COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY, District Judge.
Plaintiffs Janice Ruffin and Rev. Keith Young (collectively, "Plaintiffs") filed this action against Defendants New Destination, LLC and India Lyles (collectively, "Defendants") seeking to recover wages they claim they are owed for hours worked as employees of Defendant New Destination, LLC. Plaintiffs have asserted a claim for breach of contract and causes of action under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 ("FLSA"), and the D.C.
Presently pending before the Court is Plaintiffs' [35] Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiffs contend that they are entitled to judgment against Defendants on their FLSA and DCWPCL claims because the undisputed facts clearly show that they were not paid wages owed to them. For the reasons explained below, the Court agrees that Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment on their FLSA and DCWPCL claims. Accordingly, the Court shall GRANT Plaintiffs' renewed motion for summary judgment. Furthermore, because Defendants failed to file an opposition to Plaintiffs' renewed motion for summary judgment, the Court may alternatively grant the motion as conceded.
The following facts are drawn primarily from Plaintiffs' Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ("Pls.' Stmt."), which was filed with Plaintiffs' initial motion for summary judgment.
Plaintiff Janice Ruffin ("Ruffin") is a social worker with a license in counseling issued by the District of Columbia. Pls.' Stmt. ¶ 1. Since earning a masters degree in social work, Ruffin has worked with adults and juveniles in Washington, D.C., many of whom have a history of substance abuse. Id. Rev. Keith Young ("Young") is an "Elder" in the Apostolic Christian Church and is currently the Pastor of Sovereign Ministries of the Apostolic Faith in Washington, D.C. Id. ¶ 2. Young earned a Ph.D. in pastoral counseling in 2000 and provides pastoral counseling to his members and works as a spiritual counselor. Id.
Defendant New Destination, LLC ("New Destination") is a professional corporation that provided individual and group counseling for addiction recovery. Pls.' Stmt. ¶ 3. Defendant India Lyles
Both Young and Ruffin submitted "Application[s] for Employment" with Defendants in 2008. Pls.' 2d Stmt. ¶ 1. The application form asked for "employment desired" and stated at the top, "Pre-Employment Questionnaire Equal Opportunity Employer." Id. On February 18, 2008, Ruffin signed a contract with New Destination to work as a counselor. Pls.' Stmt. ¶ 3. New Destination agreed to pay Ruffin $50 per hour for individual counseling and $65 per hour for group counseling. Id. ¶ 6. Young signed a contract to work for New Destination as a "Faith Based Minister" on April 10, 2008. Id. ¶¶ 5-6. New Destination agreed to pay Young $17 per hour. Id. ¶ 6. Soon after being hired, Ruffin and Young recruited clients for New Destination from missions, jails, and throughout the District of Columbia. Id. ¶ 11. The "Professional Services Agreement" that each plaintiff signed states that New Destination, as the "Client," can terminate the Agreement "for cause of non-performance." Pls.' 2d Stmt. ¶ 2. Under "Service Delivery," the Agreement states that "[t]he extent of your authority of the execution of the program will be determined by the Clinical Director." Id. ¶ 3. Under "Compensation and Operating Hours," the Agreement states that "[y]ou will be expected to work up to thirty (40) [sic] hours per week at the rate of $ per hour [sic]. . . . Any changes in your scheduled working hours shall be approved by the Clinical Director." Id. Lyles signed the Professional Services Agreement for both Ruffin and Young in her capacity as the Executive Director of New Destination. Id. ¶ 7.
Ruffin counseled her first client at New Destination on May 21, 2008. Pl.'s Stmt. ¶ 12. Ruffin provided both group counseling and individual counseling for addiction recovery and prevention for her clients at New Destination. Id. ¶ 14. Ruffin submitted time sheets known as "NDBHS Tickets" to Lyles listing the date and hours worked and the names of the clients she counseled. See id.; Pl.'s Ex. 6 (NDBHS Tickets). Ruffin worked hundreds of hours for New Destination between May and October 2008 and claims that she is owed $15,675.25 in back pay. See Pl.'s Ex. 4 (Decl. of Janice Ruffin) ¶ 9. Ruffin's only payment from New Destination came in the form of a $1000 check issued on October 9, 2008. Id. ¶ 10. Ruffin claims that Lyles was responsible for providing information about her counseling sessions to the D.C. Department of Health. Id. ¶ 13. Defendants do not dispute that Lyles told New Destination employees that she was "solely responsible for billing." Pl.'s Stmt. ¶ 11. Lyles admitted that only she was responsible for sending documents to the D.C. Department of Health for reimbursement. Pls.' 2d Stmt. ¶ 8.
Plaintiffs have moved for summary judgment on all of their claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. "The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a).
Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). "If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(e). When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence; the evidence must be analyzed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, with all justifiable inferences drawn in his favor. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "If material facts are at issue, or, though undisputed, are susceptible to divergent inferences, summary judgment is not available." Moore v. Hartman, 571 F.3d 62, 66 (D.C.Cir.2009) (citation omitted).
The mere existence of a factual dispute, by itself, is insufficient to bar summary judgment. See Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Id. For a dispute about a material fact to be "genuine," there must be sufficient admissible evidence that a reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party. Id. The Court must determine "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not sufficiently probative, summary judgment may be granted." Id. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (internal citations omitted). The adverse party must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). Conclusory assertions offered without any factual basis in the record cannot create a genuine dispute. See Ass'n of Flight Attendants-CWA v.
As the Court noted in its prior Memorandum Opinion, Plaintiffs' claims in this case are very simple—they are seeking payment for counseling services they performed for New Destination. The Court has already ruled that based on the undisputed facts on the record, Ruffin and Young were not paid for counseling services they performed for New Destination worth $15,675.25 and $11,500, respectively. The Court has entered judgment against New Destination on Plaintiffs' breach of contract claim for these amounts. The question remaining before the Court is whether Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment against New Destination and Lyles on their claims under the DCWPCL and the FLSA by virtue of Defendants' failure to pay them wages under their employment contract. The Court shall therefore analyze the elements of each of these claims.
Plaintiffs' first cause of action is for violation of the D.C. Wage Payment and Collection Law, D.C.Code §§ 32-1301 et seq. The DCWPCL provides, inter alia, that "[e]very employer shall pay all wages earned to his employees at least twice during each calendar month, on regular paydays designated in advance by the employer. . . ." D.C.Code § 32-1302. The law defines an employee as "any person suffered or permitted to work by an employer except any person employed in a bona fide executive, administrative, or professional capacity (as such terms are defined and delimited by regulations promulgated by the Council of the District of Columbia)." Id. § 32-1301(2). The Court noted in its prior opinion that it was unclear whether Plaintiffs, who are both highly educated professionals, were employed in a bona fide professional capacity, an exempt category under the D.C. Wage Payment and Collection Law.
The D.C. Municipal Regulations provide a five-prong test for determining whether a person is employed in a bona fide professional capacity. See D.C. Mun. Reg. tit. 7, § 999.1. The employee must satisfy all five elements of the test to be determined employed in a bona fide professional capacity. Id. The last element of the test is that the employee is "[p]aid on a salary or fee basis at a rate of not less than $170 a week." Id. Plaintiffs argue that because their contracts contemplated payment on an hourly basis depending on the work performed, they were not paid on a "salary or fee basis" and therefore were not employed in a bona fide professional capacity. Accordingly, they argue they are not subject to the exemption under the DCWPCL.
The D.C. Municipal Regulations do not define the terms "salary or fee basis"; however, the regulations state that "[i]nterpretations of the term `professional capacity' shall be made in accordance with Title 29 Code of Federal Regulations, Part 541, Defining the Terms `Executive,' `Administrative,' `Professional' and `Outside Salesman.'" Id. Federal regulations do define the terms "salary basis" and "fee basis." See 29 C.F.R. § 541.602 ("Salary basis"); id. § 541.605 ("Fee basis"). Under those definitions, a "salary basis" employee is one who regularly receives a predetermined amount which is not subject to reduction because of variations in the quantity of work performed. See id. § 541.602(a). A "fee basis" employee is one who is paid an agreed sum for a single job regardless of the time required for its completion; a "fee" is paid for the kind of job that is unique rather than for a series of jobs repeated an indefinite number of
Like the DCWPCL, the FLSA provides a cause of action for employees to sue their employers for unpaid minimum wages or overtime compensation. See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b). The FLSA broadly defines "employee" as "any individual employed by an employer." 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1). The FLSA also contains an exemption for employees employed in a bona fide professional capacity. See 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1). However, the Court need not determine whether Plaintiffs fall under this exemption because the case law is clear that FLSA exemptions are "affirmative defense[s] on which the employer has the burden of proof." McKinney v. United Stor-All Centers LLC, 656 F.Supp.2d 114, 120 (D.D.C.2009) (citing Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 196-97, 94 S.Ct. 2223, 41 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974)). Defendants did not raise this affirmative defense in their answer, and therefore it is waived. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(c) ("In responding to a pleading, a party must affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense. . . ."). However, the Court must determine whether Plaintiffs were employees of New Destination as opposed to independent contractors, who are not covered by the statute.
To determine whether an individual is an employee covered by the statute as opposed to an independent contractor, courts must consider a series of factors involving the plaintiff's relationship to the employer. See Morrison v. Int'l Programs Consortium, Inc., 253 F.3d 5, 10-11 (D.C.Cir.2001). These factors include whether the employer (1) had the power to hire and fire employees, (2) supervised and controlled employee work schedules or conditions of employment, (3) determined the rate and method of payment, and (4) maintained employment records. Id. No single factor is dispositive; courts are directed to look at the totality of the circumstances and consider any relevant evidence. Id. The Court is persuaded that Plaintiffs qualified as employees under this "economic reality" test. The undisputed facts show that Defendants had the power to hire and fire Plaintiffs; the employment contracts signed by Plaintiffs and Defendants dictated that Plaintiffs' authority would be subject to supervision by the Clinical Director; the rate and method of payment were fixed by the employment contract; and Defendants maintained employment records in the form of time sheets that were filled out by Plaintiffs. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are employees subject to the requirements of the FLSA. Alternatively, because Defendants failed to file an opposition to Plaintiffs' renewed motion for summary judgment, the Court finds that Defendants have conceded that Plaintiffs are employees covered by the FLSA.
Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to judgment not only against New Destination but also against Lyles because she exercised "operational control" over
Having concluded that Defendants are liable for unpaid wages under both the DCWPCL and the FLSA, the Court must now turn to the question of damages. Both the D.C. statute and the FLSA provide for an award of liquidated damages. See D.C.Code § 32-1303(4) ("If an employer fails to pay an employee wages earned as required . . ., such employer shall pay, or be additionally liable to, the employee, as liquidated damages, 10 per centum of the unpaid wages for each working day during which such failure shall continue after the day upon which payment is hereunder required, or an amount equal to the unpaid wages, whichever is smaller. . . ."); 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) ("An employer who violates the [FLSA] . . . shall be liable for such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate . . ., including without limitation employment, reinstatement, promotion, and the payment of wages lost and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.") (emphasis added). An employer may avoid an award of liquidated damages under the FLSA if he can show that he had a reasonable belief that his acts or omissions did not violate the law. See 29 U.S.C. § 260. However, Defendants have made no such showing to the Court. Accordingly, the Court finds that it is proper to award liquidated damages. The amount of liquidated damages in this case is the same under the DCWPCL and the FLSA, i.e., the amount of unpaid wages. Accordingly, the Court shall enter judgment against Defendants on the DCWPCL and FLSA claims in the amounts of $31,350.50 for Ruffin and $23,000 for Young.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that New Destination is liable as an employer under the D.C. Wage Payment and Collection Law and under the Fair Labor Standards Act for failing to pay wages to Plaintiffs and that Lyles may also be held liable under the FLSA. Accordingly, the Court shall GRANT Plaintiffs' [35] Renewed Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court shall enter judgment against Defendants for the amount of the actual unpaid wages and an additional equal amount as liquidated damages, totaling $31,350.50 for Plaintiff Ruffin and $23,000 for Plaintiff Young. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
