RULING ON PENDING MOTIONS

DONNA F. MARTINEZ, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff, Delisa McLellan, seeks judicial review of a partially favorable decision by an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") granting plaintiff's application for social security income ("SSI") but denying her application for disability insurance benefits ("DIB").1 (R. 10-20.) Currently pending are plaintiff's motion to reverse the decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Commissioner") (doc. #21) and defendant's motion to affirm the decision of the Commissioner. (Doc. #27.) On July 15, 2016, pursuant to the court's order, counsel filed a joint stipulation of facts and medical chronology, which I incorporate by reference. (Doc. #39.) I heard oral argument on July 28, 2016. For the following reasons, plaintiff's motion is DENIED and defendant's motion is GRANTED.2

I. Legal Standard

The standards for determining an individual's entitlement to DIB, the Commissioner's five-step framework for evaluating disability claims, and the district court's review of the final decision of the Commissioner are well-settled. I am following those standards, but do not repeat them here.

II. Discussion

Plaintiff makes five arguments. She contends that the ALJ erred by (a) failing to give controlling weight to the opinion of her treating physician, Dr. Vincent Carlesi; (b) failing to meet his burden of proof that plaintiff retained the RFC to perform light work until October 1, 2010; (c) failing to apply the requirements of Social Security Ruling ("SSR") 83-20; (d) failing to disclose new evidence obtained after the hearing to either plaintiff or her attorney; and (e) failing to properly explain his credibility determination.

Plaintiff first argues that the ALJ erred by rejecting the opinion of her treating physician, Dr. Carlesi.

Under the treating physician rule, a treating physician's opinion is accorded controlling weight when that opinion is "well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the] record." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); see Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 31-32 (2d Cir. 2004). The ALJ must "give good reasons" for the weight accorded to the treating physician's opinion. See Halloran, 362 F.3d at 32; see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) ("We will always give good reasons in our notice of determination or decision for the weight we give your treating source's opinion.").

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by rejecting Dr. Carlesi's "multiple statements of disability and descriptions of his examinations that showed persistent severe low back and leg pain, cervical spine pain, and antalgic gait," and by "ignor[ing] all of Dr. Carlesi's statements of disability between January 24, 2005 and May 16, 2007." (Doc. #21-1, Pl. Memo of Law, pp. 19-20.) Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ was required, but failed to consider the factors enumerated in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)3 when rejecting Dr. Carlesi's opinion.

The ALJ gave "significant weight" to Dr. Carlesi's opinion, with the exception of his "notations" that plaintiff is "disabled" or "totally disabled," to which he assigned no special significance. He explained:

(R. 21.)

The ALJ correctly concluded that Dr. Carlesi's notations that plaintiff is disabled are not medical opinions.4 See Westcott v. Colvin, No. 12-CV-4183 (FB), 2013 WL 5465609, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2013) ("[S]tatement[s] by a medical source that you are disabled or unable to work are not medical opinions.") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, even if Dr. Carlesi had intended these notations to represent his opinion that plaintiff is disabled,5 "[o]pinions on some issues, such as . . . . whether [plaintiff] meet[s] the statutory definition of disability," are "issues reserved to the Commissioner." 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). "No deference is owed to a physician's statement that a claimant is `disabled,' because that determination is a legal conclusion, not a medical determination, reserved for the ALJ, the Commissioner, and the courts." Serrano v. Astrue, No. 3:10-CV-468 (JCH), 2011 WL 1399465, at *10 (D. Conn. Apr. 12, 2011).

Because Dr. Carlesi's notations that plaintiff is "disabled" or "totally disabled" concern an issue reserved to the Commissioner and are not medical opinions, the ALJ properly determined that they are not entitled to any special significance, nor was he required to apply the factors set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c) when reaching his decision. See, e.g., Earl-Buck v. Barnhart, 414 F.Supp.2d 288, 293 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) ("Because the opinions of [plaintiff's treating and examining orthopedic surgeons] that plaintiff was `totally disabled' are not `medical opinions' under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(a)(2), the ALJ was not required to accord them any significant weight under the treating physician's rule. Nor was the ALJ required to state reasons on the record for not doing so.").

B. RFC Determination

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ had no basis for his RFC determination. The initial burden of establishing disability is on the claimant. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(5), 1382c(a)(3)(G). "Once the claimant demonstrates that [she] is incapable of performing [her] past work, however, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to show that the claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform other substantial gainful activity in the national economy." Ruiz v. Apfel, 98 F.Supp.2d 200, 206 (D. Conn. 1999). Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's RFC determination—that plaintiff could perform light work until October 1, 2010—is not supported by substantial evidence and that he erred by relying on the opinions of the non-examining state agency physicians over the opinions of her treating and examining physicians.

Three non-examining state-agency physicians opined that plaintiff was capable of performing light work.6 (R. 55-58, 399-406, 654-61.) The ALJ assigned these opinions "some weight," noting that "[a]lthough those physicians were non-examining, and therefore their opinions do not as a general matter deserve as much weight as those of examining or treating physicians, those opinions do deserve some weight." (R. 22.) Contrary to plaintiff's assertion, the ALJ's RFC determination was not based solely on these non-examining physicians' opinions. When reaching his RFC determination, the ALJ discussed the evidence of record (including plaintiff's own statements) over four single-spaced pages. He explained his ultimate conclusion as follows:

(R. 22.)

"[T]he court must decide whether the [RFC] determination is supported by substantial evidence . . . . Substantial evidence is evidence that a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion; it is more than a `mere scintilla.' . . . The substantial evidence rule also applies to inferences and conclusions that are drawn from findings of fact . . . . The court may not decide facts, reweigh evidence or substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner." Gonzalez v. Apfel, 23 F.Supp.2d 179, 189 (D. Conn. 1998) (citations omitted). The court will not second-guess the ALJ's decision where, as here, he identified the reasons for his RFC determination and supported his decision with substantial evidence. Falcon v. Colvin, No. 5:12-CV-1164 (FJS), 2014 WL 1312362, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2014) ("So long as the ALJ properly exercises his discretion, the court must limit its review to whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ's decision; the court may not second-guess the ALJ's balancing of the evidence."); Marquez v. Colvin, No. 12 CIV. 6819 (PKC), 2013 WL 5568718, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 9, 2013) (where "the ALJ conforms with applicable law and SSA regulations, and the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence, this court will not second-guess his judgment."). Here, the ALJ provided a detailed explanation of his RFC determination and supported his decision with substantial evidence. There is no error.

C. SSR 83-20

Plaintiff next argues that because this is a case where the ALJ had to infer plaintiff's onset date from the evidence of record, SSR 83-20 required the ALJ to employ a medical advisor to determine the onset date. Plaintiff submits that a new hearing is required at which orthopedic and neurosurgical medical advisors must review the record and guide the ALJ's inference.

SSR 83-20 provides:

SSR 83-20, 1983 WL 31249, at *3 (1983).

"Where . . . the record is ambiguous regarding the onset date of a claimant's disability, the ALJ must call on a medical advisor to assist in inferring a date." Larkin v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:10-CV-291, 2011 WL 4499296, at *6 (D. Vt. Sept. 27, 2011). "While SSR 83-20 does not mandate that a medical advisor be called in every case, courts have construed this step to be essential when the record is ambiguous regarding onset date." Parmenter v. Astrue, No. 08-CV-1132, 2010 WL 2884866, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., Telfair v. Astrue, No. 04CIV. 2122 (JGK), 2007 WL 1522616, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2007) (holding that "[b]ecause the onset date needed to be inferred and the medical evidence was unclear," ALJ erred by not calling upon services of medical advisor).

Here, the record was not ambiguous as to plaintiff's onset date and thus, the ALJ was not required to call upon the services of a medical advisor. The ALJ found that plaintiff became disabled in October 2010. This was not an arbitrary date. The ALJ discussed the specific evidence that supports his decision as follows:

(R. 21).

The record supports the ALJ's finding that plaintiff's right shoulder condition became disabling in October 2010 and thus, there was no need for a medical advisor to assist the ALJ in determining plaintiff's disability onset date.

D. New Evidence

Plaintiff next argues that her due process rights were violated because she was not permitted to confront new evidence submitted after the hearing, upon which the ALJ relied. Plaintiff maintains that there was no mention at the hearing of Exhibit 12F, which was included in the record before this court.7 Plaintiff did not raise this argument in her complaint. This court previously has held that where "plaintiff did not raise a colorable constitutional claim that her due process rights were violated in her complaint . . . in which she sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Appeals Council's dismissal of her case, . . . such a claim is waived." Rivera v. Colvin, No. 3:11-cv-1788 (JGM), at *20 (D. Conn. July 16, 2013). Plaintiff here did not raise this due process claim in her complaint and thus, she has waived her right to argue it now.

E. Credibility Assessment

Plaintiff lastly argues that the ALJ erred by not providing any reasons for his credibility finding. The ALJ's credibility determination begins with the following boilerplate language found in many ALJ decisions:

(R. 19.)

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred by making only this conclusory boilerplate statement without providing any specific reasons for his credibility assessment. The boilerplate language is permissible here because it does not stand alone. Rather, it is followed by a detailed, six-paragraph explanation of the evidence the ALJ considered when making his credibility finding. See Lumpkin v. Colvin, No. 12-cv-1817(DJS), 2014 WL 4065651, at *10 (D. Conn. Aug. 13, 2014) (notwithstanding use of boilerplate language, ALJ satisfied standard for assessing credibility where he also discussed plaintiff's activities and inconsistent statements). Therefore, there is no error with the ALJ's credibility determination.

III. Conclusion

For these reasons, plaintiff's motion to reverse the decision of the Commissioner (doc. #21) is DENIED and defendant's motion to affirm the decision of the Commissioner (doc. #27) is GRANTED.

This is not a recommended ruling. The consent of the parties allows this magistrate judge to direct the entry of a judgment of the district court in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Appeals can be made directly to the appropriate United States Court of Appeals from this judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3); Fed.R.Civ.P. 73(c).

SO ORDERED at Hartford, Connecticut this 3rd day of August, 2016.