GREGORY J. KELLY, District Judge.
The Plaintiff Charrise M. Devestern (the "Claimant") brings this action pursuant to the Social Security Act (the "Act"), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (the "Commissioner") denying her claim for disability benefits. Doc. No. 1. Claimant alleges a disability onset date of June 1, 2007, and she is insured for benefits through March 31, 2011. R. 21. Claimant argues that the Administrative Law Judge (the "ALJ") erred by: 1) giving great weight to the July 21, 2011 opinion, of a non-examining psychologist, Dr. Yamir Laboy, but failing to discuss or adopt Dr. Laboy's opinion that Claimant is moderately limited in the ability to complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms; 2) failing to discuss or make findings about the side-effects of Claimant's medications; and 3) failing to account for Claimant's moderate limitations in maintaining concentration, persistence or pace in the ALJ's residual functional capacity assessment ("RFC") or in the hypothetical question to the vocational expert. Doc. No. 17 at 1-16. For the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner's final decision is
The dispositive issue in this case is the ALJ's handling of Dr. Laboy's July 21, 2011, non-examining mental RFC ("MRFC") opinion. R. 435. Claimant maintains that the ALJ erred because even though she gave the opinion great weight, it contains a significant limitation, i.e., a moderate limitation in the ability to complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms, which the ALJ failed to address or adopt in the ALJ's ultimate RFC. Doc. No. 17 at 8-11. The Commissioner argues that the ALJ did not err because Dr. Laboy's ultimate opinion is consistent with the ALJ's RFC. Doc. No. 18 at 5-7.
The ALJ's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla — i.e., the evidence must do more than merely create a suspicion of the existence of a fact, and must include such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the conclusion. Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982) and Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)); accord Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991).
Where the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the Court will affirm, even if the reviewer would have reached a contrary result as finder of fact, and even if the reviewer finds that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's decision. Edwards, 937 F.2d at 584 n.3; Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1991). The Court "`may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner].'" See Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983)).
Weighing the opinions and findings of treating, examining, and non-examining physicians is an integral part of the ALJ's sequential evaluation process for determining disability. In cases like this one, involving the ALJ's handling of the medical opinions, "substantial-evidence review . . . involves some intricacy." Gaskin v. Commissioner of Social Security, 533 Fed.Appx. 929, 931 (11th Cir. Aug. 14, 2013) (unpublished).
On July 21, 2011, Dr. Yamir Laboy, a psychologist, completed a MRFC based upon a records review. R. 433-35. A MRFC is a form that contains a series of check boxes in Section I and, in Section III, the doctor provides his or her functional capacity assessment. See R. 433-35. Section III of the MRFC constitutes the doctor's medical opinion. See Jones v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 478 Fed.Appx. 610, 612 (11th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (Section III contains medical opinion); Land v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 494 Fed.Appx. 47, 49-50 (11th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (stating that checking the box in Section I of a mental RFC assessment form does not indicate the degree and extent of the limitation but rather is an aid before the doctor renders his or her RFC determination in Section III). Dr. Laboy opined, in part, that Claimant "may evidence some moderate difficulty . . . completing a normal workday or week free from interruptions from psychological [symptoms]." R. 435.
In the decision, the ALJ does not discuss any particular aspect of Dr. Laboy's opinion, but states:
R. 28. Thus, the ALJ gave "great weight" to Dr. Laboy's opinion because it is well supported by the medical evidence of record, including subsequent unspecified evidence that the ALJ found "credible and relevant." R. 28.
With respect to Claimant's non-exertional mental impairments, the ALJ determined that Claimant retains the RFC for "simple, routine and repetitive tasks performed in a work environment free of fast-paced production requirements involving only simple work-related decision and routine work place changes. The claimant is limited to a workplace environment that isolated from the public with only occasional supervision and only occasional interaction with co-workers." R. 23. On its face, the ALJ's RFC does not account for a moderate limitation in completing a normal workday or workweek without interruptions from psychological symptoms. Compare R. 23 with R. 435. Moreover, the ALJ never articulates why, if she gave Dr. Laboy's opinion great weight, she did not include or account for such a limitation in the RFC. R. 28. It could be that the ALJ rejected that portion of Dr. Laboy's opinion, but without the ALJ articulating her reasons for doing so, the Court cannot determine if it is supported by substantial evidence. See Winschel, 631 F.3d at 1179 ("It is possible that the ALJ considered and rejected these two medical opinions, but without clearly articulated grounds for such a rejection, we cannot determine whether the ALJ's conclusions were rational and supported by substantial evidence.").
Dr. Laboy's opinion that Claimant is moderately limited in the ability to complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms is significant because "only an ability to do full-time work will permit the ALJ to render a decision of not disabled." Kelley v. Apfel, 185 F.3d 1211, 1214-15 (11th Cir. 1999). While the Commissioner correctly points out that other aspects of Dr. Laboy's opinion are substantially similar to the ALJ's ultimate RFC, a moderate difficulty completing a normal workday or workweek is clearly a more restrictive limitation that those contained in the ALJ's RFC. Doc. No. 18 at 5-7; R. 23.
For the reasons stated above, it is
DONE and ORDERED.
