MONTE C. RICHARDSON, Magistrate Judge.
In reaching the decision, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had "the following severe impairments: chronic anemia, diabetes mellitus, degenerative disc disease, obesity, arthroplasty, an affective disorder, neuropathy and gastritis." (Tr. 16.) The ALJ also found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform a reduced range of sedentary work. (Tr. 19.)
Plaintiff is appealing the Commissioner's decision that she was not disabled from March 1, 2009 through November 3, 2014. Plaintiff has exhausted her available administrative remedies and the case is properly before the Court. The Court has reviewed the record, the briefs, and the applicable law. For the reasons stated herein, the Commissioner's decision is
The scope of this Court's review is limited to determining whether the Commissioner applied the correct legal standards, McRoberts v. Bowen, 841 F.2d 1077, 1080 (11th Cir. 1988), and whether the Commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence, Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 390 (1971). "Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Crawford v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 363 F.3d 1155, 1158 (11th Cir. 2004). Where the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the district court will affirm, even if the reviewer would have reached a contrary result as finder of fact, and even if the reviewer finds that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's decision. Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991); Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1991). The district court must view the evidence as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the decision. Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995); accord Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating the court must scrutinize the entire record to determine the reasonableness of the Commissioner's factual findings).
Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in assigning minimal weight to the opinions of Drs. Goldman and Reno, who treated Plaintiff, and the opinions of Dr. McCloskey, who performed a consultative examination of Plaintiff. Plaintiff asserts that the opinions of these doctors establish far greater limitations than assessed by the ALJ in the RFC, particularly with respect to lifting, standing, walking, sitting, and the requirement to alternate between these positions. Plaintiff also asserts that the opinions of these doctors are consistent with the underlying record and with each other, and these doctors provided the only opinions from treating/examining sources regarding Plaintiff's work-related limitations. Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ's credibility finding is deficient as a matter of law because he did not consider Plaintiff's 25-year exemplary work history before finding her not credible. Defendant responds that the ALJ properly discounted the opinions of Drs. Goldman, Reno, and McCloskey, and properly concluded that Plaintiff's allegations concerning her subjective symptoms were inconsistent with the evidence of record.
On August 14, 2010, Dr. James McCloskey conducted a consultative examination of Plaintiff. (Tr. 723-27.) Under Functional Limitations, Dr. McCloskey noted:
(Tr. 724.)
On examination, Plaintiff "had an unsteady, asymmetric gait favoring the right lower extremity," her "lower extremity strength was difficult to assess secondary to pain," there was "[d]ecreased sensation over the plantar surface of the feet bilaterally," and "[t]he straight leg test was positive at 15 degrees on the right and 25 degrees on the left." (Tr. 726.) Further, the musculoskeletal examination demonstrated, in relevant part, that:
(Tr. 726-27.) Dr. McCloskey continued: "Range of motion in the hip and lower extremity was difficult to assess secondary to pain and the limited range of motion observed above was most likely secondary to pain and not true limited range of motion of the joint itself." (Tr. 727.)
The doctor's impression was as follows:
(Id.)
Dr. Andrew Reno, a chiropractic doctor, has treated Plaintiff since April 9, 2010 for severe low back pain, right leg pain, and bilateral foot pain. (See Tr. 729.) She was diagnosed with disc displacement, sciatica, lumbar disc degeneration, and spasm of muscle. (Id.) In a September 1, 2010 letter to Dr. Powell, Dr. Reno summarized Plaintiff's treatment as follows:
(Tr. 729-30.) In conclusion, Dr. Reno stated: "Mrs. Wells has applied to Department of Rehabilitative Services for benefits and I have forwarded all notes. At this time[,] I strongly recommend her to not return to work. With her current pain level and presentation[,] I don't feel she could even drive safely to get there." (Tr. 730.)
On September 22, 2014, nurse practitioner Joan Rellmore and Dr. David Goldman co-signed a "Medical Opinion Re: Ability to Do Work-Related Activities (Physical)." (Tr. 1776-77.) They opined that Plaintiff could lift and carry less than ten pounds occasionally and frequently due to back pain and neuropathy, could stand and walk for less than two hours in an eight-hour workday, and could sit for less than two hours in an eight-hour workday. (Tr. 1776.) Further, Plaintiff could sit for 45 minutes and stand for 15 minutes before changing position, she would need to walk around every 15 minutes for 5 minutes, she would need the opportunity to shift positions at will, and would sometimes need to lie down at unpredictable intervals every four hours. (Id.) These limitations were due to radiculopathy from back pain, lesion in the left T7 vertebrae, and weakness in the legs. (Id.)
Dr. Goldman and nurse practitioner Rellmore also opined that Plaintiff could occasionally twist, stoop (bend), crouch, and climb stairs, but never ladders, due to neuropathy and back pain. (Tr. 1777.) They further opined that Plaintiff's reaching, fingering (fine manipulation), handling (gross manipulation), and feeling were affected by her impairment. (Id.) They added that Plaintiff's symptoms were severe enough to constantly interfere with attention and concentration, that she would be absent from work more than four days per month due to her impairments or treatment, and that her symptoms and limitations began in 2007. (Id.)
The ALJ is required to consider all the evidence in the record when making a disability determination. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(3). With regard to medical opinion evidence, "the ALJ must state with particularity the weight given to different medical opinions and the reasons therefor." Winschel v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2011). Substantial weight must be given to a treating physician's opinion unless there is good cause to do otherwise. See Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997).
"`[G]ood cause' exists when the: (1) treating physician's opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating physician's opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor's own medical records." Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240-41 (11th Cir. 2004). When a treating physician's opinion does not warrant controlling weight, the ALJ must nevertheless weigh the medical opinion based on: (1) the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of examination, (2) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship, (3) the medical evidence supporting the opinion, (4) consistency of the medical opinion with the record as a whole, (5) specialization in the medical issues at issue, and (6) any other factors that tend to support or contradict the opinion. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)-(6).
Although a treating physician's opinion is generally entitled to more weight than a consulting physician's opinion, see Wilson v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 513, 518 (11th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2), "[t]he opinions of state agency physicians" can outweigh the contrary opinion of a treating physician if "that opinion has been properly discounted," Cooper v. Astrue, 2008 WL 649244, *3 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 10, 2008). Further, "the ALJ may reject any medical opinion if the evidence supports a contrary finding." Wainwright v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 06-15638, 2007 WL 708971, *2 (11th Cir. Mar. 9, 2007) (per curiam). See also Sryock v. Heckler, 764 F.2d 834, 835 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (same).
Evidence from other sources, e.g., not acceptable medical sources such as nurse-practitioners, may be used to show the severity of a claimant's impairments and how it affects the claimant's ability to work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d); SSR 06-03p. "Since there is a requirement to consider all relevant evidence in an individual's case record, the case record should reflect the consideration of opinions from medical sources who are not `acceptable medical sources' and from `non-medical sources' who have seen the claimant in their professional capacity." SSR 06-03p.
Id.; see also Duncan v. Astrue, Case No. 3:07-cv-751-J-HTS, 2008 WL 1925091, *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 29, 2008) (citing SSR 06-03p); Sloan v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 883, 888-89 (8th Cir. 2007) (same).
The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform sedentary work,
(Tr. 19.)
In making this finding, the ALJ discussed Plaintiff's subjective complaints and the medical evidence, including the opinions of Drs. Goldman, Reno, and McCloskey. (Tr. 20-24.) With respect to the opinions of Dr. Goldman and nurse practitioner Rellmore, the ALJ stated:
(Tr. 23.)
The ALJ next discussed Dr. Reno's opinions as follows:
(Tr. 23-24.)
With respect to Dr. McCloskey's opinions, the ALJ stated:
(Tr. 23.)
The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the ALJ erred in his evaluation of the opinion evidence. Although an ALJ may discount any medical opinion if the evidence supports a contrary finding, in the present case, the ALJ's reasons for discounting the opinions of Drs. Goldman, Reno, and McCloskey are not supported by substantial evidence.
First, in rejecting Dr. Goldman's opinion, the ALJ took the position that the opinion was inconsistent with the treatment notes from the doctor's own clinic, while at the same time, rejecting the opinion because it did not seem clear that Dr. Goldman ever treated or examined Plaintiff. (Tr. 23.) This inconsistency in the ALJ's stated reasons for discounting Dr. Goldman's opinion leaves the Court speculating as to whether the ALJ examined the voluminous record in this case. To the extent the ALJ concluded that Dr. Goldman's opinion was inconsistent with the record as a whole, the ALJ did not provide any indication as to what parts of the record he had in mind. The ALJ similarly discounted Dr. Reno's opinion for being inconsistent with the evidence as a whole, without pointing to any particular evidence in that respect.
Without specific references to the record, which spans over 1900 pages and certainly includes evidence supporting Plaintiff's claim for disability, the Court cannot conclude that the ALJ's decision to discount the doctors' opinions based on somewhat conclusory and internally inconsistent reasons, was supported by substantial evidence. Without attempting to provide a complete picture of Plaintiff's condition and medical records, the Court observes that the record includes detailed reports from multiple emergency room visits, treatment records,
The ALJ also concluded that the opinions of Dr. Reno and Dr. McCloskey were "overly vague." As to Dr. Reno's opinions, the ALJ stated "other than postulating that the claimant could not drive, the chiropractor gave no specific limitations that the claimant's diagnoses caused." (Tr. 23-24.) However, the purpose of Dr. Reno's letter was not to give any particular opinion as to Plaintiff's work-related limitations, but to apprise Dr. Powell of Plaintiff's treatment to date. Clearly, Dr. Reno considered Plaintiff's case to be complicated and that is why he referred Plaintiff to Dr. Powell's office. (See Tr. 729-30.) Dr. Reno stated that he had treated Plaintiff for severe low back pain, right leg pain, and bilateral foot pain since April of 2010. (Tr. 729.) He noted no improvement in Plaintiff's foot pain and only three to four hours of sleep at night. (Tr. 729-30.) Based on Plaintiff's "current pain level and presentation," Dr. Reno recommended that Plaintiff not return to work, and he did not feel that "she could even drive safely to get there." (Tr. 730.) This opinion seems consistent with the opinions of Dr. Goldman and Dr. McCloskey, all of which suggest more severe restrictions than found by the ALJ.
The ALJ found Dr. McCloskey's opinions overly vague in that the doctor stated Plaintiff had "limitations on bending, stooping, crouching, and so on," but did not define what was included in "and so on." (Tr. 23.) Regardless of any ambiguity as to "and so on," Dr. McCloskey issued a detailed report after an examination, during which Plaintiff provided "her best effort." (Tr. 727.) Based on this examination, Dr. McCloskey opined that Plaintiff could be expected to sit for two hours, stand for 30 minutes, and walk for 15 minutes at a time before requiring a break. (Id.) He stated that these limitations were due to lower back pain and radiculopathy.
Based on the foregoing, this case will be remanded with instructions to the ALJ to properly consider the opinions of Drs. Goldman, Reno, and McCloskey, explain what weight they are being accorded, and the reasons therefor. In the event the ALJ decides to reject any portion of these opinions, the ALJ must provide explicit reasons supported by substantial evidence. If, while evaluating the evidence, the ALJ finds that further development of the record is necessary, the ALJ shall take the appropriate steps to do so. In light of this conclusion and the possible change in the RFC assessment, the Court finds it unnecessary to address Plaintiff's argument regarding credibility. See Jackson v. Bowen, 801 F.2d 1291, 1294 n.2 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam); Freese v. Astrue, 2008 WL 1777722, at *3 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 18, 2008); see also Demenech v. Sec'y of the Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 913 F.2d 882, 884 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
Accordingly, it is
1. The Commissioner's decision is
2. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly, terminate any pending motions, and close the file.
3. In the event that benefits are awarded on remand, any § 406(b) or § 1383(d)(2) fee application shall be filed within the parameters set forth by the Order entered in In re: Procedures for Applying for Attorney's Fees Under 42 U.S.C. §§ 406(b) & 1383(d)(2), Case No.: 6:12-mc-124-Orl-22 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 13, 2012). This Order does not extend the time limits for filing a motion for attorney's fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412.