REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

BERNARD M. JONES, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiff, Pravina Desai, seeks judicial review of the Social Security Administration's denial of her application for disability insurance benefits (DIB). United States District Judge Stephen P. Friot has referred the matter for proposed findings and recommendations. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C). The Commissioner has filed the Administrative Record (AR), [Doc. No. 9], and both parties have briefed their positions.1 For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the Commissioner's decision be reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

I. Procedural Background

On October 27, 2017, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued an unfavorable decision finding Plaintiff was not disabled and, therefore, not entitled to DIB. AR 12-31. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. Id. at 1-6. Accordingly, the ALJ's decision constitutes the Commissioner's final decision. See Krauser v. Astrue, 638 F.3d 1324, 1327 (10th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff timely commenced this action for judicial review.

II. The ALJ's Decision

The ALJ followed the multi-step sequential evaluation process required by agency regulations. See Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1051 (10th Cir. 2009) (explaining process); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The ALJ first determined Plaintiff met the insured status requirement through September 30, 2019 and has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since March 20, 2013, her alleged onset date. AR 14.

At steps two and three, the ALJ determined Plaintiff suffers from severe "lumbar degenerative disc disease, status post laminectomy and fragment removal, scoliosis, recalcitrant plantar fasciitis on the right side, osteoarthritis, diabetes mellitus, hyperlipidemia, gastroparesis, anxiety and depression" but that her impairments do not meet or medically equal any of the impairments listed at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1. Id.

The ALJ next determined Plaintiff's residual functional capacity (RFC), concluding, in relevant part, she can perform sedentary work with exertional and non-exertional limitations and can "perform simple and some complex tasks." Id. at 16. Finally, at step four, the ALJ determined Plaintiff can perform her past relevant work as a claim processor, Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) 241.362-010, and is therefore not disabled for purposes of the Social Security Act. See id. at 30.

III. Claim Presented for Judicial Review

According to Plaintiff, her past relevant work as a claim processor requires a reasoning level of four, which is inconsistent with her ability to perform only "simple and some complex tasks." Pl.'s Br. at 3-5.

IV. Standard of Review

Judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision is limited to determining whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole and whether the correct legal standards were applied. See Poppa v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 2009).

V. Analysis

A vocational expert (VE) described Plaintiff's past work as a claim processor as requiring a "SVP of 4," AR 58, which is how it is described in the DOT. See DOT 241.362-010, 1991 WL 672250. Plaintiff argues this reasoning level is inconsistent with her ability to perform only "simply and some complex tasks." Pl.'s Br. at 2-5. The Court agrees.

As described in the DOT, reasoning level four requires the ability to "[a]pply principles of rational systems to solve practical problems and deal with a variety of concrete variables in situations where only limited standardization exists" and "[i]nterpret a variety of instructions furnished in written, oral, diagrammatic, or schedule form." DOT 241.362-010, 1991 WL 672250. "Examples of rational systems are: bookkeeping, internal combustion engines, electric wiring systems, house building, farm management, and navigation." Id.

As Plaintiff argues, this Court has frequently followed Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168 (10th Cir. 2005), where the Tenth Circuit found that an RFC limiting a claimant to "simple and routine work tasks" appeared inconsistent with jobs requiring a reasoning level of three. Id. at 1176; see also, Sly v. Berryhill, No. CIV-17-781-BMJ, 2018 WL 1954836, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 25, 2018); Hilliard v. Berryhill, No. CIV-17-424-BMJ, 2018 WL 1221485, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 8, 2018); Farris v. Berryhill, No. CIV-16-359-HE, 2017 WL 2303521 at *1, *6 (W.D. Okla. May 25, 2017) (distinguishing unpublished cases and collecting cases in support). The circumstances here are slightly different, as Plaintiff can perform not only simple tasks, but simple and "some complex" tasks. Supra at 2. For this reason, the Commissioner argues Hackett is inapplicable. See Def.'s Br. at 7.2 But the Court continues to find Hackett's reasoning persuasive.

In Hackett, the court compared the claimant's ability to perform "simple and routine" tasks with the level three reasoning, "which requires the worker to `apply commonsense understanding to carry out detailed but uninvolved written or oral instructions and deal with problems involving a few concrete variables in or from standardized situations,'" and found them incompatible. Hackett, 395 F.3d at 1176 (citation and internal brackets omitted). Applying the same reasoning here, a claimant's ability to complete only "some" complex tasks seems incompatible with the reasoning required for "bookkeeping, internal combustion engines, electric wiring systems, house building, farm management, and navigation." Supra at 3. In other words, "[t]he ALJ's RFC finding . . . of an ability to perform simple and some complex tasks would appear to include jobs requiring a level-three reasoning ability." Rackley v. Colvin, No. CIV-13-500-M, 2014 WL 1338081, at *5 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 2, 2014).

The Court recognizes that the VE testified a hypothetical claimant with Plaintiff's RFC could perform a reasoning level four job, AR 58-59, and did not identify any conflict between the testimony and DOT. See id. at 57-61. But it appears that a conflict did in fact exist, and thus the ALJ was required to elicit a reasonable explanation for the discrepancy. See Haddock, 196 F.3d at 1087; see also Farris, 2017 WL 2303531, at *7 (collecting cases holding that an ALJ is required to elicit a reasonable explanation for a conflict between a VE's testimony and the DOT, where a conflict in fact exists, even if the VE did not identify a conflict during testimony).

RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff's limitation to "simple and some complex" tasks appears incompatible with reasoning level four work and thus the Court should reverse and remand the Commissioner's decision for further proceedings.

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT

The parties are advised of their right to object to this Report and Recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636. Any objection must be filed with the Clerk of the District Court by October 21, 2019. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to make timely objection to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate review of the factual and legal issues addressed herein. See Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656 (10th Cir. 1991).

STATUS OF REFERRAL

This Report and Recommendation terminates the referral by the District Judge in this matter.