Filed: Dec. 06, 2010
Latest Update: Feb. 21, 2020
Summary: 09-3370-ag Caceres v. Holder BIA Romig, IJ A094 496 157 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE
Summary: 09-3370-ag Caceres v. Holder BIA Romig, IJ A094 496 157 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE ..
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09-3370-ag
Caceres v. Holder
BIA
Romig, IJ
A094 496 157
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
4 New York, on the 6 th day of December, two thousand ten.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 JOSÉ A. CABRANES,
8 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
9 GERARD E. LYNCH,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 __________________________________________
12
13 CHRYSTIAN ERICK RAFAEL CACERES, ALSO
14 KNOWN AS CHRYSTIAN ERICK CACERES-MASTERS,
15 Petitioner,
16
17 v. 09-3370-ag
18 NAC
19 ERIC H. HOLDER, JR.,
20 UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL; UNITED
21 STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; BOARD OF
22 IMMIGRATION APPEALS
23 Respondents.
24 __________________________________________
25
26 FOR PETITIONER: Tanya T. Dorman, Hartford,
27 Connecticut
28
29 FOR RESPONDENTS: Tony West, Assistant Attorney
30 General; Emily Anne Radford,
31 Assistant Director; Christopher P.
1 McGreal, Trial Attorney, Office of
2 Immigration Litigation, United
3 States Department of Justice,
4 Washington, D.C.
5
6 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
7 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
8 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that the petition for review
9 is DENIED.
10 Chrystian Erick Rafael Caceres, a native and citizen of
11 Guatemala seeks review of a July 8, 2009, order of the BIA
12 affirming the December 4, 2007, decision of Immigration
13 Judge (“IJ”) Jeffrey L. Romig, denying his application for
14 asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
15 Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Chrystian Erick
16 Rafael Caceres No. A094 496 157 (BIA July 8, 2009), aff’g
17 No. A094 496 157 (Immig. Ct. Hartford Dec. 4, 2007). We
18 assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts
19 and procedural history in this case.
20 Under the circumstances of this case, we review the
21 IJ’s decision as the final agency determination. See Shunfu
22 Li v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 141, 146 (2d Cir. 2008). The
23 applicable standards of review are well-established.
24 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng v. Holder, 562
25 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).
2
1 The IJ reasonably found that Caceres had not raised a
2 basis for a political opinion asylum claim because he did
3 not indicate that he was making such a claim in his asylum
4 application and he testified that he was not involved in
5 politics or any political organizations in Guatemala. See
6 Castro v. Holder, 597 F.3d 93, 100 (2d Cir. 2010). Caceres
7 also failed to present any evidence indicating that his
8 alleged persecutors had imputed any political opinion to him
9 or his father. See
id.
10 The IJ also reasonably determined that Caceres’s
11 claimed social groups, individuals in his family or
12 individuals who are employed by or are related to
13 individuals employed by financial institutions, were not
14 cognizable under the Immigration and Nationality Act.
15 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(1)(B)(i),
16 1231(b)(3)(A) . The BIA has long interpreted the term
17 “social group” to mean “a group of persons all of whom share
18 a common, immutable characteristic.” Matter of Acosta, 19
19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985). An “immutable
20 characteristic” is one that members of the group “either
21 cannot change, or should not be required to change because
22 it is fundamental to their individual identities or
23 consciences.”
Id. Moreover, a cognizable social group must:
3
1 (1) exhibit a shared characteristic that is socially visible
2 to others in the community; and (2) be defined with
3 sufficient particularity. See Matter of A-M-E & J-G-U-, 24
4 I. & N. Dec. 69, 74-76 (BIA 2007), aff’d by Ucelo-Gomez v.
5 Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007) . We have noted that
6 “an asylum applicant’s status as a member of a particular
7 social group-and not some other factor-must be the central
8 reason why that individual is targeted for persecution.”
9 Koudriachova v. Gonzales,
490 F.3d 255, 261-62 (2d Cir.
10 2007) .
11 The agency did not err in concluding that Caceres’s
12 claimed group lacked the requisite social visibility and
13 that he failed to establish that his membership in such
14 group was a central reason that he was targeted. See
id.
15 (stating that “a former police officer singled out for
16 reprisal because of her role in disrupting particular
17 criminal activity would likely not be eligible for asylum”
18 because “the persecution the applicant fears is not a result
19 simply of her status as a former police officer, but rather
20 is a result occasioned by other factors more specific to the
21 particular applicant”). In fact, Caceres claimed to have
22 been targeted on account of his father’s personal actions as
23 a bank official attempting to collect a debt rather than on
4
1 account of his status as a member of his family or a group
2 of “individuals related to employees in the financial
3 industry.” Thus, the agency reasonably determined that he
4 failed to demonstrate that he was targeted or would be
5 targeted on account of his membership in a particular social
6 group, and did not err in denying his applications for
7 asylum and withholding of removal. See Koudriachova, 490
8 F.3d at 261-62 ; 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(42), 1158(b)(1)(B)(i),
9 1231(b)(3)(A).
10 Caceres does not challenge in his brief the agency’s
11 denial of his application for CAT relief.
12 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
13 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of
14 removal that the Court previously granted in this petition
15 is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
16 this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for
17 oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with
18 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second
19 Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
20 FOR THE COURT:
21 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
22
5
