GREGORY J. KELLY, Magistrate Judge.
Robyn L. Feldman (the "Claimant") appeals from a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the "Commissioner") denying her application for Social Security Disability Insurance benefits. Doc. No. 1. On November 15, 2011, Claimant filed an application for disability benefits alleging an onset of disability date as of October 1, 2008. R. 141-148. Claimant argues that the Administrative Law Judge (the "ALJ") erred by: (1) by failing to demonstrate good cause, supported by substantial evidence, for giving "little weight" to the opinion of Claimant's primary treating physician, Dr. Luz Alonso; and (2) making a credibility determination that is not supported by substantial evidence. Doc. No. 22 at 23-39. For the reasons that follow, the Commissioner's final decision is
Under the authority of the Social Security Act, the Social Security Administration has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether an individual is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). In Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2001), the Eleventh Circuit explained the five-step sequential evaluation process as follows:
Id. at 1278 (citations omitted). The steps are followed in order. If it is determined that the claimant is not disabled at a step of the evaluation process, the evaluation will not go on to the next step.
The Commissioner's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla — i.e., the evidence must do more than merely create a suspicion of the existence of a fact, and must include such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the conclusion. Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553, 1560 (11th Cir. 1995) (citing Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir. 1982) and Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)); accord Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991).
Where the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the District Court will affirm, even if the reviewer would have reached a contrary result as finder of fact, and even if the reviewer finds that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's decision. Edwards, 937 F.2d at 584 n.3; Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1991). The District Court must view the evidence as a whole, taking into account evidence favorable as well as unfavorable to the decision. Foote, 67 F.3d at 1560; accord Lowery v. Sullivan, 979 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1992) (the court must scrutinize the entire record to determine reasonableness of factual findings); Parker v. Bowen, 793 F.2d 1177, 1180 (11th Cir. 1986) (the court also must consider evidence detracting from evidence on which Commissioner relied). The District Court "`may not decide the facts anew, reweigh the evidence, or substitute [its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner].'" See Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983)).
Claimant argues the ALJ failed to demonstrate good cause, supported by substantial evidence, for according "little weight" to the opinion of Claimant's primary treating physician, Dr. Alonso. Doc. No. 22 at 25-27. See also R. 20-21 (ALJ's decision); 566-69 (Dr. Alonso's opinion).
Weighing the opinions and findings of treating, examining, and non-examining physicians is an integral part of steps four and five of the ALJ's sequential evaluation process for determining disability. In cases like this one, involving the ALJ's handling of such medical opinions, "substantial-evidence review . . . involves some intricacy." Gaskin v. Commissioner of Social Security, 533 F. App'x. 929, 931 (11th Cir. Aug. 14, 2013) (unpublished).
Absent good cause, the opinion of a treating physician must be accorded substantial or considerable weight. Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 703 (11th Cir. 1988). The Eleventh Circuit has held:
Johnson v. Barnhart, 138 F. App'x 266, 270 (11th Cir. 2005) (unpublished) (quoting Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1240-41 (11th Cir. 2004)). Thus, good cause exists to give a treating physician's opinion less than substantial weight where the ALJ demonstrates in the decision that the physician's opinion is not bolstered by the evidence in the record, the evidence supports a contrary finding, or the opinion is conclusory or inconsistent with the physician's medical records. Id.
Dr. Alonso is Claimant's long-standing primary treating physician, who treated Claimant from September 15, 2008 to January 12, 2012 for the following conditions: diabetes mellitus; neuropathy; anorexia; anxiety; depression; insomnia; fatigue; gastroesophageal reflux disease; upper respiratory infections; urinary tract infections; spinal stenosis at C5; parenthesis of the left foot; hot flashes; and chronic neck pain. R. 455-500, 538-541. In the decision, the ALJ provides a thorough overview of the medical record, including Dr. Alonso's treatment records. R. 15-21. The ALJ repeatedly notes that Dr. Alonso's treatment records, which the ALJ identifies as being from Park Avenue Internal Medicine, "continually show that the claimant demonstrated normal motor strength and sensation from [October 1, 2008] through January 2012." R. 17-18 (citing R. 455-500, 538-541). The ALJ further states: "While the December 28, 2011 and August 4, 2012 lumbar spine [magnetic resonance imaging] suggest significant deficits, the [ALJ] again notes that [Dr. Alonso's] treatment records continually show that the claimant demonstrated normal motor strength and sensation. . . ." R. 19 (citing R. 455-500, 538-41.
The ALJ then provides a review of Dr. Alonso's April 11, 2012 opinion, as follows:
R. 20 (citing R. 567.). Ultimately, the ALJ accords Dr. Alonso's opinion "little weight" because "her opinions are not supported by clinical signs documented in the claimant's primary care treatment records, which clearly demonstrate normal motor strength and sensation from the alleged onset date through January 2012." R. 21. In addition, the ALJ gave Dr. Alonso's opinion little weight because Dr. Alonso is not a neurosurgeon. R. 21.
As set forth above, the ALJ points out that Dr. Alonso's treatment records show that Claimant's physical exams reveal normal motor strength and sensation throughout the relevant time period, which are inconsistent with Dr. Alonso's opinions. See R. 17-18, 21, 459, 461, 463, 465, 467, 469, 471, 473, 476, 481, 483, 487, 489, 491, 493, 495, 497, 500, 539, 541. Moreover, as the ALJ stated, the clinical signs documented in Dr. Alonso's treatment notes do not support Dr. Alonso's opinions. Compare R. 455-500, 538-541 with R. 566-69. Thus, the Court finds that the ALJ has demonstrated good cause, supported by substantial evidence for giving little weight to Dr. Alonso's opinion. Accordingly, Claimant's argument is rejected.
Claimant maintains that the following two (2) reasons given by the ALJ for finding Claimant's subjective statements not entirely credible are not support by substantial evidence: (1) Claimant made inconsistent statements regarding the side-effects of her medications; and (2) the Claimant's activities of daily living are inconsistent with an individual with significant functional limitations. Doc. No. 22 at 35. The Commissioner contends that the ALJ's credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence. Doc. No. 22 at 37-39.
In the Eleventh Circuit, subjective complaints of pain are governed by a three-part "pain standard" that applies when a claimant attempts to establish disability through subjective symptoms. By this standard, there must be: (1) evidence of an underlying medical condition and either (2) objective medical evidence that confirms the severity of the alleged symptom arising from the condition or (3) evidence that the objectively determined medical condition is of such severity that it can be reasonably expected to give rise to the alleged pain. Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing Landry v. Heckler, 782 F.2d 1551, 1553 (11th Cir. 1986)). "20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 provides that once such an impairment is established, all evidence about the intensity, persistence, and functionally limiting effects of pain or other symptoms must be considered in addition to the medical signs and laboratory findings in deciding the issue of disability." Foote, 67 F.3d at 1561; 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529.
A claimant's subjective testimony supported by medical evidence that satisfies the standard is itself sufficient to support a finding of disability. Foote, 67 F.3d at 1561. "If the ALJ decides not to credit a claimant's testimony as to her pain, [they] must articulate explicit and adequate reasons for doing so." Id. at 1561-62; see also SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *2 ("It is not sufficient for the adjudicator to make a single, conclusory statement that `the individual's allegations have been considered' or that `the allegations are (or are not) credible.'"). A reviewing court will not disturb a clearly articulated credibility finding with substantial supporting evidence in the record. Foote, 67 F.3d at 1562. The lack of a sufficiently explicit credibility finding may give grounds for a remand if credibility is critical to the outcome of the case. Id.
In the decision, the ALJ reviews the Claimant's disability reports and testimony regarding her subjective complaints. R. 16. Thereafter, the ALJ makes the following findings:
R. 15-16. The ALJ then states that the Claimant's allegations of disability "are not entirely consistent with the objective medical record," which is immediately followed by the ALJ's review of the medical record. R. 17-21. Thus, the ALJ found that Claimant's subjective statements are not entirely credible because Claimant made inconsistent statements regarding side-effects of medication and her activities of dialing living are inconsistent with an individual with significant functional limitations. R. 15-16.
The record shows that Claimant sometimes claimed side-effects from medications (R. 189), but at other times Claimant specifically denied side-effects from medications (R. 191). In addition, taking care of a four year-old, including providing meals, bathing, dressing, and assisting the four year-old in and out of an automobile is inconsistent with an individual who has significant functional limitations in the ability to bend, squat, kneel, and to take care one's own hygienic needs. R. 16; 192-193.
For the reasons stated above, it is hereby
SSR 96-7p, 1996 WL 374186, at *1 (1996).