ORDER

ANNE C. CONWAY, District Judge.

This cause comes before the Court on Defendant Nancy Calhoun's Motion for Attorney Fees, filed on November 8, 2013. (Doc. No. 25). Plaintiff The Travelers Home and Marine Insurance Company ("Travelers") responded in opposition. (Doc. No. 26).

On February 21, 2014, Magistrate Judge Lammens submitted a report recommending that Defendant's Motion for Attorney Fees be granted in part and denied in part. (Doc. No. 28).

After an independent de novo review of the record in this matter, including the objection filed by Defendant (Doc. No. 29) and Defendant's Motion for Leave to File Under Seal Unredacted Time Records (Doc. No. 30), the Court agrees entirely with the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the Report and Recommendation. ("R & R").

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

On May 28, 2013, Travelers filed this suit against Defendant Nancy Calhoun ("Defendant") for declaratory relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2201 and 2202. (Doc. No. 1). In its Complaint, Travelers sought a declaration that it properly handled Defendant's uninsured/underinsured motorist claim and that it was not liable to Defendant for any amount over the at issue policy limit. (Id. at p. 6). Defendant responded to the Complaint by filing its Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. No. 12). Relying on the abstention doctrine, the Court granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and dismissed Travelers' Complaint without prejudice. (Doc. No. 24). On November 8, 2013, Defendant filed her Motion for Attorney Fees, seeking to recover fees under Florida Statute § 627.428. (Doc. No. 25). On February 21, 2014, Judge Lammens issued the R & R, recommending that Defendant's Motion for Attorney Fees be granted "to the extent that Defendant be awarded $7,410.00 in attorney's fees and otherwise denied." (Doc. No. 28 at p. 9).

II. LEGAL STANDARD

In the Eleventh Circuit, a district judge may accept, reject or modify a magistrate judge's report and recommendation after conducting a careful and complete review of the findings and recommendations. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Williams v. Wainwright, 681 F.2d 732, 732 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1112, 103 S.Ct. 744 (1983). A district judge must conduct a de novo review of the portions of a magistrate judge's report and recommendation to which a party objects. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). This requires that the district judge "give fresh consideration to those issues to which specific objection has been made by a party." Jeffrey S. v. State Bd. of Educ., 896 F.2d 507, 512 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing H.R. Rep. No. 94-1609, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 6162, 6163). A district judge reviews legal conclusions de novo, even in the absence of an objection. See Cooper-Houston v. Southern Ry., 37 F.3d 603, 604 (11th Cir. 1994).

III. DISCUSSION

Defendant does not object to Judge Lammens' recommendation that an award of fees in this case is warranted. (Doc. No. 28 at pp. 2-5).1 The Court does not address this issue any further. Next, the Court turns to Defendant's objections to the Magistrate Judge's calculation of fees.

A. Defendant's Motion for Leave to File Under Seal & Hours Reasonably Expended

Initially, the Court denies Defendant's request to file unredacted time sheets for the Court to consider in conjunction with Defendant's objections. Because Defendant's Motion for Leave to File Under Seal presents issues intertwined with Defendant's objections as to the reasonableness and relatedness of certain entries in her fee request, the Court addresses these issues together. In regards to the severely redacted versions of these records, Magistrate Judge Lammens stated:

(Id. at pp. 6-7) (internal citations omitted). Defendant now claims that the "subject entries were redacted in an abundance of caution to prevent disclosure of attorney-client and work-product information." (Doc. No. 29 at p. 3). However, these unredacted records were not made available to the Magistrate Judge and, even more significantly, Defendant made no explanation for the heavy redaction of these records until after Judge Lammens issued the R & R. Defendant offers no valid reason for her failure to present this argument to the Magistrate Judge in the first instance. As the First Circuit Court of Appeals stated, "it would be fundamentally unfair to permit a litigant to set its case in motion before the magistrate, wait to see which way the wind was blowing, and — having received an unfavorable recommendation — shift gears before the district judge." Paterson-Leitch Co. v. Mass. Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 840 F.2d 985, 991 (1st Cir. 1988).

It is in the Court's "broad discretion" whether to consider new evidence after Defendant previously had the opportunity to offer it, but decidedly chose not to. See Williams v. McNeil, 557 F.3d 1287, 1292 (11th Cir. 2009) ("[A] district court has discretion to decline to consider a party's argument when that argument was not first presented to the magistrate judge."). Moreover, in her objection, Defendant specifically noted that "[r]egarding the scope of review, litigants generally must present their evidence and arguments to the magistrate judge in the first instance to preserve review. . . ." (Doc. No. 29 at p. 3 n.3 (citations omitted)). The Court finds it inappropriate to consider evidence and arguments presented for the first time in Defendant's objections, and therefore declines to do so. See Williams, 557 F.3d at 1291 (approving district court's refusal to consider new argument set forth in objections where party had opportunity to present such argument to magistrate judge and failed to do so); see also United States v. Howell, 231 F.3d 615, 621 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that district courts are not required to consider evidence presented for the first time in objections to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation).

With respect to the number of hours expended in this matter, the Court agrees entirely with Judge Lammens' analysis. Confusingly, Defendant seems to accept that certain entries are clearly not related to this federal case by not raising any objection to their omission, (see, e.g., Doc. No. 25-1 (5.80 hours on "Appear for/attend m/leave to amend; travel re: same (cancelled)), yet still claims entitlement to the full amount previously requested, i.e., $15,980.00. (Compare (Doc. No. 25 at p. 7), with (Doc. No. 29 at p. 6)). As to Defendant's invitation for the Court to now consider specific and detailed explanation of the time entries (Doc. No. 29 at p. 4), the Court declines for the same reasons previously stated. See Williams, 557 F.3d at 1291. As such, these objections are overruled.

After de novo review, the Court finds that the Magistrate Judge's legal reasoning and factual findings are correct and adopts the same rationale set forth in the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. The Court finds that the entries outlined by Judge Lammens (Doc. No. 28 at p. 7) are not sufficiently specific and detailed to show that the time expended was reasonable, necessary, and directly related to this federal case. Defendant has failed to meet her burden to prove the amount of fees, which she herself has recognized that she must do. (See Doc. No. 25 at p. 4 ("The burden is on Ms. Calhoun to prove the amount if its [sic] fees.")). After eliminating the time from these entries, "what remains in terms of countable time is 3.0 hours expended by Attorney Marino and 31.8 hours expended by Attorney Wimbush." (Doc. No. 28 at p. 8).

B. Reasonable Hourly Rates

The Court also overrules Defendant's objections as to Magistrate Judge Lammens' calculation of the hourly rates of Attorney Marino and Attorney Wimbush. On this issue, Judge Lammens found:

(Id. at p. 8). The Court agrees with this analysis. The cases cited by Defendant in her objections either mistakenly focus on cases from different localities and courts, or simply are not persuasive as to this case.

"A reasonable hourly rate is the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation." Norman v. Hous. Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1988). "The general rule is that the `relevant market' for purposes of determining the reasonable hourly rate for an attorney's services is `the place where the case is filed.'" Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ga. v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 437 (11th Cir. 1999) (quoting Cullens v. Ga. Dep't of Transp., 29 F.3d 1489, 1494 (11th Cir. 1994)). "If a fee applicant desires to recover the non-local rates of an attorney who is not from the place in which the case was filed, he must show a lack of attorneys practicing in that place who are willing and able to handle his claims." Barnes, 168 F.3d at 437; see also Brooks v. Ga. State Bd. of Elections, 997 F.2d 857, 869 (11th Cir. 1993) (upholding decision to award non-local rates based on the district court's finding that there were no local attorneys who could have handled the case); Am. Charities for Reasonable Fundraising Regulation, Inc. v. Pinellas Cnty., 278 F.Supp.2d 1301, 1310 n.4 (M.D. Fla. 2003). Defendant has made no such showing.

Based upon the Court's experience and familiarity with rates in the Ocala Division, the Court finds that a rate of $350.00 per hour is appropriate for Attorney Marino and a rate of $200.00 per hour is appropriate for Attorney Wimbush. Therefore, the Court finds the following to be an appropriate fee award to Defendant for this case:

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, it is ORDERED as follows: