PHILIP A. BRIMMER, District Judge.
The Court takes up this matter sua sponte on the Complaint for Declaratory Judgment [Docket No. 1]. Plaintiff states that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this lawsuit pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Docket No. 1 at 1-2, ¶ 1.
In every case and at every stage of the proceeding, a federal court must satisfy itself as to its own jurisdiction, even if doing so requires sua sponte action. See Citizens Concerned for Separation of Church & State v. City & County of Denver, 628 F.2d 1289, 1297 (10th Cir. 1980). Absent an assurance that jurisdiction ex ists, a court may not proceed in a case. See Cunningham v. BHP Petroleum Great Britain PLC, 427 F.3d 1238, 1245 (10th Cir. 2005). Courts are well-advised to raise the issue of jurisdiction on their own, regardless of parties' apparent acquiescence. First, it is the Court's duty to do so. Tuck v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 859 F.2d 842, 844 (10th Cir. 1988). Second, regarding subject matter jurisdiction, "the consent of the parties is irrelevant, principles of estoppel do not apply, and a party does not waive the requirement by failing to challenge jurisdiction." Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982) (internal citations omitted). Finally, delay in addressing the issue only compounds the problem if, despite much time and expense having been dedicated to the case, a lack of jurisdiction causes it to be dismissed. See U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Pinkard Constr. Co., No. 09-cv-00491-PAB-MJW, 2009 WL 2338116, at *3 (D. Colo. July 28, 2009).
"The party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing such jurisdiction as a threshold matter." Radil v. Sanborn W. Camps, Inc., 384 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff asserts that this Court has diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Pursuant to that section, "district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . . citizens of different States." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). The facts presently alleged are insufficient to establish plaintiff's citizenship.
The complaint states that "Plaintiff Underwriters is domiciled in London, England and maintains its principal place of business at 1 Lime Street, London, England EC3M 7HA." Docket No. 1 at 2, ¶ 3. The assertion that plaintiff is a distinct entity is almost certainly incorrect. As the Eleventh Circuit has explained
Underwriters at Lloyd's, London v. Osting-Schwinn, 613 F.3d 1079, 1083 (11th Cir. 2010). The fact that the Names, not some entity known as "Lloyd's," underwrite the risk for a given insurance policy is reflected in the caption: "Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London Subscribing to Policy No. LL024CO0300942." The complaint does not identify what syndicates act as underwriters for the policy at issue in this case, but as noted in Osting-Schwinn
Id. However, assuming that the Names did underwrite the policy through syndicates, each syndicate would at most be considered an unincorporated association that "must prove the citizenship of each of [its] members."