A). A written report must accompany this disclosure for a witness who will testify solely as an expert. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B). This report must include, among other things, "a complete statement of all opinions the witness will express and the basis and reasons for them."
A party must supplement an expert disclosure when Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e) requires doing so. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(E). Rule 26(e) provides that a party must supplement or correct an expert disclosure upon learning that "in some material respect the disclosure . . . is incomplete or incorrect" and "the additional or corrective information has not otherwise been made known to the other parties during the discovery process or in writing." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1). The duty to supplement covers information in written expert reports. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(2). A party must disclose "[a]ny additions or changes to this information" by the Rule 26(a)(3) pretrial disclosures deadline.
Sanctions apply if a party does not meet its expert disclosure obligations. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(c)(1), a party that does not "provide information or identify a witness as required by Rule 26(a) or (e)," cannot "use that information or witness to supply evidence . . . at a trial." A party escapes this sanction by "showing that the failure to disclose is substantially justified or harmless."
District courts have "broad discretion to determine whether a nondisclosure of evidence is substantia lly justified or harmless."
Markle's first motion in limine concerns the opinions of Dr. Zizic. The United States timely disclosed Dr. Zizic as an expert and his expert report. The disclosure pertinently states: "Dr. Zizic will testify to a reasonable degree of medical certainty within the practice of rheumatology that there is no association between the Nicolau syndrome and any avascular necrosis of bone which Ms. Markle may have developed." The report states:
Markle argues that Dr. Zizic cannot offer the following opinions concerning the standard of care, breach of the standard of care and causation of Markle's Nicolau syndrome because the United States did not disclose them:
The United States does not dispute that the report does not specifically state these opinions. Instead, the United States argues that the Court should allow Dr. Zizic to testify to these issues because the nondisclosure is substantially justified or harmless. Thus, Rule 37(c)(1) bars Dr. Zizic from offering such opinions unless the Court finds that the nondisclosure is substantially justified or harmless in light of the
First, the report only indicates that Dr. Zizic will opine on what caused her avascular necrosis, not that he will address the standard of care, breach and causation as to her Nicolau syndrome. Thus, if Dr. Zizic addressed undisclosed opinions at trial, they would be a surprise to Markle. Second, it would be too late to cure the surprise. Third, admitting this evidence would significantly disrupt the trial. Trial is imminent, and Markle has no way of knowing the substance of these opinions to prepare for trial. Allowing this evidence therefore would require delaying trial to allow time for the United States to provide the opinions and Markle to investigate them. Fourth, these opinions are important because they concern essential elements of Markle's claims. Finally, the reason for the nondisclosure weighs heavily against admitting this evidence because the United States has not explained why it did not disclose the opinions earlier.
Because all of the
Markle's second motion in limine seeks to strike Selby's April 15, 2015 expert report.
On December 10, 2014, the United States produced Selby's original expert report. That report states that Selby assumed several factors in calculating Markle's future damages, including that she is disabled based on her deposition testimony. Then, the report estimates Markle's loss based on three scenarios:
On April 15, 2015, the United States produced an amended expert report prepared by Selby. This report added the following paragraph to Selby's assumptions:
The report then provides new estimates of Markle's future damages. These estimates reduced the present value of 16.90 hours per week for fifty weeks per year at a rate of $9.10 from $195,166 to $119,610, reduced the net present value of 16.90 hours per week for fifty weeks per year at $13.00 per hour from $278,055 to $170,409, and eliminated the third scenario.
Markle argues that the April 15, 2015 report should be excluded because it is a late disclosure and its untimeliness was not substantially justified or harmless.
In response, the United States explains the circumstances surrounding these reports. In May 2014, the United States asked Markle to sign a form consenting to the Social Security Administration ("SSA") releasing her disability records. Markle did not return the form until September 9, 2014, after which the United States requested the records from the SSA. Before receiving the records, the United States deposed Markle on October 7, 2014. Thereafter, the United States received Markle's records and disclosed them to her counsel on November 18, 2014. On December 12, 2014, the expert disclosures deadline, the United States filed its expert disclosures, including Selby's original expert report. However, the United States did not give Selby the records before then because it needed to tag and code them. In January 2015, the United States gave Selby the records. Then, on April 15, 2015, the United States disclosed Selby's revised expert report.
Based on the foregoing, the United States argues that the April 15 report is a timely supplementation. The United States alternatively asserts that, if the report is not a supplementation, the
First, the Court must decide whether the April 15 report is a supplementation because, if it is, the United States timely filed it before the pretrial disclosures deadline.
"Rule 26(e) envisions supplementation when a party's discovery disclosures happen to be defective in some way so that the disclosure was incorrect or incomplete and, therefore, misleading."
When Selby compiled his original report, he knew that Markle was disabled based on her deposition testimony. He did not, however, know the extent of her disability until he reviewed her SSA records. Selby received those records after submitting his original report because the United States needed adequate time to prepare them for him. The April 15 report did not result from inadequate or incomplete preparation by Selby. Rather, Selby prepared his original report based on the information he had about Markle's disability and corrected his opinions after receiving her SSA records. Accordingly, the April 15 report is a timely supplementation.
Even if the report was not a supplementation, Rule 37(c)(1) would not exclude it because the
First, the report is no surprise to Markle because Markle knew her disability impacted Selby's original opinions and that the United States was obtaining records that further illuminated the nature of her disability. Second, if there had been a surprise, Markle could have conducted discovery regarding the report with leave of court. Third, there is sufficient time before trial for the Court to reopen discovery for the limited purpose of deposing Selby. Fourth, the report is important because it concerns the disputed issue of damages. Finally, the reason for the late disclosure favors admitting the report. The United States asked Markle to allow the SSA to release her records well before the expert disclosures deadline, but could not request the records until just three months before the deadline when Markle returned the consent form. With Markle's consent, the United States promptly obtained the records and prepared them for Selby's review. Thus, the report was understandably supplemented later as the United States needed time to obtain and prepare the records and Selby needed time to revise his report based on them.
Accordingly, having found that the report is a supplementation and, regardless, that the Southern States factors favor admitting it, the Court denies this motion in limine.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court
The Clerk is directed to transmit copies of this Order to counsel of record herein.