DANIEL C. IRICK, Magistrate Judge.
Lourdes Lucia Pagan (Claimant) appeals to the District Court from a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the Commissioner) denying her application for disability insurance benefits. Doc. 1; R. 2-5; 198-99. Claimant argued that the Administrative Law Judge (the ALJ) erred by: 1) "failing to adequately account for all severe impairments in the residual functional capacity determination and failing to weigh all the pertinent evidence;" 2) relying "on the testimony of the Vocational Expert after posing a hypothetical question that did not adequately reflect the limitations of the [C]laimant;" and 3) "finding that the [C]laimant is `not entirely credible when the record clearly reveals that the [Claimant] suffered from documented impairments causing significant limitations and pain." Doc. 19 at 2-3. For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner's final decision is
In 2012, Claimant filed an application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits (DIB). R. 198-99. Claimant initially alleged a disability onset date of October 15, 2007, but subsequently changed her alleged onset date to January 11, 2011. R. 45, 207. Claimant's date last insured was March 31, 2013. R. 27.
The ALJ issued his decision on March 14, 2014. R. 27-37. In his decision, the ALJ found that Claimant had the following severe impairments through the date last insured: fibromyalgia, diabetes mellitus, and restless leg syndrome. R. 30. The ALJ also found that Claimant had the following non-severe impairments through the date last insured: spine disorder and mental impairments. R. 30-31.
The ALJ found that Claimant had the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform less than a full range of light work as defined by 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b)
R. 32. The ALJ posed a hypothetical question to the vocational expert (VE) that was consistent with the foregoing RFC determination, and the VE testified that Claimant would be capable of performing her past relevant work. R. 56. The ALJ, relying on the VE's testimony, found that Claimant was capable of performing her past relevant work through the date last insured. R. 36-37. Therefore, the ALJ found that Claimant was not disabled between the alleged onset date and the date last insured. R. 37.
"In Social Security appeals, [the court] must determine whether the Commissioner's decision is `supported by substantial evidence and based on proper legal standards.'" Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1178 (11th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). The Commissioner's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla — i.e., the evidence must do more than merely create a suspicion of the existence of a fact, and must include such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the conclusion. Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982) and Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). Where the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the District Court will affirm, even if the reviewer would have reached a contrary result as finder of fact, and even if the reviewer finds that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's decision. Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991); Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1991). The Court must view the evidence as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the decision. Foote, 67 F.3d at 1560. The District Court "`may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner].'" Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983)).
This case centers on the denial of Claimant's application for DIB. A claimant seeking DIB is eligible for such benefits where he or she demonstrates disability on or before his or her date last insured. Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). Thus, Claimant was required to demonstrate that she was disabled on or before the date last insured, June 30, 2013. Id. The Court, bearing this in mind, turns to Claimant's arguments.
Claimant argued that the ALJ erred in determining Claimant's RFC "after failing to adequately account for all severe impairments in the [RFC] determination and failing to weigh all the pertinent evidence." Doc. 19 at 11. The Commissioner argued that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's RFC determination. Doc. 20 at 4-9. The Commissioner also argued that the ALJ properly considered the relevant evidence and opinions in assessing Claimant's RFC. Id.
At step four of the sequential evaluation process, the ALJ assesses the claimant's residual functional capacity (RFC) and ability to perform past relevant work. Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1238. "The residual functional capacity is an assessment, based upon all of the relevant evidence, of a claimant's remaining ability to do work despite his impairments." Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997). The ALJ is responsible for determining the claimant's RFC. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1546(c); 416.946(c). In doing so, the ALJ must consider all relevant evidence, including, but not limited to, the medical opinions of treating, examining, and non-examining medical sources. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a)(1), (3); 416.945(a)(1), (3); Rosario v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 877 F.Supp.2d 1254, 1265 (M.D. Fla. 2012).
The weighing of treating, examining, and non-examining physicians' opinions is an integral part of steps four and five of the sequential evaluation process. In Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176 (11th Cir. 2011), the Eleventh Circuit stated that "`Medical opinions are statements from physicians and psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of [the claimant's] impairment(s), including [the claimant's] symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis, what [the claimant] can still do despite impairment(s), and [the claimant's] physical or mental restrictions.'" Id. at 1178-79 (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2)) (alterations in original). "[T]he ALJ must state with particularity the weight given to different medical opinions and the reasons therefor." Id at 1179 (citing Sharfarz v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 278, 279 (11th Cir. 1987)). "In the absence of such a statement, it is impossible for a reviewing court to determine whether the ultimate decision on the merits of the claim is rational and supported by substantial evidence." Id. (quoting Cowart v. Schwieker, 662 F.2d 731, 735 (11th Cir. 1981)).
The ALJ must consider a number of factors in determining how much weight to give each medical opinion, including: 1) whether the physician has examined the claimant; 2) the length, nature, and extent of the physician's relationship with the claimant; 3) the medical evidence and explanation supporting the physician's opinion; 4) how consistent the physician's opinion is with the record as a whole; and 5) the physician's specialization. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c); 416.927(c). A treating physician's opinion must be given substantial or considerable weight, unless good cause is shown to the contrary. Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(2); 416.927(c)(2) (giving controlling weight to the treating physician's opinion unless it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence). "Good cause exists when the: (1) treating physician's opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating physician's opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor's own medical records." Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179 (quotation marks omitted).
Here, Claimant's first argument appears to be that the ALJ erred by failing to include any limitations in the RFC related to Claimant's purported neuropathy of the bilateral wrists.
In response, the Commissioner argued that the ALJ did not find that Claimant's purported neuropathy of the bilateral wrists was a severe impairment. Doc. 20 at 6. The Commissioner also argued that Claimant failed to show that diagnostic studies from outside the relevant time period established additional limitations that should have been included in the RFC. Id. at 6-7. Finally, the Commissioner argued that Claimant's subjective complaints about her ability to use her hands were not a sufficient basis for finding additional limitations given that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's determination that Claimant's statements were not entirely credible. Id. at 7.
Upon review of the record, the Court finds that Claimant's first argument is without merit. Contrary to Claimant's argument, the Court does not find that the ALJ implicitly found that Claimant's purported neuropathy of the bilateral wrists was a severe impairment through her date last insured.
Regardless of whether or not the ALJ implicitly found that Claimant's purported neuropathy of the bilateral wrists was a severe impairment through the date last insured, Claimant has not shown that the ALJ failed to account for any limitations arising from Claimant's purported neuropathy of the bilateral wrists. Claimant cited two medical records in support of her argument that the ALJ should have included a limitation pertaining to Claimant's purported neuropathy: an EMG from February 27, 2009 and an EMG from December 24, 2013.
Claimant's second argument appears to be that the ALJ failed to weigh the pertinent evidence and opinions of Dr. Richard L. Smith, Dr. Howard S. Buchoff, and Dr. Melissa A. Hartman.
In Response, the Commissioner argued that the ALJ properly considered the records and opinions from Claimant's medical sources in assessing Claimant's RFC, and that Claimant "failed to cite any evidence in which a treating doctor opined that she had functional limitations." Doc. 20 at 7. The Commissioner further argued that the "notes by [Dr. Smith, Dr. Buchoff, and Dr. Harman] that Claimant describes as opinions are not `medical opinions.'" Id. at 8. In the alternative, the Commissioner argued, even if the "notes are interpreted as `medical opinions,' [Claimant] failed to show that the `opinions' in any way undermined the ALJ's assessment of her RFC." Id.
To the extent Claimant's second argument is that the ALJ failed to consider the pertinent evidence contained in the records of Dr. Smith, Dr. Buchoff, and Dr. Hartman, Claimant's argument is without merit. The ALJ discussed the records of Dr. Smith, Dr. Buchoff, and Dr. Hartman in his decision. R. 30, 35. Moreover, the records of Dr. Smith, Dr. Buchoff, and Dr. Hartman were consistent with the ALJ's discussion regarding Claimant's objective medical condition.
To the extent Claimant's second argument is that the ALJ failed to weigh the purported medical opinions contained within the records of Dr. Smith, Dr. Buchoff, and Dr. Hartman, Claimant's argument is without merit. Claimant did not identify any specific opinions contained within these records that the ALJ failed to weigh, or explain how said opinions contradicted the RFC. Doc. 19 at 13-16. The statements Claimant referred to from the records of Dr. Smith, Dr. Buchoff, and Dr. Hartman were not "medical opinions" that needed to be weighed because they were not statements reflecting a judgment about the nature and severity of Claimant's impairment. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2); Tavarez v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 638 Fed. Appx. 841, 846 (11th Cir. 2016) ("Medical opinions are statements from physicians and other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and severity of the claimant's impairment."). The statements provided no opinion regarding what Claimant could still do despite her impairments, nor did they identify any specific physical or mental restrictions caused by Claimant's impairments.
Moreover, even to the extent the records of Dr. Smith, Dr. Buchoff, and Dr. Hartman contained medical opinions that the ALJ needed to weigh, the ALJ's purported failure to do so was harmless error. The Court has reviewed the medical records of Dr. Smith, Dr. Buchoff, and Dr. Hartman, and to the extent the records cited to by Claimant contained any medical opinions, such medical opinions did not directly contradict the ALJ's RFC determination, which provided as follows:
R. 32. Therefore, the ALJ's purported failure to weigh any such purported medical opinions was harmless error.
Finally, Claimant argued, in conclusory fashion, that the ALJ substituted his own judgment for that of the medical and vocational experts, and that the ALJ reached his own conclusions regarding Claimant's limitations. Doc. 19 at 16. Although it is not clear to the Court what exactly Claimant was trying to argue, the Court believes that Claimant may have been trying to argue that the ALJ inappropriately disregarded the opinions of Dr. Smith, Dr. Buchoff, and Dr. Hartman in favor of the ALJ's own opinion. Id. To the extent that this is the argument being raised by Claimant, the argument is without merit. As discussed above, the ALJ did not fail to weigh any purported medical opinions from Dr. Smith, Dr. Buchoff, and Dr. Hartman, and even to the extent that he did, it was harmless error. Regardless, Claimant waived whatever argument she may have been trying to raise by raising said argument in a perfunctory manner. See, e.g., Jacobus v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 15-14609, 2016 WL 6080607, at *3 n.2 (11th Cir. Oct. 18, 2016) (stating that claimant's perfunctory argument was arguably abandoned); Gombash v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 566 Fed. App'x. 857, 858 n.1 (11th Cir. 2014) (stating that the issue was not properly presented on appeal where claimant provided no supporting argument).
Claimant argued that the ALJ "erred in finding that [Claimant] is `not entirely credible' when the record clearly reveals that [Claimant] suffered from documented impairments causing significant limitations and pain." Doc. 19 at 18. Specifically, Claimant argued that the ALJ did not articulate sufficient reasoning to support his credibility determination, and that the ALJ's credibility determination was not supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 18-22. Claimant argued that Claimant's pain issues were well-documented throughout the medical records and that there was objective medical evidence supporting Claimant's complaints of pain. Id.
The Commissioner argued that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's credibility determination. Doc. 20 at 11-17. Specifically, the Commissioner argued that the objective medical evidence did not support Plaintiff's allegations of disabling limitations during the relevant time period. Id. The Commissioner also argued that the ALJ "properly considered Plaintiff's activities, and her inconsistent statements about her activities, in assessing the credibility of her subjective complaints of disabling symptoms." Id. at 15. Finally, the Commissioner argued that the ALJ properly considered Claimant's failure to follow her doctors' recommendations as evidence undermining her subjective complaints of disabling symptoms. Id. at 16.
A claimant may establish "disability through his own testimony of pain or other subjective symptoms." Dyer v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 2005). A claimant seeking to establish disability through his or her own testimony must show:
Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam). If the ALJ determines that the claimant has a medically determinable impairment that could reasonably produce the claimant's alleged pain or other symptoms, the ALJ must then evaluate the extent to which the intensity and persistence of those symptoms limit the claimant's ability to work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(1). In doing so, the ALJ considers a variety of evidence, including, but not limited to, the claimant's history, the medical signs and laboratory findings, the claimant's statements, medical source opinions, and other evidence of how the pain affects the claimant's daily activities and ability to work. Id. at § 404.1529(c)(1)-(3). "If the ALJ decides not to credit a claimant's testimony as to her pain, he must articulate explicit and adequate reasons for doing so." Foote, 67 F.3d at 1561-62. The Court will not disturb a clearly articulated credibility finding that is supported by substantial evidence. See Foote, 67 F.3d at 1562.
On January 3, 2014, Claimant appeared before the ALJ for a hearing. R. 45-58. At the hearing, Claimant testified that she is unable to work because of
R. 48-49. Claimant also testified that she was incapable of performing numerous daily activities, including dishes, laundry, vacuuming, and cleaning. R. 52. Claimant testified that she could not carry a laptop, that she had difficulty driving, that she had no desire to go out because she was depressed, and that she had to "buy clothes with no buttons or — because it's very difficult." R. 47-49, 51, 53.
The ALJ found Claimant's impairments could reasonably be expected to cause her alleged symptoms, but concluded that her statements concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms were "not entirely credible for the reasons explained in this decision." R. 35. Specifically, the ALJ explained, in part, as follows:
R. 34-35.
Although not specifically tied to his credibility determination, the ALJ also noted in his decision that, other than some limited motion in Claimant's shoulders and some tenderness in Claimant's arms and legs, the medical records revealed that Claimant had normal palpation, range of motion, and stability of both upper and lower extremities, as well as normal strength and gait. R. 30, 35-36. In addition, the ALJ noted that Claimant had a history of failing to follow her doctors' recommendations. R. 35-36.
Contrary to Claimant's argument, the Court finds that the ALJ articulated sufficient reasoning to support his credibility determination. The ALJ did not, as Claimant implied, offer nothing but meaningless template language in support of his credibility finding. Further, Claimant's argument that her pain issues were well-documented and that there was objective medical evidence supporting Claimant's complaints of pain is without merit. The issue for the Court to decide is not whether there is objective medical evidence supporting Claimant's complaints of pain. The issue is whether the ALJ's credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence. In this case, it was.
"[T]he ALJ may consider the testimony of a VE in determining whether the claimant still possesses the ability to perform her past relevant work." Waldrop v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 379 Fed. App'x. 948, 952 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(b)). The ALJ is required to pose hypothetical questions that are accurate and that include all of the claimant's functional limitations. See Pendley v. Heckler, 767 F.2d 1561, 1563 (11th Cir. 1985). However, the ALJ need not include "each and every symptom" of the claimant's impairments, Ingram v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253, 1270 (11th Cir. 2007), or medical "findings . . . that the ALJ . . . properly rejected as unsupported" in the hypothetical question, Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1161 (11th Cir. 2004). Where the ALJ relies on the VE's testimony, but fails to include all the claimant's functional limitations in the hypothetical question, the final decision is not supported by substantial evidence. See Pendley, 767 F.2d at 1562 (quoting Brenem v. Harris, 621 F.2d 688, 690 (5th Cir. 1980)).
Claimant argued that the ALJ improperly relied on the testimony of the VE. Doc. 19 at 16-18. Claimant's sole argument was that the ALJ's RFC determination did not adequately reflect Claimant's limitations, and thus that the hypothetical the ALJ posed to the VE was incorrect.
For the reasons stated above, it is
