JORDAN, Circuit Judge.
Daoud Chehazeh appeals the May 24, 2010 order of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey dismissing, for lack of jurisdiction, his "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Stay of Removal Proceedings."
Chehazeh is a Syrian native and citizen who, prior to 1999, lived in Damascus and worked as a travel agent. As part of his business, Chehazeh helped his customers to obtain Saudi Arabian work visas through his contacts in the Saudi Arabian embassy. In 1999, one of those contacts allegedly defrauded Chehazeh of 7 million Syrian lire that Chehazeh had paid to obtain visas. Chehazeh was left indebted to his customers and so borrowed 3.5 million lire from several moneylenders to help meet those debts. Soon afterwards, he travelled to Saudi Arabia to confront the person he believed had defrauded him. After failing in that attempt, he came to the United States rather than returning to Syria. He was admitted to this country on July 3, 2000, on a non-immigrant visa that authorized him to stay here until January 2, 2001. His family in Syria subsequently informed him that his creditors were pursuing legal action against him and had put a lien on his house. Chehazeh claims he was afraid that if he returned to Syria, he would be put in jail, and so he stayed in
Chehazeh settled in Northern Virginia and began attending the Dar al Hijra mosque in Falls Church. Through that affiliation, he became acquainted with two Saudi men named Hanji Hanjour and Nawaf al-Hazmi, who told him that they were in the United States studying to become pilots. On at least one occasion, Hanjour and al-Hazmi visited Chehazeh in his apartment. On September 25, 2001, while watching news coverage of the September 11, 2001 attacks, Chehazeh recognized pictures of Hanjour and al-Hazmi and heard that they were two of the individuals suspected of perpetrating the attacks. Chehazeh "felt compelled to tell the U.S. authorities everything [he] knew about Hanjour and Hamzi [sic]." (App. at 41.) As a result, he made several attempts to contact the FBI, but his efforts were impeded by his inability to speak English. Finally, on September 28, 2001, he was able to communicate with someone at the FBI and, during an interview that day, provided FBI agents with the information he had regarding Hanjour and al-Hazmi. The FBI brought him in for additional questioning on October 1, 2001, after which— no doubt to his distress—he was detained and placed in the custody of the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS").
On October 19, 2001, the INS issued a Notice to Appear charging Chehazeh with being a removable alien. He did not dispute his removability but submitted an application for asylum and sought withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture ("CAT"). Prior to a merits hearing on his application, Chehazeh was transferred back to FBI custody on a material witness warrant. Although the timing is unclear, it appears that Chehazeh bounced between INS and FBI custody from November 2001 until the date of the eventual hearing on his asylum application on May 24, 2002.
During that hearing, the Immigration Judge ("IJ") granted Chehazeh's application for asylum pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1158, withholding of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A), and withholding of removal pursuant to the CAT. In so doing, the IJ first found that, although Chehazeh's application for asylum had not been filed within a year of his entering the country as required by § 1158(a)(2)(B), his application was still timely because it was motivated by "events that ha[d] happened to [him] since the time that [he was] arrested," namely, that he had "developed a new fear ... after people realized that [he was] giving information to the FBI."
Next, the IJ found Chehazeh to be credible and "an exceptional, honest person," explaining that he had been "arrested only because [he] asked the FBI to please accept information that [he] felt that [he] had that related to terrorists who destroyed the World Trade Center." (App. at 48.) The IJ also noted that "the FBI ha[d] carefully examined [his] case and [he was deemed] no longer to be of special interest.... That mean[t] that what [he'd] said
The IJ then concluded that Chehazeh was a member of a social group comprising hopeless debtors who, the IJ determined, faced a denial of fundamental rights, including the lack of a fair trial and severe prison conditions in Syria. The IJ found that, due to Chehazeh's membership in that group, there was a "clear likelihood of persecution in Syria should [he] be returned there" and that "[t]he physical abuse that would be lodged against [him] is specifically described by the State Department as torture." (App. at 60-61.) As a result, the IJ granted his applications for asylum and for withholding of removal.
The INS appealed to the BIA, claiming that the IJ erred by considering Chehazeh's asylum application to be timely, by finding that he was a member of a social group comprising hopeless debtors, and by finding that he would be unable to obtain a fair trial in Syria. The INS also claimed that the IJ "should have recused herself due to her inability to be fair and impartial." (App. at 311.) With respect to the IJ's alleged bias, the INS stated:
(Id.)
Despite filing an appeal, the INS never submitted any briefing and, consequently, the BIA dismissed the appeal on August 20, 2004. The IJ's order thus became the final outcome of the agency proceedings, or so it appeared.
Nearly three years later, on August 9, 2007, the Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE"), which had succeeded to the responsibilities of the INS,
On December 13, 2007, without explicitly ruling on ICE's motion to reopen, the BIA "exercise[d] [its] sua sponte authority to reopen proceedings," pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). (App. at 112.) The BIA explained that, because "the FBI has been unable to rule out the possibility that [Chehazeh] poses a threat to the national security of the United States .... reopening and remand of proceedings is warranted under these circumstances." (Id.) The BIA added—though not, it seemed, as a reason for reopening but as an instruction for further proceedings—that the remand should be "for a new hearing before a different Immigration Judge," because of "instances in the record" that suggested "that the Immigration Judge was not conducting the hearings in a generally fair manner."
On November 6, 2009, Chehazeh filed in the District Court his "Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Stay of Removal Proceedings," listing the Attorney General and the Secretary of Homeland Security as respondents. Chehazeh asked the Court to issue an immediate stay of the removal proceedings, to declare that the BIA's decision to reopen the proceedings was contrary to law, and to remand with orders for the BIA to reinstate his grant of asylum and to terminate the removal proceedings. He noted that the action arose under the APA and asserted that the District Court could exercise jurisdiction through a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
The government moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. In particular, the government argued that the Court lacked habeas jurisdiction because Chehazeh was not in "custody" for purposes of habeas corpus, even though he was subject to removal proceedings. The government also argued that the case should be dismissed for several other reasons: because the District Court was deprived of jurisdiction by the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005);
On May 24, 2010, the District Court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that Chehazeh was not in custody and therefore there was no basis for habeas jurisdiction. The District Court did not address any of the alternative bases for jurisdiction identified in Chehazeh's petition. On July 2, 2010, Chehazeh filed a timely Notice of Appeal to our Court.
We have jurisdiction to review the District Court's decision pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Whether the District Court had jurisdiction is the only issue on appeal and is discussed below.
We exercise plenary review over an order dismissing a complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir.2006).
On appeal, Chehazeh argues that the District Court erred by concluding that he was not in custody for purposes of habeas review, and that, even if that were correct, the Court could have exercised jurisdiction through a writ of mandamus or a declaratory judgment and erred by failing to address those alternative avenues for relief. Chehazeh also argues that the District Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and the APA. The government responds that Chehazeh was not in custody and that, even if some other avenue for review (such as the APA) might otherwise be available, review is precluded by the REAL ID Act. The government further contends that Chehazeh has not exhausted his administrative remedies and that the BIA's exercise of its sua sponte reopening authority is unreviewable.
We are persuaded that the District Court has jurisdiction under § 1331 and may, under the APA, review Chehazeh's petition.
The Supreme Court has held that 28 U.S.C. § 1331 "confer[s] jurisdiction on federal courts to review agency action," "subject only to preclusion-of-review statutes created or retained by Congress." Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977). The scope and limitations on that review are defined by the APA, which permits judicial review for any "person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely
We have previously explained that the APA standards for determining the reviewability of agency decisions are applicable to decision-making in the immigration sphere. See Smriko, 387 F.3d at 290-91 ("Decisions of the BIA are agency actions within the meaning of the APA," and, therefore, "we have jurisdiction to review [a BIA decision] so long as the INA does not preclude that judicial review and the issues so presented are not committed to agency discretion."); M.B. v. Quarantillo, 301 F.3d 109 (3d Cir.2002) (holding that the APA enabled a district court to review the Attorney General's decision regarding an application for special immigration juvenile status because the INA did not preclude review of that decision and the decision was not committed to agency discretion). On general principles, then, the District Court had jurisdiction over Chehazeh's claims under § 1331 and could have reviewed the BIA's decision to reopen Chehazeh's removal proceedings pursuant to the APA if (1) the BIA's action was not "committed to agency discretion by law," 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2); (2) no statute precluded review, 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1); (3) the BIA's action was a "final agency action," 5 U.S.C. § 704; and (4) no "special statutory review" provision required that Chehazeh's action be brought in some other form or forum, 5 U.S.C. § 703. We consider each of those requirements below.
The government, relying on Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 475 (3d Cir.2003), and related cases, argues that the BIA has "unfettered discretion" (Letter Brief of Appellee at 5 (July 15, 2011)) regarding whether to reopen removal proceedings and, therefore, a BIA decision to sua sponte reopen proceedings is committed to agency discretion by law. Those precedents, however, were based on BIA decisions declining to sua sponte reopen removal proceedings. See Calle-Vujiles, 320 F.3d at 475 ("[T]his court is without jurisdiction to review a [BIA] decision declining to exercise [sua sponte ] discretion to reopen or reconsider [a] case." (emphasis added)); Alzaarir v. Att'y Gen., 639 F.3d 86, 89 n. 2 (3d Cir.2011) ("[T]he BIA's decision not to reopen the proceedings sua sponte. ... is a discretionary decision beyond our jurisdiction." (emphasis added)). We have never decided whether a BIA decision to reopen, as opposed to declining to reopen, is committed to agency discretion.
The BIA's authority to sua sponte reopen removal proceedings comes from 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a), which states that "[t]he Board may at any time reopen or reconsider on its own motion any case in which it has rendered a decision." The regulation provides no guidance on how that authority should be exercised, but the BIA has explained that it is not boundless:
In re J-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 976, 984 (BIA 1997) (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). It is apparent, therefore, that the BIA views its authority to reopen as being limited and only available in "exceptional situations," id., not as being "unfettered," despite the government's current claim to the contrary. The BIA has consistently relied on that "exceptional situations" limitation, applying it more than fifty times in the year leading up to its decision to reopen Chehazeh's case, see e.g., In re Juan Marquez, 2007 WL 4699844 (BIA Nov. 1, 2007) ("Insofar as the motion requests sua sponte reopening, we find that the motion does not establish an exceptional situation warranting the exercise of our discretionary authority."); In re Ekins A. Hoyte, 2007 WL 2463961 (BIA Aug. 2, 2007) ("[W]e find the pending motion sufficiently compelling to provide an exceptional circumstance warranting a reopening of [respondent's] record."); In re Guillermo Lenin Garcia Montenegro, 2007 WL 1153926 (BIA Mar. 12, 2007) ("[W]e find that an exceptional situation exists herein to warrant sua sponte reopening of proceedings in the exercise of discretion."), and more than one-hundred times in the past year, see, e.g., In re Werner Remberto Orozco-Lopez, 2011 WL 2261236 (BIA May 25, 2011) ("We further will not reopen these proceedings sua sponte because the respondent has not established an exceptional situation to do so."); In re Elvi Antonio Vicente Arias, 2010 WL 5173971 (BIA Nov. 30, 2010) ("The respondent presents an exceptional situation which warrants sua sponte reopening."); In re Jose Santos Diaz, 2010 WL 4971010 (BIA Nov. 23, 2010) ("The respondent does not present an exceptional situation which warrants reopening on our own motion.").
We have explained that "if an agency `announces and follows—by rule or settled
That conclusion is supported by our reasoning in Calle-Vujiles, the case in which we ruled that "decisions not to sua sponte reopen or reconsider are non-reviewable." 320 F.3d at 473-75. There, relying on the Supreme Court's opinion in Heckler v. Chaney, we explained that courts may not review matters "where the governing `statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard of review against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion.'" Id. at 474 (quoting Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985)). Applying that principle, we explained that, while the BIA is "allow[ed] ... to reopen proceedings in exceptional situations," it is not "require[d]... to reopen proceedings in exceptional situations." Id. at 475. Therefore, because the BIA has "unfettered discretion to decline to sua sponte reopen," even when there is an exceptional situation, the "exceptional situations" requirement provides no meaningful standard against which to judge a BIA's decision not to reopen. Id.
The same is not true, though, when the BIA chooses to exercise its authority to reopen. According to the BIA's own "settled course of adjudication," Quarantillo, 301 F.3d at 112, the authority to sua sponte reopen can be exercised only in exceptional situations, and, therefore, the "exceptional situations" requirement does provide a meaningful standard by which to judge the agency's action. The legal difference attached to the distinction between denials of reopening and grants of reopening is supported—if not mandated—by Heckler.
470 U.S. at 832, 105 S.Ct. 1649 (emphasis in original). Heckler's guidance is of particular import here. When the BIA refuses to reopen proceedings, it puts an end to the administrative process without the exercise of any additional "coercive power over an individual's liberty or property rights." Id. By contrast, when the BIA reopens proceedings, the administrative process starts again, potentially placing in jeopardy an adjudicated right to stay in this country.
Moreover, if, as the government insists, the BIA has unfettered power to reopen, nothing would prevent it from reopening and remanding a case to a new immigration judge over and over again until satisfied with the outcome. Neither in its briefs nor at oral argument has the government offered any suggestion of what would prevent such injustice, other than its assurances that we can trust the BIA not to abuse its power. Trust is a fine thing, and the public servants who work to enforce our immigration laws—often with little of the appreciation they are due—are,
Our decision in Cruz v. Attorney General, 452 F.3d 240 (3d Cir.2006), lends further support to our conclusion on this point. In that case, we remanded a petition to the BIA because we could not "tell from its opinion whether the BIA concluded that Cruz made out a prima facie case for sua sponte relief ... but nevertheless exercised its unreviewable discretion ... to decline to reopen, or whether it believed that Cruz had not shown an `exceptional situation,' and was therefore ineligible ... for sua sponte relief." Id. at 250. We explained that if it was the latter, "we would have jurisdiction to review the BIA's decision," id., which strongly suggests that courts have jurisdiction to review the threshold question of whether there was an exceptional situation.
We are thus persuaded that there are indeed principled reasons for distinguishing between the reviewability of a BIA decision denying reopening and the reviewability of a BIA decision granting reopening. In sum, because the BIA has limited its reopening authority only to exceptional situations, when it exercises that authority, there is a basis for judicial review to determine whether the agency decision was based upon an exceptional situation.
The government argues that, to the extent the District Court might otherwise have jurisdiction, amendments to the immigration laws promulgated by the REAL ID Act preclude judicial review. Specifically, the government cites 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9) and 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).
Section 1252(b)(9) states:
Based on that provision, the government argues that "judicial review of a final order" is the only avenue to review any issue arising from a "proceeding brought to remove an alien." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). There is obvious force to that reasoning, given the quoted text, but the Supreme Court has noted that § 1252(b)(9) is subject to the limitations of § 1252(b), and, therefore, "applies only `[w]ith respect to review of an order of removal under subsection (a)(1).'" INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 313, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)).
While we have not written precedentially on the scope of § 1252(b)(9) after the REAL ID Act, we have addressed the effect of nearly identical language in § 1252(a)(5). In Kumarasamy v. Attorney General, we considered whether a habeas petition that was before us on appeal when the REAL ID Act came into effect should be converted into a petition for review pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). 453 F.3d 169, 172 (3d Cir.2006). That subsection states that a "petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals ... shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal." 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). The petitioner in Kumarasamy had not been seeking review of an order of removal but was seeking habeas relief, claiming that his deportation was illegal "because there was no order of removal." 453 F.3d at 172 (emphasis in original). We held that § 1252(a)(5) did not apply, because that provision pertained only to "judicial review of an order of removal." Id. (emphasis in original). Our holding in Kumarasamy supports the conclusion that, because § 1252(b) refers only to "review of an order of removal under subsection (a)(1)," it, and its subsections, are inapplicable when there is no such order.
Section 1252(g), titled "Exclusive jurisdiction," states:
The government argues that Chehazeh's claim arises from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal
Fortunately, the Supreme Court has explained that § 1252(g) has a more limited scope than the government claims for it. In Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee, the Court said that § 1252(g) was designed to address only three discrete actions by the Attorney General: the "decision or action to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders." 525 U.S. 471, 482, 119 S.Ct. 936, 142 L.Ed.2d 940 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is not "a sort of `zipper' clause that says `no judicial review in deportation cases unless this section provides judicial review,'" as "it is implausible that the mention of three discrete events along the road to deportation was a shorthand way of referring to all claims arising from deportation proceedings." Id. Instead, § 1252(g) was "directed against a particular evil: attempts to impose judicial constraints upon prosecutorial discretion." Id. at 485 n. 9, 119 S.Ct. 936.
We recognize that BIA decisions may be construed as actions of the Attorney General, see, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(1) (explaining that the members of the BIA are "appointed by the Attorney General to act as the Attorney General's delegates"), and, therefore, that BIA actions may in some cases implicate § 1252(g). This is not one of those cases, however, because the decision to sua sponte reopen proceedings is not a prosecutorial decision to "commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders." Reno, 525 U.S. at 482, 119 S.Ct. 936. Rather, it is a quasi-judicial decision to reconsider an already adjudicated case.
An argument might be made that a decision to reopen is similar enough in character to a decision to adjudicate a case in the first instance that any reopening should be encompassed within § 1252(g), but we think that position is untenable for two reasons. First, and most importantly, in listing the kinds of "decisions or actions that may be part of the deportation process" but are not encompassed by § 1252(g), the Supreme Court included the decision "to refuse reconsideration of [a removal order]." Id. Thus, the Supreme Court distinguished between the initial adjudication of a case and the reconsideration of that case, declaring that the latter was not encompassed within § 1252(g).
According to the Supreme Court's analytical construct, § 1252(g) was designed to make unreviewable prosecutorial decisions, not quasi-judicial ones. We therefore conclude that, when the BIA reopens removal proceedings, its action does not constitute a "decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders," and, thus, claims arising from that action do not fall within the scope of § 1252(g). Because § 1252(g) and § 1252(b)(9)—the only potential statutory barriers identified by the government—do not preclude review, there is apparently no statute that precludes judicial review of the BIA's decision to reopen Chehazeh's removal proceedings.
The BIA's decision to reopen Chehazeh's case was not a final disposition of the renewed administrative proceedings. Therefore, we must first consider whether agency action that does not conclude administrative proceedings may ever be considered "final agency action" for purposes of Section 704.
A provision analogous to Section 704's "final agency action" requirement is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which permits appellate review only of "final decisions" of a district court. In that context, it has long been understood that, while "a `final decision' generally is one which ends the litigation on the merits," Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945), other preliminary decisions may be "final" if they are "conclusive," "resolve important questions completely separate from the merits," and would be "effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment in the underlying action." Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 867, 114 S.Ct. 1992,
While we have never considered whether the collateral order doctrine applies to judicial review of agency decisions, the nine Courts of Appeals that have addressed the question have all concluded that it does. See Hale v. Norton, 476 F.3d 694, 698 (9th Cir.2007) (holding that the collateral order doctrine applies to review of administrative decisions); Rhode Island v. EPA, 378 F.3d 19, 24-25 (1st Cir.2004) (holding the same and citing cases in the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. circuits also holding the same). The Supreme Court has likewise strongly suggested that the doctrine applies in the administrative context. See Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 778, 103 S.Ct. 2187, 76 L.Ed.2d 312 (1983) ("We conclude that, at least in the absence of an appealable collateral order, the federal courts may exercise jurisdiction only over a final order of the Department [of Education]." (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted)). We see no reason to depart from the unanimous view on the issue and, therefore, join in holding that the collateral order doctrine applies to judicial review of agency decisions.
Because the BIA's decision did not conclude the administrative proceedings on the merits, it is reviewable as a collateral order only if it (1) is "conclusive," (2) "resolve[s] important questions completely separate from the merits," and (3) would be "effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment in the underlying action." Digital Equip., 511 U.S. at 867, 114 S.Ct. 1992.
Chehazeh has already availed himself of the only administrative remedy available to him—asking the BIA to reconsider its decision to reopen—and, therefore, absent judicial review, Chehazeh will be forced to go through a second round of removal proceedings. In light of that fact, the government does not dispute that the BIA's decision is "conclusive," and indeed it is.
The government does argue, however, that the other two requirements for collateral review are not present here. First, it contends that the BIA's decision does not "resolve important questions completely separate from the merits," id., because the BIA justified its decision to reopen by citing the FBI's inability to rule out the possibility that Chehazeh is a national security threat. That argument, though, misses the point. While the question of whether Chehazeh is a national security threat does go to the merits of whether he should continue to enjoy asylum, the BIA's decision neither resolves nor even addresses that question. Instead, the decision addresses whether the FBI's inability to rule out that possibility warranted reopening the proceedings. The question resolved by the BIA, therefore, was whether the FBI's inability to determine whether a person is a security threat gives rise to an exceptional situation justifying reopening. That question is separate from the merits of whether Chehazeh is, in fact, a security threat. Similarly, the BIA's determination that allegations of IJ partiality justified reopening pertains to a question separate from the merits of Chehazeh's asylum
Second, the government contends that the BIA's decision is not "effectively unreviewable on appeal from final judgment in the underlying action." Id. In support of that argument, the government cites Will v. Hallock, in which the Supreme Court held that when a party seeks to avoid trial through collateral order review of a pre-trial order, the order is reviewable only if there are "compelling public ends." 546 U.S. 345, 351-52, 126 S.Ct. 952, 163 L.Ed.2d 836 (2006). The Supreme Court reasoned that "almost every pretrial or trial order might be called `effectively unreviewable'" and allowing collateral order of all of them "would leave the final order requirement of § 1291 in tatters." Id. at 351, 126 S.Ct. 952. That observation is sound but inapposite here.
Chehazeh is not seeking collateral review of a pre-trial order so as to avoid litigation. He is seeking, instead, collateral review of a post-adjudication order so as to enforce the result of an adjudication that has already taken place. That there is a legally significant difference between seeking to avoid litigation in the first instance and seeking to avoid relitigating an issue that has already been decided was explicitly recognized in Will, and listed as a "compelling public end" that supports collateral order review. The Supreme Court explained that, in the context of a criminal prosecution, while collateral order review was unavailable to avoid trial in the first instance because an individual does not have "a right to be free of all proceedings whatsoever," collateral order review was available to consider a claim of double jeopardy because "the only way to alleviate the[] consequences of the Government's superior position was by collateral order appeal." Id. at 352, 126 S.Ct. 952. Of course, this is not a criminal case, and the Double Jeopardy clause is not at issue. Nonetheless, the reasons why collateral order review can be invoked to avoid double jeopardy, as described in Abney v. United States, are instructive here:
431 U.S. 651, 661-62, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Should the BIA be free to sua sponte reopen removal proceedings, without the possibility of judicial review, nothing would prevent it, "with all its resources and power" from "mak[ing] repeated attempts to [deport Chehazeh], thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity."
Indeed, in Duvall v. Attorney General we recognized the magnitude of the concerns raised by repeated relitigation when we noted that "[s]ubstantive due process may offer some protection against repeated relitigation of the same issue by an administrative agency." 436 F.3d 382, 387 n. 5 (3d Cir.2006). For reasons substantially similar to the concerns explained above, in Duvall we interpreted the INA as incorporating principles of collateral estoppel: "The adversarial system of dispute resolution established in the INA is plainly adjudicatory in character and susceptible to full application of common law principles of preclusion." Id. at 390. As we explained, if that were not true, "[f]ailure to satisfy the burden of proof at one hearing before one immigration judge would have no effect on the government's ability to bring successive proceedings in front of successive immigration judges," and "[t]he same evidence could be introduced and the same witnesses could be interrogated, over and over, until the desired result is achieved." Id. at 388. That conclusion comports with a lengthy line of case law in this circuit and in our sister circuits. See, e.g., Alvear-Velez v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir.2008) (holding that, as a general matter, res judicata applies to administrative hearings and works to minimize "the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits"); Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Marshall, 610 F.2d 1128, 1138 (3d Cir. 1979) (holding that exhaustion of administrative remedies is not always required when, for example, "the administrative procedure itself is alleged to violate a constitutional right ... by subjecting a party to `vexatious and harassing' prosecutions by refusing to apply collateral estoppel"); Cont'l Can Co., U.S.A. v. Marshall, 603 F.2d 590, 597 (7th Cir.1979) (holding that in the administrative adjudication context, it is "rather fundamental" and is a "basic tenet of due process" that "the Government cannot, without violating due process, needlessly require a party to undergo the burdens of litigation" because "[t]he Government is not a ringmaster for whom individuals and corporations must jump through a hoop at their own expense each time it commands" (internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 127, 79 S.Ct. 676, 3 L.Ed.2d 684 (1959) (holding that "the cruelty of harassment by multiple prosecutions" can violate the Due Process clause of the Fifth Amendment).
This case is not about "mere avoidance of a trial, but avoidance of a trial that would imperil a substantial public interest"—namely the public's interest in "mitigating the government's advantage over the individual" and preventing the government from using its superior "resources and power" to re-run removal proceedings except in exceptional situations. Will, 546 U.S. at 352-53, 126 S.Ct. 952. Those interests are compelling because they "count when asking whether an order is `effectively' unreviewable if review is to be left until later," id. at 353, 126 S.Ct. 952, because they raise concerns so substantial
"Where the governing statute provides for `special statutory review' ... that is the form that the required judicial review will take." Smriko, 387 F.3d at 291 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 703). As previously noted, while a "special statutory review" provision dictates the process pertaining to final orders of removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b), (b)(9) ("With respect to review of an order of removal ... [,] [j]udicial review of all questions of law and fact ... shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section."), there is no such provision with respect to final or effectively final BIA actions besides final orders of removal. Consequently, the proceeding may take "any applicable form of legal action ... in a court of competent jurisdiction," 5 U.S.C. § 703.
Thus, because no statute precludes review of the BIA's decision, which is effectively final and not committed to agency discretion by law, the District Court has jurisdiction to review the decision. We will therefore reverse its order dismissing for lack of jurisdiction.
Because the District Court believed that it did not have jurisdiction over Chehazeh's petition, it never addressed whether the BIA's decision to reopen proceedings was warranted by an exceptional situation. We may decide a question not addressed by the District Court when "the record has been sufficiently developed for us to resolve [the] legal issue." In re Ben Franklin Hotel Assocs., 186 F.3d 301, 306 (3d Cir.1999). Here, the BIA offered two justifications for its decision: that "the FBI has been unable to rule out the possibility that the respondent poses a threat to the national security of the United States," (App. at 112) and that the BIA was "concerned that the Immigration Judge failed to adhere to the role of impartiality assigned to her as one acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity." (App. at 152.) We conclude that the record is insufficient for us to determine whether either of those alleged situations are exceptional, and, therefore, we will remand to the District Court.
With respect to the BIA's first proffered reason—the FBI's inability to rule out the possibility that Chehazeh is a national security threat—a "blink" response is that it may not be exceptional. "[P]roving a negative is a challenge in any context," Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 311, 124 S.Ct. 1769, 158 L.Ed.2d 546 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring), and if the BIA were able to reopen any proceeding in which the FBI was "unable to rule out the possibility" that a person was a security threat, reopening may perhaps become a regular occurrence and hardly exceptional. Moreover, the facts known at the time of the initial removal proceedings led the IJ to conclude that Chehazeh was "not a danger to the United States and that [he was] not involved in any kind of terrorist activities"—a conclusion based on "the FBI ha[ving] carefully examined [his] case" and determining that he was "no longer to be of special interest." (App. at 49.) The government never pursued its appeal of that decision. Nor, in moving to reopen, has the government offered any new facts suggesting that Chehazeh was, or has become, a security threat. Allowing the BIA to reopen under these circumstances would thus appear to circumvent the general requirement that a motion to reopen "shall not be granted unless it appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available ... at the former hearing." 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(1).
The BIA has plainly stated that its sua sponte authority is not designed to "circumvent the regulations." In re J-J-, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 984. That authority may, of course, have the effect of circumventing the regulations when an exceptional situation calls for it, but wherever the line between an unexceptional situation and an exceptional situation lies, we wonder whether—on this record—this case is near it. Nevertheless, we cannot say whether the FBI might have heretofore-undiscussed criteria by which it can, in ordinary circumstances, effectively rule out aliens as security threats, and we certainly cannot say with assurance that there was not an exceptional reason for some change in the FBI's assessment of Chehazeh. Thus, the record is insufficient for us to decide the issue.
With respect to the concern that "the Immigration Judge failed to adhere to the role of impartiality assigned to her as one acting in a judicial or quasi-judicial capacity," (App. at 152), the BIA has not given much detail regarding the allegedly problematic conduct. Most of what we know is from the INS appeal from the initial IJ decision, in which, among other things, the
If, in fact, those allegations are true, they certainly seem unusual and may warrant categorizing the circumstances as exceptional. But, again, based on the record before us, we cannot make that determination. We will therefore remand to the District Court to allow the parties to supplement the record so that that Court can "review the whole record," 5 U.S.C. § 706, to determine whether there was an exceptional situation that warranted reopening Chehazeh's removal proceedings.
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the District Court's order dismissing Chehazeh's petition for lack of jurisdiction and will remand for the District Court to consider whether the BIA's decision to reopen Chehazeh's removal proceedings was warranted by an exceptional situation.
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge, dissenting.
Since I conclude that Congress has established a clearly defined system for the courts to review decisions of the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"), which requires that petitions for review be filed with the courts of appeals, and not the district courts, I find that I must respectfully dissent from the majority's opinion. Congress, by enacting the REAL ID Act, vested courts of appeals with jurisdiction to review orders reopening removal proceedings. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(6).
The majority sets forth the factual and procedural history of this matter in thorough detail. I have nothing to add. Similarly, the majority clearly recites the factors we must review in determining whether the APA applies. As they state, review under the APA is available
Majority Dec. at 17.
While I think the majority's reasoning on factors (1)
As the majority notes, Smriko v. Ashcroft allows for application of the APA only "in the absence or inadequacy" of any "special statutory review" provisions. 387 F.3d 279, 290-91 (3d Cir.2004). In the present case, there are two statutes, given short shrift by the majority, that provide for review of immigration decisions, including motions to reopen. First, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D) provides that
This provision removes the authority to review legal and constitutional claims from district courts. The APA basis for jurisdiction is only available if no "special statutory review" provision requires that the action be brought in some other forum. Here, Congress has provided a basis for review before our Court, not the district court. The statute does not prohibit judicial review, but it does limit that review to the courts of appeals.
Second, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(6) provides that "[w]hen a petitioner seeks review of an order under this section, any review sought of a motion to reopen or reconsider the order shall be consolidated with the review of the order." I do not believe we can circumvent Congress's clear intention to allow aliens only one opportunity to seek review of a motion to reopen as part of the review of the order of removal before a court of appeals by reading the APA to provide jurisdiction to the district court.
For decades, Congress has expressed its desire to streamline immigration proceedings, endeavoring to "create a single, separate, statutory form of judicial review of administrative orders for the deportation and exclusion of aliens from the United States." H.R.Rep. No. 72, 109th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 240 at 297 (2005) (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 1086, 87th Cong. 1st Sess., reprinted in 1963 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2950, 2966 (1961)).
"Congress continued these streamlining reforms when it enacted the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub.L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3546 (Sept. 30, 1996)." Id. at 298. The amendments in IIRIRA "were intended to preclude all district court review of any issue raised in a removal proceeding." Id. The 2005 amendments were directed at correcting anomalies created by the Supreme Court's decision in I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001) with respect to judicial review of the removal proceedings for criminal aliens. One purpose of the amendments was to ensure that "all aliens will get review in the same forum—the courts of appeals." 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 299. The amendment "would give every alien one day in the court of appeals, satisfying constitutional concerns." Id. "By placing all review in the courts of appeals, [the amendments] would provide an `adequate and effective' alternative to habeas corpus." Id. at 300 (quoting St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 314, 121 S.Ct. 2271).
Further, Congress's action in consolidating review of motions to reopen with review of the order of removal is consistent with the established practice in appellate review of civil cases involving motions to reconsider, motions to reopen, and decisions vacating default judgment. For example, "[o]rders granting a motion to vacate [default judgment] should be treated in the same way as orders granting a new trial [both of which] set[] the stage for further trial court proceedings [and are] not final. Appeal is properly taken upon conclusion of the proceedings set in motion by the order vacating the judgment." 15B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure § 3916 (2d ed.) (footnotes omitted). Indeed, "[a]n order granting a new trial ... ordinarily is not final; review is supposed to be available only after completion of the new trial." Id. at § 3915.5. "Denial of immediate appeal from an order granting a new trial means that the order merges in, and is reviewable on appeal from, the final judgment entered after the new trial or other event that concludes the litigation." Id. "Few theories are likely to help a party who is anxious to bend the final judgment rule to permit appeal from an order granting a new trial." Id.
"Congress is expected to legislate against the backdrop of well-established common law principles." Duvall v. Att'y Gen., 436 F.3d 382, 387 (3d Cir.2006). That is exactly what Congress did in enacting § 1252(b)(6)—Congress recognized the principle that in granting a motion to reopen, the BIA sets in motion a new proceeding, which should be allowed to continue to its conclusion before review is sought of any stage of that proceeding. By seeking review of the decision reopening his removal proceedings in the District
Given the clear directive of § 1252(b)(6), I find the majority's discussion of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) to be unnecessary to the analysis of the question before us.
To the contrary, I fear that the majority's decision will create a situation similar to that in Duvall where our Court expressed concern that Duvall's refusal to testify as to her citizenship during her removal proceeding "would effectively preclude the INS from ever relitigating the issue of alienage or ever securing removal, despite the alien's ongoing criminal conduct." Duvall, 436 F.3d at 391. Here, the government presented evidence to the BIA that Chehazeh may have committed fraud during his original asylum application proceeding. The BIA reopened the matter and remanded to an immigration judge so that the evidence could be presented more fully and the allegations of fraud evaluated by the appropriate factfinder. By allowing Chehazeh to seek review of the decision to reopen before the District Court, absent a full exploration of the facts by an immigration judge, the majority creates a situation where an alien could lie during their asylum proceeding, and then never be put to task regarding that lie before the immigration authorities.
In satisfying the third factor—finality of the agency's decision—the majority applies the collateral order doctrine. Analogizing to review of a post-judgment order in a criminal proceeding where double jeopardy concerns exist, the majority finds that the BIA's decision to reopen is effectively unreviewable if left until a later time in the litigation. Majority Dec. at 39-43. I disagree with this conclusion for several reasons. Most importantly, in the statute Congress has explicitly provided for review of the BIA's decision to reopen. Second, both the Supreme Court and our Court have consistently held that application of the collateral order doctrine should be the exception, not the rule. Third, I am disinclined to imbue immigration proceedings with the constitutional protections associated with double jeopardy review.
Having already discussed the statutory directive set forth in § 1252(b)(6), I turn to the general principles underlying application of the collateral order doctrine. The Supreme Court has emphasized its view that the collateral order doctrine should be
Given these strong statements on the narrow scope of the collateral order doctrine, I do not think it is applicable here. The majority analogizes the present situation to that in Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977), where the collateral order doctrine was applied to prevent the government from "using its resources and power ... to make repeated attempts to convict an individual," and to protect the individual from the concomitant "embarrassment, expense and ordeal" associated with multiple prosecutions. Id. at 661-62, 97 S.Ct. 2034. Specifically, the Supreme Court concluded that an order denying a defendant's motion to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy grounds was reviewable under the collateral order doctrine. The Court noted that "the very nature of a double jeopardy claim is such that it is collateral to, and separable from the principal issue at the accused's impending criminal trial." Id. at 659, 97 S.Ct. 2034.
The situation presented by this case differs from that in Abney in important ways. The issues raised in the motion to reopen are not collateral to or separable from the issues underlying the asylum application. Rather, the new facts introduced by the government directly address, among other points, the question of whether or not Chehazeh committed fraud during the original asylum proceeding.
Additionally, as the Supreme Court has observed, "[a] deportation proceeding is a purely civil action to determine eligibility to remain in this country, not to punish an unlawful entry, though entering or remaining unlawfully in this country is itself a crime.... Consistent with the civil nature of the proceeding, various protections that apply in the context of a criminal trial do not apply in a deportation hearing." I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038, 104 S.Ct. 3479, 82 L.Ed.2d 778 (1984).
Further, our court has noted that "[w]hile an alien may be eligible for a grant of asylum or an adjustment of status under the immigration laws, he is not entitled to such benefits as a constitutional matter. There is no constitutional right to asylum per se. An alien seeking admission to the United States through asylum `requests a privilege and has no constitutional rights regarding his application, for the power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign prerogative.'" Mudric v. Att'y Gen., 469 F.3d 94, 98 (3d Cir.2006) (quoting Marincas v. Lewis, 92 F.3d 195, 203 (3d Cir.1996)) (internal citations omitted).
With those admonitions in mind, I turn to the third prong of the collateral order test—whether the matter at hand will be effectively unreviewable later. The Supreme Court discussed this factor in Mohawk Indus. There, the Court observed that
Id. at 605 (quoting Swint v. Chambers County Comm'n, 514 U.S. 35, 42, 115 S.Ct. 1203, 131 L.Ed.2d 60 (1995); Digital Equip., 511 U.S. at 872, 878-879, 114 S.Ct. 1992; and Will v. Hallock, 546 U.S. 345, 352-353, 126 S.Ct. 952, 163 L.Ed.2d 836 (2006)).
The majority expresses concern over the government's ability to continue to challenge Chehazeh's grant of asylum, forcing him to relitigate an issue that was already decided. Majority Dec. at 39. I do not share that concern. The issue that will be addressed in the reopened proceeding is the question of whether or not Chehazeh committed fraud during his original asylum application. Requiring Chehazeh to defend himself in a second proceeding does not "imperil a substantial public interest." To the contrary, I believe thoroughly examining the possible fraud in his original asylum application is a substantial public interest that should be protected. Relitigating his asylum application may place an additional burden on Chehazeh, but that burden is not insurmountable, and is presumably an unusual circumstance.
Further, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(6) requires that review of a motion to reopen be consolidated with the review of the removal order. Congress has spoken clearly on this issue and concluded that review should be had in a single appeal. As a result, Chehazeh would be able to obtain review of the motion to reopen in the future.
Motions to reopen are filed often in immigration proceedings, and some of those motions are granted. In most, if not all, of those cases, the litigants seek review in the appropriate court of appeals, as required by the statute. The only aspect of this case that makes it, as the majority notes, "highly unusual" is Chehazeh's decision to seek review in the District Court, rather than before us.
We agree with the Seventh and Eighth circuits that even if Congress has committed discretion to the BIA by law to take or not take certain actions, it has not deprived the District Court or us of jurisdiction to consider a plaintiff's claim that such action was erroneous pursuant to the APA. The question is whether a plaintiff can state a claim for relief from such action under the APA. See Trudeau, 456 F.3d at 185 (the APA provides "a limited cause of action for parties adversely affected by agency action").
The government also notes our statement from Pllumi v. Attorney General that whether to sua sponte reopen is "committed to the unfettered discretion of the BIA, [and] we lack jurisdiction to review a decision on whether and how to exercise that discretion." 642 F.3d 155, 159 (3d Cir.2011). Pllumi, however, involved a BIA decision refusing to sua sponte reopen. Id. at 158. Any suggestion that, for reviewability purposes, grants of reopening are the same as refusals, could not be more than dicta, uttered without the benefit of the arguments that the parties have provided here, which have illuminated the meaningful distinction between the two.
"The Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub.L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002), eliminated the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") and assigned INS's enforcement functions to the [Department of Homeland Security]'s Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE")." Khouzam v. Atty. Gen'l, 549 F.3d 235, 243 n. 7 (3d Cir.2008).
The majority cites Kumarasamy v. Att'y Gen., 453 F.3d 169 (3d Cir.2006), for the proposition that review is available in the courts of appeals only from a final order of removal. In Kumarasamy, the alien, who had been removed from this country, sought habeas review in the district court, arguing that the removal was illegal since no order of removal existed. The alien persisted in this argument, even after the government submitted a copy of the order of removal. The district court dismissed the habeas petition for lack of jurisdiction.
While the appeal was pending, Congress enacted the REAL ID Act, which vested jurisdiction for review of orders of removal with the courts of appeals. The REAL ID Act also required that habeas petitions challenging orders of removal before district courts or pending on appeal would be converted to petitions for review of the removal order. We concluded that Kumarasamy's habeas appeal should not be converted to a petition for review since Kumarasamy argued that no order of removal existed.
Here, no order of removal exists because Chehazeh sought, by filing for review before the District Court, to avoid the procedures established by Congress. If the established procedures are allowed to go forward as provided in the statute, and as is the normal practice in civil cases, Chehazeh will be able to obtain review of the decision reopening the case upon conclusion of the proceedings.