Filed: Feb. 17, 2011
Latest Update: Feb. 22, 2020
Summary: 10-569-ag Liu v. Holder BIA Nelson, IJ A094 824 987 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOT
Summary: 10-569-ag Liu v. Holder BIA Nelson, IJ A094 824 987 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTA..
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10-569-ag
Liu v. Holder
BIA
Nelson, IJ
A094 824 987
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patrick Moynihan
3 United States Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, in the City of
4 New York, on the 17th day of February, two thousand eleven.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 PIERRE N. LEVAL,
8 PETER W. HALL,
9 DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON,
10 Circuit Judges.
11 _______________________________________
12
13 XIAOBIN LIU,
14 Petitioner,
15
16 v. 10-569-ag
17 NAC
18 ERIC H. HOLDER, JR., UNITED STATES
19 ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20 Respondent.
21 _______________________________________
22
23 FOR PETITIONER: Nathan Weill, New York, New York.
24
25 FOR RESPONDENT: Tony West, Assistant Attorney
26 General; Keith I. McManus, Senior
27 Litigation Counsel; Timothy G.
28 Hayes, Trial Attorney, Office of
29 Immigration Litigation, United
30 States Department of Justice,
31 Washington, D.C.
1 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
2 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
3 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that the petition for review
4 is DENIED.
5 Xiaobin Liu, a native and citizen of China, seeks
6 review of a January 20, 2010, decision of the BIA affirming
7 the March 12, 2008, decision of Immigration Judge (“IJ”)
8 Barbara A. Nelson, which denied her application for asylum,
9 withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention
10 Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Xiaobin Liu, No. A094 824
11 987 (B.I.A. Jan. 20, 2010), aff’g No. A094 824 987 (Immig.
12 Ct. N.Y. City Mar. 12, 2008). We assume the parties’
13 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
14 in this case.
15 Under the circumstances of this case, we review the
16 decision of the IJ as supplemented by the BIA. See Yan Chen
17 v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005). The
18 applicable standards of review are well-established.
19 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); see also Salimatou Bah v.
20 Mukasey,
529 F.3d 99, 110-11 (2d Cir. 2008); Manzur v. DHS,
21
494 F.3d 281, 289 (2d Cir. 2007).
22 Title 8, Section 1158(a)(3) of the United States Code
23 provides that no court shall have jurisdiction to review the
2
1 agency’s finding that an asylum application was untimely
2 under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B), or its finding of neither
3 changed nor extraordinary circumstances excusing the
4 untimeliness under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D).
5 Notwithstanding that provision, however, we retain
6 jurisdiction to review constitutional claims and “questions
7 of law.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D). In order to determine
8 whether jurisdiction exists in an individual case, we “study
9 the arguments asserted” in a petition for review and
10 determine, “regardless of the rhetoric employed in the
11 petition, whether it merely quarrels over the correctness of
12 the factual findings or justification for the discretionary
13 choices, in which case the court would lack jurisdiction, or
14 whether it instead raises a ‘constitutional claim’ or
15 ‘question of law,’” in which case those particular issues
16 could be addressed. Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,
17 471 F.3d 315, 329 (2d Cir. 2006). Here, we lack
18 jurisdiction to review the denial of Liu’s asylum
19 application as untimely because Liu has challenged only
20 purely factual determinations and the agency’s exercise of
21 discretion.
22 Liu argues that the agency erred as a matter of law in
3
1 determining that credible testimony alone, without
2 corroboration, cannot establish, by clear and convincing
3 evidence, that an asylum application was filed within one
4 year of entry into the United States. Here, however, the
5 agency did not declare as a matter of law that an
6 individual’s testimony alone is not enough to establish date
7 of entry. Rather, the agency found that, based on the lack
8 of credible detail and consistency in Liu’s testimony
9 regarding her trip to the United States, Liu did not
10 demonstrate, by clear and convincing evidence, her date of
11 entry into the United States. This finding by the agency
12 was a factual determination regarding the timeliness of
13 Liu’s asylum application, which we lack jurisdiction to
14 review. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a), Xiao Ji Chen, 471 F.3d at
15 323-32.
16 Liu also argues that her constitutional due process
17 rights were violated when the IJ declined to grant her a
18 continuance in order to present a witness who could testify
19 as to her date of entry into the United States. However,
20 “[a] petitioner may not create the jurisdiction that
21 Congress chose to remove simply by cloaking an abuse of
22 discretion argument in constitutional garb.” Saloum v. U.S.
4
1 CIS, 437 F.3d 238, 243 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Torres-
2 Aguilar v. INS,
246 F.3d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 2001)); see
3 also Xiao Ji
Chen, 471 F.3d at 330-32. Indeed, “[t]o hold
4 otherwise would allow all [petitioners] ... to circumvent
5 clear congressional intent to eliminate judicial review over
6 discretionary decisions through the facile device of re-
7 characterizing an alleged abuse of discretion as a ‘due
8 process’ violation.”
Saloum, 437 F.3d at 243-44 (quoting
9
Torres-Aguilar, 246 F.3d at 1271). Here, Liu has not raised
10 a colorable constitutional claim by contending that the IJ
11 violated her due process rights, as she is simply re-
12 characterizing an allegation that the IJ abused her
13 discretion as a constitutional issue.*
Id.
14 Liu further contends that the IJ abused her discretion
15 in denying a continuance. Immigration Judges have the
16 authority to grant continuances “for good cause shown.”
17 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29. We review the BIA’s affirmance of an
*
Even if Liu did raise a colorable constitutional
claim that we have jurisdiction to review, her right to
due process was not violated, as Liu had ample
opportunity to introduce corroborative evidence regarding
her arrival date. See Li Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, 453 F.3d 99, 104-05 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that
there is no due process violation where the IJ’s finding
was not arbitrary and the alien was not denied a full and
fair opportunity to present her claims).
5
1 IJ’s decision to deny a motion for a continuance for abuse
2 of discretion. See Kulwinder Singh v. U.S. DHS, 526 F.3d
3 72, 81 (2d Cir. 2008); Sanusi v. Gonzales,
445 F.3d 193, 199
4 (2d Cir. 2006). We have noted that IJs have “broad
5 discretion” and “are accorded wide latitude in calendar
6 management.” Morgan v. Gonzales,
445 F.3d 549, 551 (2d Cir.
7 2006)(citation omitted). An IJ abuses his discretion in
8 denying a continuance only “if (1) his decision rests on an
9 error of law (such as application of the wrong legal
10 principle) or a clearly erroneous factual finding or (2) his
11 decision – though not necessarily the product of a legal
12 error or a clearly erroneous factual finding – cannot be
13 located within the range of permissible decisions.”
Id. at
14 551-52 (citations, internal quotation marks, and alterations
15 omitted). In this case, the IJ did not abuse her discretion
16 in denying the continuance, as Liu had ample opportunity to
17 introduce corroborative evidence regarding her arrival date.
18
Id.
19 Because Liu has failed to present any constitutional
20 claim or question of law related to the agency’s finding
21 that her application was untimely, Xiao Ji
Chen, 471 F.3d at
22 323-32, we lack jurisdiction to review the IJ’s denial of
23 her asylum claim, see 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a). We may, however,
6
1 review Liu’s challenge to the agency’s denial of withholding
2 of removal.
3 In 1996, Congress amended the definition of “refugee”
4 to include “a person who has been forced to abort a
5 pregnancy or to undergo involuntary sterilization, or who
6 has been persecuted for failure or refusal to undergo such a
7 procedure or for other resistance to a coercive population
8 control program, . . . and a person who has a well founded
9 fear that he or she will be forced to undergo such a
10 procedure or subject to persecution for such failure,
11 refusal, or resistance.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). The BIA
12 has held that Congress did not intend to include in this
13 definition the involuntary insertion of an IUD as a per se
14 form of persecution. See Matter of M-F-W- & L-G-, 24 I. &
15 N. Dec. 633, 636 (B.I.A. 2008). Liu first challenges the
16 BIA’s determination in Matter of M-F-W- & L-G- that an
17 involuntary IUD insertion does not amount to persecution
18 absent “aggravating circumstances.” Id. at 642. We
19 recently rejected this exact argument, however, holding that
20 the BIA’s interpretation of the Immigration and Nationality
21 Act to conclude that an involuntary IUD insertion is not per
22 se grounds for asylum was entitled to deference. Xia Fan
23 Huang v. Holder,
591 F.3d 124, 129-30 (2d Cir. 2010).
7
1 Therefore, in order to constitute persecution, an IUD
2 insertion must involve aggravating circumstances and occur
3 as a result of the applicant’s resistance to the family
4 planning policy. Id. at 128.
5 Liu further argues that even if involuntary IUD
6 insertion does not amount to per se persecution, the agency
7 erred in concluding that her forcible IUD insertion did not
8 rise to the level of persecution. However, the BIA did not
9 err in finding that the circumstances surrounding Liu’s
10 unwilling IUD insertion did not rise to the level of harm
11 required to establish persecution. In her hearing at the
12 immigration court, Liu testified that the IUD resulted in
13 pain in her abdomen, bleeding, and ultimately, an infection.
14 She stated that she asked the family planning officials to
15 remove the IUD, but was refused and given medicine to
16 address her infection, from which she eventually recovered.
17 While these circumstances are unfortunate, they do not
18 constitute the “aggravating circumstances” necessary for the
19 harm Liu suffered to rise to the level of persecution. See
20 M-F-W- & L-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 641-42 (providing that
21 “examples of routine acts implementing China’s family
22 planning policy that are lacking in harm sufficient to
23 constitute persecution include reinsertion of an IUD after
8
1 the removal of an IUD, fines for having removed the IUD that
2 are not excessive, regularly required gynecological exams,
3 and other routine fines and threats for disobeying the
4 policy”).
5 Because the agency reasonably concluded that Liu did
6 not suffer past persecution, she is not entitled to a
7 presumption of future persecution. See 8 C.F.R.
8 § 208.16(b)(1). Furthermore, in her brief, Liu does not
9 raise the issue of future persecution, and makes no argument
10 regarding the likelihood of persecution if she returns to
11 China. Accordingly, we decline to address the issue.
12 Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 541 n.1, 545 n.7
13 (2d Cir. 2005); LNC Invs., Inc. v. Nat’l Westminster Bank,
14 N.J.,
308 F.3d 169, 176 n.8 (2d Cir. 2002). Because Liu
15 failed to establish past persecution, and fails to argue
16 that she would be persecuted if she were to return to China,
17 we conclude that the agency did not err in denying her
18 application for withholding of removal. See 8 C.F.R.
19 § 1208.16(b).
20 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
21 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of
22 removal that the Court previously granted in this petition
23 is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in
9
1 this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for
2 oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with
3 Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second
4 Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b).
5 FOR THE COURT:
6 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk
7
8
10
