Filed: Oct. 26, 2010
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: 09-2845-ag Trisna v. Holder BIA Chew, IJ A099 686 959 A099 686 960 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABAS
Summary: 09-2845-ag Trisna v. Holder BIA Chew, IJ A099 686 959 A099 686 960 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE..
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09-2845-ag
Trisna v. Holder
BIA
Chew, IJ
A099 686 959
A099 686 960
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
New York, on the 26th day of October, two thousand ten.
PRESENT:
ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
PETER W. HALL,
GERARD E. LYNCH,
Circuit Judges.
_______________________________________
WITA TRISNA, ROBY SETIAWAN,
Petitioners,
v. 09-2845-ag
NAC
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., U.S.
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Respondent.
______________________________________
FOR PETITIONERS: H. Raymond Fasano, Madeo & Fasano,
New York, N.Y.
FOR RESPONDENT: Tony West, Assistant Attorney
General; Susan K. Houser, Senior
Litigation Counsel; Dawn S. Conrad,
Trial Attorney, Office of
Immigration Litigation, Civil
Division, United States Department
of Justice, Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Petitioners Wita Trisna and Roby Setiawan, natives and
citizens of Indonesia, seek review of a June 5, 2009 order
of the BIA affirming the August 27, 2007 decision of
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) George T. Chew denying their
application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Wita
Trisna, Roby Setiawan, Nos. A099 686 959/960 (B.I.A. June 5,
2009), aff’g Nos. A099 686 959/960 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City
Aug. 27, 2007). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the
underlying facts and procedural history in this case.
Under the circumstances of this case, we review the
IJ’s decision as supplemented by the BIA’s decision. See
Yan Chen v. Gonzales,
417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). The
Court reviews the agency’s factual findings under the
substantial evidence standard, treating them as “conclusive
unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to
conclude to the contrary.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B);
Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey,
546 F.3d 138, 157-58 (2d Cir.
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2008). The Court “review[s] de novo questions of law and
the application of law to undisputed fact.” Salimatou Bah
v. Mukasey,
529 F.3d 99, 110 (2d Cir. 2008).
Reasonably relying on country reports of record
indicating the Indonesian government’s support of racial,
ethnic, and religious tolerance, the agency found that
petitioners did not establish a pattern or practice of
persecution of ethnic Chinese, Buddhist, or non-Muslim
persons in Indonesia. Specifically, the BIA noted that:
(1) the Indonesian government has repealed its ban on the
practice of Chinese religion, beliefs, and customs; (2) the
Chinese New Year is publicly celebrated in Indonesian
cities; (3) the Chinese language is taught and spoken in
Indonesia; and (4) Buddhism is an officially recognized
religion of Indonesia.
Petitioners do not challenge these findings, and
instead argue that the agency failed to address their
evidence concerning the rise of radical Islam in Indonesia.
However, “we presume that [the agency] has taken into
account all of the evidence before [it], unless the record
compellingly suggests otherwise.” Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S.
Dep’t of Justice,
471 F.3d 315, 337 n.17 (2d Cir. 2006).
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Far from demonstrating that the agency ignored any material
evidence, the record indicates that the agency explicitly
addressed the country conditions evidence upon which
petitioners rely for their assertion that conditions for
Chinese Buddhists have deteriorated in Indonesia. In fact,
most of the evidence of violence in Indonesia concerns
violence against Christians or Muslims, not against persons
of Chinese ethnicity or Buddhist faith. Thus, the agency
reasonably determined that the petitioners failed to
establish a well-founded fear of future persecution or a
pattern or practice of persecution against Chinese
Buddhists, as needed to demonstrate their eligibility for
asylum, see Santoso v. Holder,
580 F.3d 110, 112 (2d Cir.
2009), or to meet the higher standard required for
withholding of removal, see INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S.
421, 430-31 (1987).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion
for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
4