ROBIN L. ROSENBERG, District Judge.
Upon review, the Court finds Judge Brannon's recommendations to be well reasoned and correct. The Court agrees with the analysis in Judge Brannon's Report and Recommendations and concludes that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted. The Court also finds, however, that Plaintiff's objections warrant a brief discussion.
The central premise supporting Plaintiff's theory of the case is that a certain summary document, entitled "2008 LTD Booklet-Certificate", was not a plan document for the purposes of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act. Plaintiff states her position as follows:
DE 217 at p. 10.
Judge Brannon concluded that the Booklet-Certificate document was a plan document by citing to, inter alia, Clark v. Hartford Life & Accident Insurance Co., 195 F. App'x 932, 935 (11th Cir. 2006) and Tindell v. Tree of Life, Inc., 672 F.Supp.2d 1300, 1302 n.3 (M.D. Fla. 2009) (citing Ruiz v. Continental Cas. Co., 400 F.3d 986, 990-91 (7th Cir. 2005)). Plaintiff attempts to distinguish the authority relied upon by Judge Brannon by arguing that Judge Brannon's authority is outdated in light of a Supreme Court case, Cigna Corp. v. Amara, 131 S.Ct. 1866 (2011).
A plethora of authority exists for the proposition that (i) the holding in Amara was specifically targeted towards situations where a summary plan document conflicts with a master plan document and (ii) Amara does not address situations where a summary document is the only plan document. E.g., Tetreault v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 769 F.3d 49, 55 (1st Cir. 2014); Liss v. Fidelity Emp'r Servs. Co., 516 F. App'x 468, 473 (6th Cir. 2013). Although the Court's own research has revealed no published Eleventh Circuit case on this issue, the Eleventh Circuit has issued an unpublished opinion that is on point: "Amara only precludes courts from enforcing summary plan descriptions, pursuant to § 1132(a)(1), where the terms of that summary conflict with the terms specified in other, governing documents. However, the Amara Court had no occasion to consider whether the terms of a summary plan description are enforceable where it is the only document. . . ." Bd. of Trustees of Nat'l Elevator Indus. Health Benefit Plan v. Montanile, No. 14-11678, 2014 WL 6657049, at *7 (11th Cir. Nov. 25, 2014). Therefore, because there is no plan document in the instant case for the summary Booklet-Certificate document to conflict with, Amara is inapplicable and the authority relied upon by Judge Brannon remains good law. Moreover, Judge Brannon's conclusion is reinforced by other district courts that have considered this issue. L&W Assoc. Welfare Benefit Plan v. Estate of Wines, No. 12-CV-13524, 2014 WL 117349, at *6 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 13, 2014) ("Amara does not support the broad proposition . . . that a [summary-document] can never serve as an ERISA plan document. . . . [T]he Sixth Circuit [has] recognized that where there is no formal ERISA plan separate and apart from the [summary-document], the [summary-document] is the relevant plan document.") (citing Shaffer v. Rawlings Co., 424 F. App'x 422, 426 (6th Cir. 2011)). In summary, the Court agrees with Judge Brannon that the Booklet-Certificate is a plan document for the purposes of ERISA in this case.
The Court's decision on this matter reverberates throughout the foundation of Plaintiff's objections. The vast majority of Plaintiff's objections trigger in some fashion off of her contention that there is no plan document in this case. For example, Plaintiff's objections as to Count I, IV, XII, XIII, and XIV are essentially that Judge Brannon "misstates" Plaintiff's "real" cause of action. DE 217 at 17. The analysis that Plaintiff objects to, however, is merely premised upon Judge Brannon's conclusion that a plan document exists. Furthermore, the ramifications inherent in Plaintiff's contention that there is no plan document extend even further backward in time than the initiation of the instant case; the sequence of events that ultimately resulted in this litigation were derived from Plaintiff's allegation that the Booklet-Certificate was, essentially, a sham and Judge Brannon, as a result of his conclusion as to the Booklet-Certificate, necessarily viewed those events through the lens of his conclusion. For example, many of Judge Brannon's conclusions necessarily consider Plaintiff's failure to appeal the termination of her disability benefits. Although Plaintiff takes the position that she need not appeal a termination of benefits pursuant to a plan that does not exist, Judge Brannon concluded Plaintiff's central premise—the lack of a plan document—was incorrect, and the Court agrees with Judge Brannon's conclusion for the reasons set forth above.
One last point in Plaintiff's objections warrants discussion. A substantial portion of Plaintiff's objections mischaracterize Judge Brannon's evidentiary-based conclusions. For example, Plaintiff repeatedly asserts that Judge Brannon has concluded that "no harm has been done" by Defendants in this case. DE 217 at 14. This misstates Judge Brannon's Report. The relevant conclusion in Judge Brannon's Report is that Plaintiff has failed to produce evidence of harm to Plaintiff.
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby