OPINION AND ORDER
ANNA J. BROWN, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff Thea Saari's Motion (#25) to Amend Judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) on the basis that the Court clearly erred in its Opinion and Order (#23) affirming the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) permits a party to file a motion to alter or to amend judgment no later than 28 days after the judgment. "[A] Rule 59(e) motion is an `extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources.'" Wood v. Ryan, 759 F.3d 1117, 1121 (9th Cir. 2014)(quoting Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000)). "A district court may grant a Rule 59(e) motion if it `is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in controlling law.'" Id. (quoting McDowell v. Calderon, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 (9th Cir. 1999)).
A motion under Rule 59(e) may also be granted to avoid "manifest injustice." McDowell, 197 F.3d 1253, 1255 n.1 (9th Cir. 1999). See also Roschewski v. Raytheon Co., 471 F. App'x 588, 589 (9th Cir. 2012). The disposition of a motion for reconsideration is within the discretion of the district court. See Bliesner v. Commc'n Workers of Am., 464 F.3d 910, 915 (9th Cir. 2006). See also McDowell, 197 F.3d at 155 n.1 ("The district court enjoys considerable discretion in granting or denying" a motion under Rule 59(e)).
Plaintiff contends the Court clearly erred when it concluded substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff's intellectual disorder did not meet Listing 12.05C, and, therefore, the ALJ's finding at Step Three of the sequential analysis that Plaintiff was not disabled was reasonable. In particular, Plaintiff argues the Court clearly erred when it did not address Plaintiff's argument that the ALJ erred in her Step Three analysis as a matter of law pursuant to Pedro v. Astrue, 849 F.Supp.2d 1006 (D. Or. 2011). Moreover, Plaintiff also contends the Court clearly erred when it concluded substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ's finding that the IQ scores in the record did not accurately reflect Plaintiff's level of functioning and, therefore, that the IQ scores were invalid.
I. Effect of Pedro v. Astrue
Plaintiff's reliance on Pedro is misplaced. As the Court indicated in its April 28, 2017, Opinion and Order, the regulations regarding Listing 12.05C that were in effect at the time the Commissioner's decision became final provided:
Intellectual disability: Intellectual disability refers to significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning with deficits in adaptive functioning initially manifested during the developmental period; i.e., the evidence demonstrates or supports onset of the impairment before age 22.
The required level of severity for this disorder is met when the requirements in A, B, C, or D are satisfied.
* * *
C. A valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60 through 70 and a physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional and significant work-related limitation of function[.]
20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, App. 1 at 517 (2015)(available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CFR-2015-title20-vo12/pdf/CFR-2015-title20-vo12-part404-subpartP-appl.pdf). As the Pedro court summarized, to establish disability at Step Three under Listing 12.05C the "plaintiff is required to demonstrate the following: (1) significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning with deficits in adaptive functioning with an onset before age 22; (2) a valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60 to 70; and (3) a physical or other mental impairment imposing an additional and significant work-related limitation of function." 849 F. Supp. 2d at 1011.
As Plaintiff acknowledges, however, the only dispute between the parties at the time this matter came before the Court was whether Plaintiff met the second criterion of Listing 12.05C set out above; i.e., whether Plaintiff had "a valid verbal, performance, or full scale IQ of 60 to 70." The ALJ found Plaintiff's full-scale IQ score of 67 (as assessed by Emil Slatick, Ph.D., on April 11, 2013) was invalid, and, therefore, Plaintiff did not meet the requirements of Listing 12.05C.2 The parties agreed, however, that Plaintiff satisfied the first and third criteria of Listing 12.05C. This case, therefore, turns on whether substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff's April 2013 full-scale IQ score of 67 was invalid.
The Pedro court only substantively discussed the first and third criteria of Listing 12.05C because in that case "[t]he ALJ did not question the validity of plaintiff's IQ scores, and the Commissioner does not dispute that the plaintiff satisfies the second prong of the listing." Id. at 1014. Plaintiff's insistence, therefore, that "Pedro controls the outcome" of this case is incorrect. See Pl.'s Mot. (#25) at 1. To the contrary, the Pedro court did not address the central disputed issue in this case. The Court, therefore, did not clearly err when it did not adopt Plaintiff's interpretation of Pedro or find that Pedro controlled the outcome of this case.
II. Substantial Evidence Supporting ALJ Decision
Plaintiff next argues this Court clearly erred when it found substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff's full-scale IQ score of 67 was invalid. In particular, Plaintiff contends the reasons the ALJ provided to support the invalidity of Plaintiff's full-scale IQ score were insufficient and the Court erred when it relied on the ALJ's reasons for discrediting the April 2013 full-scale IQ score as a basis for similarly invalidating Plaintiff's full-scale IQ score of 65 as assessed in 1996.
The ALJ found Plaintiff's April 2013 IQ score to be invalid because (1) there were not any other IQ scores in the record to confirm the April 2013 assessment and (2) the record demonstrated Plaintiff functioned at a level greater than the IQ score indicated. The Court noted in its April 28, 2017, Opinion and Order that:
After the ALJ issued her decision (but before the Appeals Council concluded its review), Plaintiff submitted a Psychological Evaluation from 1996 when Plaintiff was 16 years old in which Richard W. Hess, Ph.D., assessed Plaintiff with a full-scale IQ of 65. Tr. 565. Accordingly, the parties agree the ALJ's rejection of Dr. Slatick's assessment of Plaintiff's IQ on the basis that there is not any other IQ score in the record is no longer correct.
Op. and Order at 11. Accordingly, the Court assessed only whether the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff's IQ score did not accurately reflect her degree of functioning was sufficient to support the ALJ's conclusion that the April 2013 IQ score was invalid.
The Court finds Plaintiff has failed to establish that the Court clearly erred when it concluded the ALJ's finding was supported by substantial evidence in the record. Again, the Court finds the ALJ reasonably concluded Plaintiff functioned at a higher level than her full-scale IQ scores indicate based on the facts that Plaintiff completed her high-school equivalency (with conflicting reports from Plaintiff concerning her use of special-education services), cared for and helped her three children with homework,3 and worked 12 jobs previously without any report that her intellectual disability limited her ability to function in the workplace.
Plaintiff now contends the Commissioner erred when she failed to account expressly for the full-scale IQ score of 65 reported in the 1996 psychological evaluation submitted first to the Appeals Council. The Court noted (and Defendant agreed) that the 1996 IQ score undermined one of the ALJ's two primary reasons for finding the 2013 IQ score invalid. After reviewing the record as a whole including the entirety of the 1996 psychological evaluation,4 however, the Court found the 1996 evaluation did not invalidate the ALJ's conclusions and, in fact, supported them in that Dr. Hess noted Plaintiff was "operating academically at a level above that expected from her psychological potential." Tr. 567. This statement directly reinforces the ALJ's pivotal conclusion that Plaintiff functions at a higher level than her full-scale IQ scores reflect, and that the IQ scores, therefore, were not valid.
Moreover, to the extent that Plaintiff contends the Commissioner was required to comment separately on Dr. Hess's 1996 evaluation, the Court concludes the reasons the ALJ provided for finding the 2013 full-scale IQ score was invalid apply with equal force to the 1996 IQ score. The Commissioner, therefore, did not err when she failed to provide a separate rationale for finding the 1996 full-scale IQ score invalid.
On this record, therefore, the Court concludes Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that the Court committed clear error when it found the ALJ did not err by finding Plaintiff's intellectual disability did not meet the requirements of Listing 12.05C at Step Three.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion (#25) to Amend Judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
