ORDER

STEVEN D. MERRYDAY, District Judge.

Colon moves to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 1) and challenges the validity of his convictions for bank robbery, aiding and abetting bank robbery, and aiding and abetting the brandishing of a firearm during the bank robbery, for which convictions he is imprisoned for 141 months. Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2255 Cases, requires both a preliminary review of the motion to vacate and a summary dismissal "[i]f it plainly appears from the face of the motion, any attached exhibits, and the record of prior proceedings that the moving party is not entitled to relief. . . ." Accord Wright v. United States, 624 F.2d 557, 558 (5th Cir. 1980)1 (finding the summary dismissal of a Section 2255 motion was proper "[b]ecause in this case the record, uncontradicted by [defendant], shows that he is not entitled to relief"); Hart v. United States, 565 F.2d 360, 361 (5th Cir. 1978) ("Rule 4(b) [Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings], allows the district court to summarily dismiss the motion and notify the movant if `it plainly appears from the face of the motion and any annexed exhibits and the prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to relief. . . .'"). See United States v. Deal, 678 F.2d 1062, 1065 (11th Cir. 1982) (citing Wright and Hart). Colon's motion is barred.

Colon challenged this same conviction in an earlier action, 8:12-cv-2047-T-23MAP, which was denied on the merits. (Doc. 182 in 10-cr-483) Colon is precluded from pursuing a second or successive motion without authorization from the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. "Before a second or successive application permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996); Dunn v. Singletary, 168 F.3d 440, 442 (11th Cir. 1999). This new action is, therefore, a second or successive action that is subject to specific restrictions because a district court lacks jurisdiction to review a second or successive motion without the requisite authorization from the circuit court. Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S.147, 157 (2007) ("Burton neither sought nor received authorization from the Court of Appeals before filing his 2002 petition, a `second or successive' petition challenging his custody, and so the District Court was without jurisdiction to entertain it.").

Colon asserts entitlement to the retroactive application of Johnson v. United States, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015). Recently Welch v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 1257 (2016), held that Johnson applies retroactively. As a consequence, Colon's proper remedy is a second or successive motion to vacate under Section 2255(h)(2), which authorizes a second or successive motion under two circumstances, specifically:

Colon's remedy lies in Section 2255(h)(2), but not in a district court, which, as Burton instructs, lacks jurisdiction to review a second or successive motion without the requisite authorization from the circuit court. Colon's obtaining relief under Johnson and Welch starts with an application for leave to file a second or successive motion under Section 2255, which motion he must file with the circuit court.

Colon represents that his request for authorization to file a second or successive motion is pending in the circuit court and, as a consequence, he requests the district court to hold in abeyance his present motion. As Burton explains, the district court lacks jurisdiction. A district court cannot hold in abeyance an action over which it lacks jurisdiction. Moreover, three days before he filed the present Section 2255 motion the circuit court denied Colon's request for leave to file a second or successive motion. In re Edgar Colon, Nos. 16-13021 and 16-13264, 2016 WL 3461009 (June 24, 2016).2

Accordingly, the motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED. The motion (Doc. 2) to stay this action is DENIED. The clerk must close this case.

DENIAL OF BOTH A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY AND LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Colon is not entitled to a certificate of appealability ("COA"). A prisoner moving under Section 2255 has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district court's denial of his motion to vacate. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). Rather, a district court must first issue a COA. Section 2253(c)(2) permits issuing a COA "only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." To merit a certificate of appealability, Colon must show that reasonable jurists would find debatable both (1) the merits of the underlying claims and (2) the procedural issues he seeks to raise. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000); Eagle v. Linahan, 279 F.3d 926, 935 (11th Cir 2001). Because the motion to vacate is clearly second or successive, Colon is entitled to neither a COA nor leave to appeal in forma pauperis.

Accordingly, a certificate of appealability is DENIED. Leave to appeal in forma pauperis is DENIED. Colon must obtain authorization from the circuit court to appeal in forma pauperis.

ORDERED.