DAVID S. DOTY, District Judge.
This matter is before the court upon the motion for leave to file a first amended class action complaint by plaintiff Saeid Azimpour. Based on a review of the file, record, and proceedings herein, and for the following reasons, the motion is denied.
The background of this matter is fully set forth in the court's order dated June 13, 2016, and will not be repeated here. In that order, the court dismissed Azimpour's class claims under Rule 12(b)(6) and dismissed his individual claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Consistent with dismissals for lack of jurisdiction, the court dismissed the complaint without prejudice. Notably, the court did not grant Azimpour leave to file an amended complaint. The court entered judgment the same day.
Thirty days later, Azimpour filed the instant motion seeking leave to file an amended complaint to address the deficiencies in his original complaint with respect to his class allegations. Azimpour brings this motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
"Although a pretrial motion for leave to amend one's complaint is to be liberally granted, different considerations apply to motions filed after dismissal."
Although Azimpour fails to address either Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b) in his motion to amend, the court will do so here. If construed as a motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e), the motion is untimely. "A motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28 days after entry of the judgment." Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Azimpour filed the instant motion 30 days after judgment was entered and it is thus untimely.
Although likely timely brought under Rule 60(b), Azimpour's motion fares no better under that rule. "Rule 60(b) provides for extraordinary relief which may be granted only upon an adequate showing of exceptional circumstances."
Azimpour argues that he should be permitted leave to file an amended complaint because he has drafted a new complaint addressing the deficiencies in his original complaint. Azimpour fails to identify any extraordinary circumstances that prevented him from seeking leave to amend before the entry of judgment. "Unexcused delay is sufficient to justify the court's denial . . . if the party is seeking to amend the pleadings after the court has dismissed the claims it seeks to amend, particularly when the plaintiff was put on notice of the need to change the pleadings before the complaint was dismissed, but failed to do so."
Azimpour was aware of Select Comfort's challenges to the complaint as early as January 22, 2016, when Select Comfort filed its motion to dismiss. Yet, in the intervening six months, he failed to file a motion seeking leave to amend before the case was dismissed. He simply maintained that his claims were adequately pleaded. Even now, Azimpour provides no explanation for his delay in seeking to amend. Under these circumstances, reopening the case to allow Azimpour leave to amend would give him an unwarranted "second bite at the apple," and would unduly prejudice Select Comfort by requiring it to incur litigation costs that could have been avoided had he moved to amend before judgment.
Accordingly, based on above,