ROBERT N. CHATIGNY, District Judge.
Prior to the start of the trial in this case, the defendant moved to dismiss the superceding indictment on the ground that his right to a speedy trial had been violated. On February 16, 2016, the Court denied the motion in a bench ruling stating that there had been no violation. The defendant requested that the Court provide a written statement of the reasons for the ruling. This memorandum responds to that request.
Under the Speedy Trial Act, the trial of a defendant must begin within seventy days of the filing of the indictment, or within seventy days of the date the defendant first appears before a judicial officer, whichever is later. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). A defendant first "appears" when he is arraigned and enters a plea of not guilty.
The Act provides that certain "periods of delay shall be excluded . . . in computing the time within which the trial . . . must commence." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h). For instance, "[a]ny period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant" is excluded, including "delay resulting from any pretrial motion." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(D). Under the Act, "filing a pre-trial motion tolls the speedy trial clock until the earlier of either (1) a ruling on the motion, or (2) 30 days after the final filing or hearing necessary to decide the motion."
In this case, the seventy day period began to run on January 18, 2014, the day after the defendant was arraigned. On January 30, 2014, the defendant moved for a continuance. On March 3, 2014, a conference was held to discuss an appropriate schedule. After the parties conferred, the Government submitted a proposal calling for a trial in March 2015. The Court then granted the defendant's motion for a continuance and set the trial date for March 11, 2015. In doing so, the Court found that the ends of justice outweighed the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial and excluded the time between March 10, 2014 and March 11, 2015. The defendant filed a waiver of his speedy trial rights effective until the new trial date.
The superceding indictment was returned on May 15, 2014. Over the next several months, the defendant filed a number of pretrial motions, including multiple motions to dismiss the indictment and two motions to suppress. These motions were fully briefed as of December 1, 2014.
On December 3, 2014, the defendant again moved for a continuance. The Court granted the motion and continued the trial date until October 2015 after finding that the ends of justice were best served by the continuance. The defendant filed a second waiver of his speedy trial rights effective until October 31, 2015.
At a conference on September 22, 2015, the parties discussed whether an October trial date was feasible. Because the Government still needed to conduct several out-of-state depositions, counsel suggested that the trial be postponed until February 2016. On October 4, 2015, the Government formally moved for a continuance. On October 13, 2015, the Court granted the motion, made the necessary "ends of justice" finding, and excluded the time between March 10, 2015 and February 9, 2016. The trial date was subsequently continued until February 16, 2016, and the trial began that day.
As the foregoing summary shows, only twelve days of non-excluded time elapsed prior to the start of the trial — specifically, the time between January 18 and 30, 2014. Accordingly, there has been no violation of the Speedy Trial Act.
The defendant also claims that his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial has been violated.
To determine whether a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial right has been violated, four factors must be considered: the "[l]ength of delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant."
The first factor — the length of the delay — "is in effect a threshold question."
The pretrial phase of this case lasted approximately twenty-six months. On its face, this period of delay might seem to weigh strongly in favor of the defendant. But delays of this length have occurred in complex cases with no Sixth Amendment violation.
Turning to the next factor — the reason for the delay — the Supreme Court has instructed that "different weights should be assigned to different reasons."
Here, "the delay in bringing the case to trial resulted primarily from the practical difficulties occasioned by the complexities of the case and not from congestion of the calendar or bad faith or neglect on the part of the government."
The next factor to consider is the defendant's assertion of his right to a speedy trial. "In practice, a defendant's demand for or failure to demand a speedy trial tends not to influence the analysis strongly except at the extremes."
Here, the defendant first broached the issue of his speedy trial rights in a motion for reconsideration of this Court's order extending the trial date from October 2015 to February 9, 2016. Prior to that time he requested or joined in requests for lengthy continuances and filed speedy trial waivers. The motion for reconsideration — which did not seek to dismiss the superceding indictment — was filed on October 14, 2015, approximately twenty-two months after the defendant was indicted. In view of this history, the defendant's belated attempt to invoke his right to a speedy trial through his motion for reconsideration is properly discounted.
Finally, on the issue of prejudice, the Court considers the interests the speedy trial right protects — "(i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the possibility that the defense will be impaired."
In his motion to dismiss, the defendant focuses primarily on the first and second interests. He argues that this prosecution has caused him to lose business opportunities and physical freedom, and that his family has suffered "the personal pain of watching their loved one suffer while incarcerated." Mot. to Dismiss (ECF No. 170) at 8. However, these hardships are not attributable to this case. They are due to the defendant's service of a sentence of imprisonment imposed by the District of Massachusetts in another fraud case.
The defendant does not argue that his ability to present a defense has been impaired. In fact, he sought and obtained lengthy continuances in order to adequately prepare. That the delay has also benefitted the Government is of no moment.
For the reasons stated, the defendant's right to a speedy trial has not been violated and, accordingly, his motion to dismiss has been denied.