ORDER AFFIRMING COMMISSIONER

ROBERT E. BLACKBURN, District Judge.

The matter before me is plaintiff's Complaint [#1],1 filed March 20, 2017, seeking review of the Commissioner's decision denying plaintiff's claims for child's disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 401, et seq. I have jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's final decision under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The matter has been fully briefed, obviating the need for oral argument. I affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff alleges that he is disabled as a result of congenital lumbar spinal stenosis, lumbar herniated disc, and obesity. After his applications for child's disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits were denied, plaintiff requested a hearing before an administrative law judge. This hearing was held on August 20, 2015. At the time of the hearing, plaintiff was 24 years old. He has some level of high school education and no past relevant work experience. He has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 22, 2010, his alleged date of onset.

The ALJ found plaintiff was not disabled and therefore not entitled to child's disability insurance benefits or supplemental security income benefits. Although the medical evidence established plaintiff suffered from severe impairments, the judge found the severity of those impairments did not meet or equal any impairment listed in the social security regulations. The ALJ determined plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform a range of sedentary, unskilled work with certain postural restrictions, including particularly the ability to sit and stand at will. Because plaintiff had no past relevant work, the ALJ found there were other jobs existing in substantial numbers in the national and local economies he could perform. He therefore found plaintiff not disabled at step five of the sequential evaluation.2 Plaintiff appealed this decision to the Appeals Council. The Council affirmed. Plaintiff then filed this action in federal court.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A person is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act only if his physical and/or mental impairments preclude him from performing both his previous work and any other "substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2). "When a claimant has one or more severe impairments the Social Security [Act] requires the [Commissioner] to consider the combined effects of the impairments in making a disability determination." Campbell v. Bowen, 822 F.2d 1518, 1521 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C)). However, the mere existence of a severe impairment or combination of impairments does not require a finding that an individual is disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. To be disabling, the claimant's condition must be so functionally limiting as to preclude any substantial gainful activity for at least twelve consecutive months. See Kelley v. Chater, 62 F.3d 335, 338 (10th Cir. 1995).

The Commissioner has established a quinquepartite sequential evaluation process for determining whether a claimant is disabled:

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(I)-(v).3 See also Williams v. Bowen 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988). The claimant has the initial burden of establishing a disability in the first four steps of this analysis. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5, 107 S.Ct. 2287, 2294 n.5, 96 L.Ed.2d 119 (1987). The burden then shifts to the Commissioner to show the claimant is capable of performing work in the national economy. Id. A finding that the claimant is disabled or not disabled at any point in the five-step review is conclusive and terminates the analysis. Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 933 F.2d 799, 801 (10th Cir. 1991).

Review of the Commissioner's disability decision is limited to determining whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standard and whether the decision is supported by substantial evidence. Hamilton v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 961 F.2d 1495, 1497-98 (10th Cir. 1992); Brown v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 1194, 1196 (10th Cir. 1990). Substantial evidence is evidence a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Brown, 912 F.2d at 1196. It requires more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance of the evidence. Hedstrom v. Sullivan, 783 F.Supp. 553, 556 (D. Colo. 1992). "Evidence is not substantial if it is overwhelmed by other evidence in the record or constitutes mere conclusion." Musgrave v. Sullivan, 966 F.2d 1371, 1374 (10th Cir. 1992). Further, "if the ALJ failed to apply the correct legal test, there is a ground for reversal apart from a lack of substantial evidence." Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1487 (10th Cir. 1993). Although a reviewing court should meticulously examine the record, it may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its discretion for that of the Commissioner. Id.

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

Plaintiff alleges error at steps three, four, and five of the sequential evaluation, as well as in the Appeals Council's refusal to consider two medical source opinions submitted following the ALJ's decision. Finding no error in any such particular, I affirm.

Plaintiff first argues the evidence was sufficient to demonstrate at step three of the sequential evaluation that he was presumptively disabled under Listing 1.04C.4 Spinal disorders are presumptively disabling when the following criteria, inter alia, are met:

20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 1.04C.5 To be presumptively disabling, an impairment must manifest all the required criteria. "An impairment that manifests only some of those criteria, no matter how severely, does not qualify." Sullivan v. Zebley, 493 U.S. 521, 531, 110 S.Ct. 885, 891, 107 L.Ed.2d 967 (1990) (footnote omitted).

As the Commissioner points out, whatever else it may show,6 the medical evidence here does not demonstrate plaintiff suffered from weakness as a result of his spinal impairment. (See Tr. 189, 195, 201, 213, 219, 223.)7 Regardless whether the absence of evidence of such weakness is common in cases of lumbar spinal stenosis vel non (see Plf. Br App., Exh. 2), such evidence is still required to satisfy Listing 1.04C.8 The ALJ thus did not err at step three of the sequential evaluation.

Nor did the ALJ err at step four of the sequential evaluation by failing to consider all plaintiff's alleged impairments. Specifically, plaintiff claims the ALJ failed to consider the impact of obesity on his residual functional capacity. That assertion is contradicted by the record, which shows the ALJ found obesity to constitute a severe impairment (Tr. 15) and expressly considered its impact on plaintiff's other impairments as required by Social Security Rule 02-1p, 2002 WL 628049 (SSA Sept. 12, 2002). (Tr. 21.)9 Because nothing in the ALJ's opinion gives me reason to doubt his assertion that he did account for the effects of obesity in assessing plaintiff's residual functional capacity, there is no reversible error in this regard.10 See Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1173 (10th Cir. 2005) ("[O]ur general practice . . . is to take a lower tribunal at its word when it declares that it has considered a matter."); Lyda v. Colvin, 221 F.Supp.3d 1254, 1258 n.3 (D. Colo. 2016) ("[N]othing in the ALJ's opinion overall gives the court reason to doubt his assertion that he in fact did consider all such impairments in reaching his determination.").11

Although plaintiff also faults the ALJ for discrediting his reports of pain and functional limitation, I perceive no error in this regard either. "[C]redibility determinations `are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact,' and should not be upset if supported by substantial evidence." White v. Barnhart, 287 F.3d 903, 909 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Kepler v. Chater, 68 F.3d 387, 390-91 (10th Cir. 1995)). Here, the ALJ thoroughly reviewed the scant medical evidence and fully substantiated his conclusion that plaintiff's subjective reports of his symptoms and limitations were inconsistent with the record. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(2); Luna v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 161, 165 (10th Cir. 1987). The ALJ pointed to specific evidence of record demonstrating that plaintiff's treatment history was sporadic; that he took no medication for pain and had declined physicians' recommendations for surgical or other, more aggressive, interventions12; and that he had given vague and inconsistent accounts as to the genesis of the exacerbation of his condition and had at the least exaggerated (if not entirely fabricated) a neurosurgeon's estimation that he "had the back of an 80-year old." (See Tr. 17-21.) All these factors are appropriately considered in evaluating a claimant's credibility. See Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1069 (10th Cir. 2009) (conservative treatment); Knuutila v. Colvin, 127 F.Supp.3d 1146, 1152 (D. Colo. 2015) (failure to pursue potentially efficacious treatment); Abdelmeged v. Colvin, 2015 WL 5047645, at *5 (D. Colo. Aug. 26, 2015) (exaggerating symptoms); Romero v. Colvin, 2015 WL 3542783 at *8 (D. Colo. June 5, 2015) (sporadic treatment). There was no error in this regard.

Plaintiff argues further that the ALJ erred at step five of the sequential evaluation by determining "it more likely than not that the claimant has a high school equivalency certificate." (Tr. 22.) Although plaintiff, who was home schooled, now argues he does not have a GED, there is no reversible error in this regard. First, regardless whether plaintiff actually has a high school diploma or GED certificate, the substance of the ALJ's conclusion — that plaintiff had attained a level of education at least equivalent to that of a high school graduate — is thoroughly supported by his review and discussion of the evidence before him, which included a prior statement by plaintiff that he received a GED in the fall of 2013 (see Tr. 142), his stated hobbies, and his articulate and coherent presentation at the hearing. (Tr. 21-22.)

Moreover, plaintiff is simply wrong in assuming that his possession of a GED vel non is determinative of the ALJ's decision at step five. Plaintiff's argument that all the alternative jobs identified by the ALJ require a GED appears to be premised on a misinterpretation of the use of that acronym in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles ("DOT"). In that context, "GED" stands for General Educational Development, a composite number which measures a job's requirements in terms of the level of reasoning, mathematical, and language skills necessary to perform that job. See Pacheco v. Colvin, 83 F.Supp.3d 1157, 1166 (D. Colo. 2015). More particularly, while these levels reflect "those aspects of education (formal and informal) which are required of the worker for satisfactory job performance," those skills "may be obtained from experience and self-study" rather than from (or in addition to) any formal education. Dictionary of Occupational Titles, App. C, § III: Components of the Definition Trailer (available at: https://occupationalinfo.org/appendxc_1.html#III) (last accessed February 14, 2018). Thus, the lack of a General Equivalency Diploma does not preclude plaintiff from having the necessary General Educational Development to perform the alternative jobs on which the ALJ relied.13 Indeed, all those jobs are unskilled, work for which a high school diploma is not a prerequisite in any event. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1564(b)(3).14 There thus was no error, much less reversible error, in this regard.

IV. ORDERS

For these reasons, I find no reversible error in the ALJ's disability determination, which accordingly must be affirmed.

THEREFORE IT IS ORDERED that the conclusion of the Commissioner through the Administrative Law Judge that plaintiff was not disabled is affirmed.