SUSAN C. BUCKLEW, District Judge.
This cause comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress Any and All Physical Evidence and/or Statements (the "Motion to Suppress") (Dkt. 28), to which the government has filed a response in opposition (Dkt. 35). In the motion, Defendant, who has been charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, seeks to suppress a rifle, ammunition, drugs, and other contraband found in his home during an unannounced compliance search by the office of probation on June 11, 2015.
The Court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion on December 11, 2015. Dkt. 42. The government presented the testimony of Alyssia Paul (Florida Department of Corrections Probation Officer assigned to Defendant at the time of the search on June 11, 2015), Kristie Duff (Correctional Probation Specialist, Florida Department of Corrections), Demetri Konstantopoulos, (Sergeant, Sarasota Police Department), and Konstantinos Balos (Special Agent, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives). At the conclusion of the testimony and evidence, the Court made factual findings, which were largely uncontested the parties, and are repeated here in part.
In order to conduct a search of a probationer's house, the probation officer must have a reasonable suspicion that the probationer was violating the terms of his probation. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001) (stating that "[w]hen an officer has reasonable suspicion that a probationer subject to a search condition is engaged in criminal activity, there is enough likelihood that criminal conduct is occurring that an intrusion on the probationer's significantly diminished privacy interests is reasonable"); United States v. Carter, 566 F.3d 970, 975 (11th Cir. 2009) (applying Knights and finding that reasonable suspicion was the standard to be applied to the search of a probationer's home). While the order of probation signed by the state court judge in this case did not include a specific search term, the temporary order of probation used by the probation office to instruct defendant the day after sentencing and which defendant signed did have a search provision. In addition the Court's Order of Probation did contain provisions allowing the probation officer to visit the probationer's home, the requirement that that the probationer answer all inquiries made to him by the probation officer, that he comply with all instruction given to him by the probation officer, and the prohibition against being present in a place where drugs and other intoxicants were being used.
In order to determine whether reasonable suspicion was present, courts look to the "totality of the circumstances of each case to see whether the detaining officer ha[d] a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing." United States v. Yuknavich, 419 F.3d 1302, 1311 (11th Cir. 2005). Here the Court looks to whether the probation officer, and the other officers present, collectively had reasonable suspicion that the defendant was violating his probation at the time of the search. This includes what the officers knew before the search, including their entire experience with probationer. Yuknavich, 419 F.3d at 1311; United States v. Henderson, 145 App'x 346, 351 (11th Cir. 2005). Here, the Court finds that at the time of the search, the probation officers were aware of the following: Defendant had an extensive criminal history and an extensive history of violating the terms of his probation; According to another law enforcement officer, Defendant was associated with persons engaged in criminal activity; Defendant was compliant on two recent residence visits from his probation officer; yet on the day of the unannounced visit, two people lied to probation officer Paul about Defendant's presence in the house; the home smelled of marijuana; and Defendant fled from the back of the house