ROBERT N. CHATIGNY, District Judge.
Pending is the defendant's second motion for a reduction in sentence pursuant to the First Step Act of 2019, ECF No. 747, which is largely duplicative of his first motion. The government opposes the motion, as it did the first one. The motion is denied for substantially the same reasons that were provided in the ruling denying the first motion. Like the previous denial, this denial is without prejudice to the filing of a new motion. However, no further motion should be filed and, in any event, no such motion will be granted, unless the defendant is able to point to changes in his present circumstances that provide extraordinary and compelling reasons to warrant a reduction in his sentence consistent with the Sentencing Commission's policy statement on compassionate release.
In December 2013, the defendant was sentenced to 144 months' imprisonment for conspiracy to commit wire fraud (2 counts) and wire fraud (16 counts). The defendant pleaded guilty in the middle of a multiweek, multidefendant jury trial, then, months later, he attempted without success to withdraw his guilty pleas. His convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal.
The offense conduct to which the defendant pleaded guilty encompassed his activities as the organizer and leader of two conspiracies involving wire fraud: an investment scheme that foreseeably caused losses of more than $2 million to numerous individual victims for whom the financial losses were life-altering; and a real estate scheme that resulted in losses to mortgage lenders of more than $23 million, as well as additional harm, both economic and non-economic, to numerous individuals. Due primarily to the extent of the financial losses resulting from the real estate scheme, but also because of,
The defendant's final sentence of 144 months, a 55% reduction from the bottom of the range, took account of the excessiveness of the guideline range for a non-violent, first-time offender. In addition, a substantial variance was warranted in light of a combination of factors, including the defendant's age (48 at the time of the sentencing); his family ties and responsibilities as the father of two young children; his lack of criminal intent at the outset of the first scheme; the minimal financial benefit he derived from the schemes compared to the amounts of the financial losses sustained by victims; and, most importantly, an untreated mental condition that likely was a factor in his offense conduct and thus mitigated his culpability.
The defendant began serving his sentence in January 2014, approximately 71 months ago. He has therefore served a little less than half of his sentence of 144 months. His projected release date is March 1, 2024.
The defendant is serving his sentence at Estill Federal Correctional Institution ("FCI Estill") in South Carolina. In early 2018, he had a heart attack, which required triple bypass surgery and follow-up medical care at another facility. Since his return to FCI Estill, he has reported some chest wall pain, but his condition has been repeatedly reported as "stable." In light of this, the defendant's previous motion for compassionate release was denied. In the present motion, the defendant does not allege any significant change in circumstances regarding his heart condition, except to argue that the ongoing stress of confinement puts him at increased risk of another heart attack. During the defendant's incarceration, his mother has passed away. His two children remain in the care of their mother.
The First Step Act of 2019, in a section entitled "Increasing Use and Transparency of Compassionate Release," modified the compassionate release statute to enable a federal prisoner to petition the sentencing court for a reduction in his sentence.
In eliminating the requirement of a BOP motion, Congress did not modify the substantive standard governing eligibility for compassionate release. Now, as before, a federal prisoner may qualify for compassionate release if (1) "extraordinary and compelling" circumstances warrant a reduction in his sentence; and (2) a reduction would be "consistent with the applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
The applicable policy statement is found in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 and Commentary. The Sentencing Commission formulated this policy statement pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(t).
The requirement of a determination by the Director of the BOP that "Other Reasons" exist to support a sentence reduction under the residual category has not been revisited by the Sentencing Commission since the First Step Act eliminated the requirement of a motion by the BOP. District court opinions have diverged concerning the need for a determination by the Director of the BOP that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist to support a sentence reduction under the residual category when the defendant has directly petitioned for a sentence reduction pursuant to the First Step Act.
Defendant argues that the following circumstances, individually and collectively, provide "extraordinary and compelling reasons" warranting his compassionate release:
1. I wrongly rejected the claim in his habeas petition that his guilty pleas were coerced by his counsel.
2. I erred in sentencing him on the incorrect assumption that he had no empathy for his victims.
3. I erred in sentencing him because he actually did make some payments to victims "out of the goodness of [his] heart," rather than as "smoke-and-mirror" payments pursuant to the fraudulent scheme to which he pleaded guilty.
4. I erred in sentencing him because the Government withheld relevant bank records.
5. His medical condition warrants his immediate release.
6. When he pleaded guilty he expected to receive a much lesser sentence than the one I imposed.
7. I erred in sentencing him by treating certain institutional lenders as victims.
8. His counsel were ineffective in failing to object to the inclusion of the lenders as victims.
9. He was misled into pleading guilty because he would not have changed his plea if he had known he could get a sentence of 10 years or more.
10. His continued confinement has negative consequences for his family, especially his children.
11. His counsel violated the ABA rules of professional conduct because he did not want to plead guilty.
12. I penalized him at sentencing for seeking to withdraw his guilty plea.
13. A delay in fully adjudicating his habeas petition has resulted in prejudice to him.
14. The level of coercion he experienced to plead guilty, even if insufficient for purposes of habeas relief, is sufficient for purposes of compassionate release.
15. His decision to change his pleas and the sentence he received are tainted by a witness's perjury.
16. The Government's attorneys have lied to the Court on multiple occasions, including about his medical care in prison.
Def. Br., at *8-*18.
None of these circumstances, alone or in combination, provides a basis for compassionate release.
The defendant's assertions concerning his guilty pleas and sentence are substantially the same as assertions he made in his first motion for compassionate release. In denying that motion, I stated that none of the defendant's assertions
ECF No. 753, at *7. I continue to believe that defendant's assertions concerning his guilty pleas and sentence do not provide a basis for compassionate release.
Under the First Step Act, the reasons for reducing a sentence of imprisonment must be "consistent with the applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(I). The applicable policy statement permits a sentence reduction for reasons related to the defendant's advanced age, physical or mental infirmity, and exigent family circumstances. Other reasons that may satisfy the "extraordinary and compelling" standard under the residual category have been suggested: the defendant's youth at the time of the offense conduct, the defendant's extraordinary rehabilitation, and changes in sentencing policies and penalties.
Perhaps the "extraordinary and compelling" standard in the residual category may permit legal errors that are no longer subject to correction on collateral attack to be given weight, as an equitable matter, in the context of a case involving an extraordinarily long sentence in which the factors explicitly mentioned in the Commission's policy statement are present to a substantial degree. But this is far from such a case: the defendant's arguments concerning his guilty pleas and sentence rehash arguments that failed on direct appeal, or are part of his still pending habeas case; he received a very substantial variance and has thus far served about 71 months; the factors explicitly mentioned in the Commission's policy statement are not present to a substantial degree; and the other factors the defendant cites in his motion are not reasonably encompassed by the "extraordinary and compelling" standard. Accordingly, I adhere to my view that the defendant's arguments concerning his guilty pleas and sentence do not provide a basis for relief here.
As mentioned, the defendant's medical condition appears to be substantially the same as it was when I denied his first motion for compassionate release. The defendant's concerns about the medical care he has received are not unfounded, as I acknowledged in the ruling denying his first motion. ECF No. 753, at *6. But his heart condition is not nearly as grave as the medical conditions that have been found to justify compassionate release in other cases.
Defendant's response to his medical providers' repeated conclusions that his heart condition is stable is simply that "`STABLE' is insufficient.'" Def. Br., at *10. But the applicable Sentencing Commission policy statement requires that any medical condition "substantially diminish[] the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility." U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, A.N. 1(A)(ii)(I). My decision on the defendants' motion must be "consistent" with the policy statement. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(I). Defendant has not provided or alleged the existence of any evidence that would indicate he has a diminished capacity for self-care because of his condition, and, indeed, he seems to accept the premise that his condition is stable. Accordingly, his medical condition does not, at this time, present an "extraordinary and compelling" reason to grant relief.
The defendant's argument concerning the hardship his continued confinement imposes on his family is repetitive of the argument he made in his first motion, which I rejected as insufficient to justify compassionate release.
The applicable policy statement provides that compassionate release may be granted due to family circumstances in the event of
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, A.N. 1(C). Defendant does not allege that the caregiver for his children has died or become incapacitated.
Nor do the defendant's allegations concerning his children provide a basis for relief under the residual category. The circumstances he alleges are unfortunately not at all "extraordinary."
Defendant argues that an "[e]xtraordinary delay in processing" his habeas petition has "caused prejudice." Def. Br., at *17. Defendant filed a habeas petition alleging thirty-five grounds for relief on July 11, 2014.
Given the foregoing history, the delay in adjudicating the defendant's habeas petition is not extraordinary. Moreover, no case has been cited or found that suggests delay in habeas litigation provides a basis for compassionate release.
Finally, the defendant argues that he should be released because the government has lied to the court about his medical condition. The defendant takes issue with the government's statement, made on December 12, 2018, that he "ha[d] a pending consultation with a cardiologist." Def. Br., at *18. Medical records provided to the court indicate that on November 30, 2018, defendant's medical provider requested an offsite cardiology consultation, which was pending at the time the government made the disputed statement. In view of the medical records, I cannot conclude that the government's lawyers "lie[d]" when they said the defendant had a pending consultation with a cardiologist. Even if the government had undertaken to mislead me concerning the defendant's medical condition, compassionate release would not be in order unless the defendant's actual condition warranted his release. As discussed above, that is not the case.
Accordingly, the motion is hereby denied.
So ordered.
