ROBIN L. ROSENBERG, District Judge.
The instant case has a procedurally complex history. A full summary can be found in the most recent Report and Recommendations [DE 145], which this Court adopted on July 18, 2014. See DE 147. For purposes of these Motions, the following facts are relevant.
Plaintiff Glenn C. Smith ("Plaintiff"), who initially proceed pro se but is currently represented by counsel, filed his Complaint on August 11, 2006. See DE 1. Adopting the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendations [DE 8], the Court dismissed Plaintiff's Complaint in its entirety. See DE 11. Plaintiff appealed, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the Court's decision with regard to all of Plaintiff's claims, except Plaintiff's claim of retaliatory transfer against Defendant Florida Department of Corrections ("Defendant"). See Smith v. Fla. Dep't of Corr. (Smith I), 318 F. App'x 726 (11th Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (unpublished). The case was remanded. See id.
Defendant then filed a Motion for Summary Judgment [DE 59]. A Report and Recommendations [DE 73] was issued recommending that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be granted. The Report was adopted and Plaintiff again appealed. See DE 74, DE 87. The Eleventh Circuit again reversed the Court, remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. See Smith v. Fla. Dep't of Corr. (Smith II), 713 F.3d 1059 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam). On remand, Defendant again moved for summary judgment. See DE 129. This time, the Magistrate Judge's Report recommended that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be denied. See DE 145. The Report was adopted, and the case was set for trial. See DE 147, DE 159.
Shortly after Smith II was issued, on May 3, 2013, the first of the three applicants, Applicant Hartley, filed his Motion to Intervene. See DE 110. Applicant Rivera filed his Motion to Intervene on November 17, 2014, four months after this Court adopted the Magistrate's final Report. See DE 149. Applicant Schiller's Motion to Intervene was filed on December 22, 2014, about a month after that. Following this Court's status conference of January 8, 2015, the Court required Defendant and Plaintiff to file responses to the Motions. See DE 157. Defendant timely filed its responses on January 13, 2015. See DE 163, DE 164, DE 165. Plaintiff timely filed his response on January 15, 2015, concurring with Defendant's analysis of the case law.
The Court concludes that Applicants' intervention is precluded by the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"). The PLRA was passed in order "to curtail abusive prisoner tort, civil rights and conditions of confinement litigation." See Hubbard v. Haley, 262 F.3d 1194, 1996 (11th Cir. 2001) (collecting cases). In pursuit of this goal, the PLRA amended 28 U.S.C. § 1915 to require a prisoner to pay the full amount of the filing fee, even when a prisoner brings a civil suit in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b). The PLRA thus "require[s] prisoners to pay a very small share of the large burden they place on the federal judicial system by paying a small filing fee upon commencement of lawsuits." Hubbard, 262 F.3d at 1198 (quoting and citing 141 Cong. Rec. S7526 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl)).
In Hubbard, the Eleventh Circuit upheld the district court's decision to require each plaintiff in the multi-plaintiff lawsuit to file a separate complaint and pay a separate filing fee under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. See id. at 1195, 1198. To the extent that statute conflicted with the Rules Enabling Act, as expressed in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20 (Permissive Joinder of Parties), Hubbard held that the statute repealed the Rule. See id. at 1198. Hubbard has been interpreted broadly. For example, in Bowens v. Turner Guilford Knight Detention, 510 F. App'x 863 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (unpublished), the Eleventh Circuit held that although Hubbard noted Congress's intent to deter frivolous lawsuits, Hubbard's holding was not limited to frivolous suits.
Daker v. Ferrero, No. 1:03-CV-02481, 2007 WL 1100463, at *2-4 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 3, 2007), applied Hubbard in the context of a motion to intervene and found that Hubbard barred intervention, just as it barred joinder:
Id. at *3.
The Court agrees with the reasoning in Daker and finds that Hubbard controls in this case just as it did in Daker, which is the position adopted by both Plaintiff and Defendant in the instant case.
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby