ROBERT C. JONES, District Judge.
This case arises out of the alleged infringement of several patents relating to automated gambling. Defendant has filed motions to dismiss, to stay, and to sever.
Plaintiffs CG Technology Development, Inc. ("CG Tech"), Interactive Games Limited ("IG Ltd."), and Interactive Games LLC ("IG LLC") accuse Defendant FanDuel, Inc. of infringing the following claims of the listed patents ("the Patents") through the use of its online fantasy sports contests ("the Accused Games"): (1) Claim 20 of U.S. Patent No. RE39,818; (2) Claim 31 of U.S. Patent No. 6,899,628; (3) Claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 9,111,417; (4) Claim 16 of U.S. Patent No. 8,641,511; (5) Claim 11 of U.S. Patent No. 8,342,924; (6) Claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 7,029,394; (7) Claim 39 of U.S. Patent No. 6,884,166; (8) Claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 7,534,169; (9) Claim 19 of U.S. Patent No. 8,771,058; (10) Claim 17 of U.S. Patent No. 8,814,664; (11) Claim 9 of U.S. Patent No. 9,355,518; and (12) Claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 9,306,952. CG Tech owns the '818 Patent for a wireless controller (Cause of Action 1); IG Ltd. owns the '628, '417, '924, '394, and '166 Patents for enhanced services for gaming applications (Causes of Action 2, 3, 5, 6, and 7), and IG LLC owns the '511, '169, '058, '664, '518, and '952 Patents for location-based game configurations (Causes of Action 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12). Defendant has asked the Court to: (1) dismiss for failure to state a claim; (2) stay the case with respect to the '818 Patent pending the resolution of the '818 Patent's ownership in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York; and (3) sever the case into three cases according to ownership of the Patents and category of technology.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief" in order to "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) mandates that a court dismiss a cause of action that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the complaint's sufficiency. See N. Star Int'l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm'n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, dismissal is appropriate only when the complaint does not give the defendant fair notice of a legally cognizable claim and the grounds on which it rests. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state a claim, the court will take all material allegations as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See NL Indus., Inc. v. Kaplan, 792 F.2d 896, 898 (9th Cir. 1986). The court, however, is not required to accept as true allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences. See Sprewell v. Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2001).
A formulaic recitation of a cause of action with conclusory allegations is not sufficient; a plaintiff must plead facts pertaining to his own case making a violation "plausible," not just "possible." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-79 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556) ("A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged."). That is, under the modern interpretation of Rule 8(a), a plaintiff must not only specify or imply a cognizable cause of action (Conley review), but also must allege the facts of his case so that the court can determine whether the plaintiff has any basis for relief under the cause of action he has specified or implied, assuming the facts are as he alleges (Twombly-Iqbal review). Put differently, Conley only required a plaintiff to identify a major premise (a cause of action), but Twombly and Iqbal require a plaintiff also to allege minor premises (facts of the plaintiff's case) such that the syllogism showing liability is logically complete and that liability necessarily, not only possibly, follows (assuming the allegations are true).
"Generally, a district court may not consider any material beyond the pleadings in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. However, material which is properly submitted as part of the complaint may be considered on a motion to dismiss." Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n.19 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). Similarly, "documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss" without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 454 (9th Cir. 1994). Moreover, under Federal Rule of Evidence 201, a court may take judicial notice of "matters of public record." Mack v. S. Bay Beer Distribs., Inc., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986). Otherwise, if the district court considers materials outside of the pleadings, the motion to dismiss is converted into a motion for summary judgment. See Arpin v. Santa Clara Valley Transp. Agency, 261 F.3d 912, 925 (9th Cir. 2001).
The Court denies the motion to sever. Severance would not be judicially economical. The Court will have to construe whatever claim terms are disputed whether the causes of action are severed from one another or not. The claims of any single Plaintiff may be permissively joined against Defendant without limitation, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 18(a), and Plaintiffs may permissively join in the action because they each assert patent rights arising out of the same series of transactions or occurrences, i.e., Defendant's alleged operation of its online fantasy sports operations, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(1)(A). Nor have Plaintiffs impermissibly joined multiple defendants based purely on allegations of having infringed the same patent(s). See 35 U.S.C. § 299. Plaintiffs have properly filed separate actions in this District against multiple defendants alleged to have infringed Plaintiffs' various patents.
The Court denies the motion to stay as to the '818 Patent. Plaintiffs argue that the action pending in the Southern District of New York does not concern ownership of the '818 Patent, but it in fact appears to do so. (See Compl. 8, ECF No. 1 in S.D.N.Y. Case No. 1:14-cv-9661, attached as Ex. B to Mot. Stay, ECF No. 45-3 (requesting as a measure of relief, inter alia, "assignment of [the '818 Patent] to Plaintiff [(the inventor)]"); id. ¶ 18 (alleging that CG Technology was required under the relevant assignment agreement to either pay certain minimum royalties or reassign the '818 Patent to the inventor)). Although there is no separate cause of action for a declaration of ownership of the '818 Patent in the New York litigation, a finding of reversion of ownership of the '818 Patent or an order requiring reassignment thereof appears to be a possible outcome in that case based on the allegations the plaintiff-inventor has made and the relief he has requested. The Court will therefore not deny a stay based on the purported impossibility of the New York litigation's effect on CG Tech's ownership of the '818 Patent.
The Court agrees with Defendant that a stay will not prejudice CG Tech as to damages because it will remain entitled to damages, if any, with interest. But the Court also finds that CG Tech may be prejudiced by having to conduct duplicative Markman and trial proceedings as to the '818 Patent. Although Defendant may be harmed without a stay because it will have to litigate a potentially moot issue, a similar measure of harm will befall CG Tech if the Court grants a stay and CG Tech must then conduct a second trial because the issue of infringement of the '818 Patent has not been mooted by the New York litigation. Finally, a stay might simplify things for the Court because it will have one fewer patent to analyze as to pretrial motions in the meantime. But a stay could complicate the issues by causing the Court to have to hold additional hearings and a second jury trial, which would be an extraordinary inconvenience compared to the additional pretrial analysis required by the inclusion of the '818 Patent. On balance, the risk of having to hold duplicative proceedings outweighs the risk of wasting some effort in the meantime by analyzing seven patents instead of six until the relevant issue is resolved in the New York litigation. The Court finds that the relevant factors do not support a stay in this case. See Filtrol Corp. v. Kelleher, 467 F.2d 242, 244-45 (9th Cir. 1972) (citing Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1936)) (affirming a district court's refusal to stay a patent infringement action pending a determination of ownership in another court).
The Court grants the motion to dismiss the infringement claims as to the '628, '417, '924, `394, and '169 Patents based on unpatentability under Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S.Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014), denies the motion under Alice Corp. as to the '818 Patent, but grants the motion as to the '818 Patent for failure to state a claim, with leave to amend. (See Order, ECF No. 36 in Case No. 2:16-cv-857). The parties have so stipulated.
The Court now addresses the remaining infringement claims: (1) Claim 16 of U.S. Patent No. 8,641,511; (2) Claim 39 of U.S. Patent No. 6,884,166; (3) Claim 19 of U.S. Patent No. 8,771,058; (4) Claim 17 of U.S. Patent No. 8,814,664; (5) Claim 9 of U.S. Patent No. 9,355,518; and (6) Claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 9,306,952. Defendant does not attack the Patents under Alice Corp. but only attacks the First Amended Complaint ("FAC") under Iqbal and Twombly. A defendant is liable for direct patent infringement if he "without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor . . . ." 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). "Under the `all elements' rule, to find infringement, the accused device must contain `each limitation of the claim, either literally or by an equivalent.'" TIP Sys., LLC v. Phillips & Brooks/Gladwin, Inc., 529 F.3d 1364, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Freedman Seating Co. v. Am. Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997))).
The Court rejects Plaintiffs' argument that the requirement of providing infringement contentions element-by-element under the Local Rules permits a more flexible application of Civil Rule 8(a) at the dismissal stage. Iqbal and Twombly unquestionably apply to claims of infringement not covered by former Form 18. See Superior Indus., LLC v. Thor Global Enters. Ltd., 700 F.3d 1287, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (citing In re Bill of Lading Transmission & Processing Sys. Patent Litig. (R+L Carriers, Inc. v. DriverTech LLC), 681 F.3d 1323, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2012)) (noting that only claims of direct infringement, not claims of indirect infringement, could be pled using Form 18). Although Form 18 formerly applied to claims of direct infringement, obviating the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard for such claims, both Form 18 and Rule 84 (authorizing the form) were deleted from the Civil Rules in 2015, extinguishing the exception to the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standard for direct infringement claims. Local Rule 16.1-6, providing for the initial disclosure of infringement contentions before discovery, was adopted no later than 2011, i.e., at a time when Rule 84 and Form 18 in conjunction permitted a direct infringement plaintiff to obtain full discovery with a bare-bones pleading that would not survive Iqbal and Twombly. As in other districts with similar local rules, "[b]y requiring the party claiming invalidity to flesh out and support its invalidity contentions early on, the Patent Local Rules fulfill[ed] the function of Twombly and Iqbal." Wistron Corp. v. Phillip M. Adams & Assocs., LLC, 2011 WL 1654466, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 28, 2011) (Chen, Mag. J.). But the fact that certain aspects of Local Rule 16.1-6 may have been rendered redundant via Rule 84's deletion and the resulting application of Iqbal and Twombly to direct infringement claims, the Local Rules may not harmonized with the Civil rules so as to cause an inconsistency between them. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 83(a)(1). The Supreme Court's interpretation of Rule 8(a) requires plausible allegations as to all elements of a cause of action, and the elements of a cause of action for direct infringement include each limitation of the patent claim at issue. In any case, the current (2016) version of the infringement contentions rule, Local Patent Rule 1-6, requires much more detailed allegations than Iqbal and Twombly do, so it is not redundant to hold infringement plaintiffs to the strictures of Rule 8(a) at the pleading stage.
Claim 16 of the '511 Patent reads in full:
U.S. Patent No. 8,641,511 col. 13, l. 17-col. 14, l. 37. Claim 16 contains ten elements. See id.
The FAC does not contain allegations that the Accused Games contain each limitation of Claim 16 of the '511 Patent. (See First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 60-68). Even assuming for the sake of argument that the screen shots of the Accused Games incorporated into the FAC may substitute for written allegations of fact and that each screen shot presented establishes the practice of the respective elements of Claim 16 to which Plaintiffs have compared them, Plaintiffs have not addressed each element of Claim 16. The FAC addresses only the first and second, (id. ¶ 60), third, (id. ¶ 61), sixth through eighth, (id. ¶ 62), ninth, (id. ¶ 63), and tenth elements, (id. ¶ 64). Plaintiffs make no allegations as to the fourth or fifth elements of Claim 16, i.e., the "determining" and "presenting" elements. See U.S. Patent No. 8,641,511 col. 13, ll. 28-32. The Court therefore dismisses the claim of infringement of the '511 Patent, with leave to amend.
Claim 39 of the '166 Patent reads in full:
U.S. Patent No. 6,884,166 col. 23, l. 55-col. 24, l. 6. Claim 39 contains three elements, the second of which contains four sub-elements. See id.
The FAC does not contain allegations that the Accused Games contain each limitation of Claim 39 of the '166 Patent. (See First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 98-101). Even assuming for the sake of argument that the screen shots of the Accused Games incorporated into the FAC may substitute for written allegations of fact and that each screen shot presented establishes the practice of the respective elements of Claim 39 to which Plaintiffs have compared them, Plaintiffs have not addressed each element of Claim 39. The FAC addresses only the first and second elements, (id. ¶ 98), and the sub-elements of the second element, (id. ¶¶ 99-101). Plaintiffs make no allegations as to the third element of Claim 39, i.e., the "memory" element. See U.S. Patent No. 6,884,166 col. 24, ll. 5-6. The Court therefore dismisses the claim of infringement of the '166 Patent, with leave to amend.
Claim 19 of the '058 Patent reads in full:
A computer system comprising:
U.S. Patent No. 8,771,058 col. 62, ll. 1-27. Claim 19 contains two elements, the second of which contains ten sub-elements. See id.
The FAC does not contain allegations that the Accused Games contain each limitation of Claim 19 of the '058 Patent. (See First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 124-27). Even assuming for the sake of argument that the screen shots of the Accused Games incorporated into the FAC may substitute for written allegations of fact and that each screen shot presented establishes the practice of the respective elements of Claim 19 to which Plaintiffs have compared them, Plaintiffs have not addressed each element of Claim 19. The FAC addresses only the first element, (id. ¶ 124), and the sub-elements of the second element, (id. ¶¶ 124-27). Plaintiffs make no allegations as to the second element of Claim 19, i.e., the "memory" element. See U.S. Patent No. 8,771,058 col. 62, l. 3. The relevant allegation leaves a conspicuous absence (via ellipsis) of "a memory having stored thereon the set of instructions," as required to satisfy the second element of Claim 19. (See First. Am. Compl. ¶ 124). The Court therefore dismisses the claim of infringement of the '058 Patent, with leave to amend.
Claim 17 of the '664 Patent reads in full:
U.S. Patent No. 8,814,664 col. 32, ll. 1-38. Claim 17 contains one element with ten subelements. See id.
The FAC does not contain allegations that the Accused Games contain each limitation of Claim 17 of the '664 Patent. (See First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 135-40). Even assuming for the sake of argument that the screen shots of the Accused Games incorporated into the FAC may substitute for written allegations of fact and that each screen shot presented establishes the practice of the respective elements of Claim 17 to which Plaintiffs have compared them, Plaintiffs have not addressed each element of Claim 17. The FAC addresses only the first sub-element, (id. ¶ 135), the second sub-element, (id. ¶ 136), the third sub-element, (id. ¶ 137), the seventh sub-element, (id. ¶ 138), the eighth sub-element, (id. ¶ 139), and the ninth and tenth sub-elements, (id. ¶ 140). Plaintiffs make no allegations as to the fourth through sixth sub-elements of the single element of Claim 17, i.e., the "identify," "receive," and "form" sub-elements. See U.S. Patent No. 8,814,664 col. 32, ll. 19-25. Nor do Plaintiffs make a sufficient allegation as to the single element itself. See id. col. 32, l. 2-3. The relevant allegation leaves a conspicuous absence (via ellipsis) of "a non-transitory medium having stored thereon a plurality of," as required to satisfy the single element of Claim 17. (See First. Am. Compl. ¶ 135). The Court therefore dismisses the claim of infringement of the '664 Patent, with leave to amend.
Claim 9 of the '518 Patent reads in full:
U.S. Patent No. 9,355,518 col. 27, l. 66-col. 28, l. 38. Claim 9 contains two elements, the second of which contains five sub-elements, the second of which in turn contains three sub-sub-elements, the fourth of which in turn contains two sub-sub-elements, and the fifth of which in turn contains three sub-sub-elements. See id.
The FAC does not contain allegations that the Accused Games contain each limitation of Claim 9 of the '518 Patent. (See First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 148-52). Even assuming for the sake of argument that the screen shots of the Accused Games incorporated into the FAC may substitute for written allegations of fact and that each screen shot presented establishes the practice of the respective elements of Claim 9 to which Plaintiffs have compared them, Plaintiffs have not addressed each element of Claim 9. The FAC addresses only the second element, (id. ¶ 148), the first sub-element of the second element, (id.), the second sub-element of the second element and the three sub-sub-elements thereof, (id. ¶ 149), the third and fourth sub-elements of the second element and the two sub-sub-elements of the fourth sub-element, (id. ¶ 150), and the fifth sub-element of the second element and the three sub-sub-elements thereof, (id. ¶ 151-52). Plaintiffs make no allegations as to the first element of Claim 9, i.e., the "processor" element. See U.S. Patent No. 9,355,518 col. 28, l. 1. The relevant allegation leaves a conspicuous absence (via ellipsis) of "at least one processor," as required to satisfy the first element of Claim 9. (See First. Am. Compl. ¶ 148). The Court therefore dismisses the claim of infringement of the '518 Patent, with leave to amend.
Claim 1 of the '952 Patent reads in full:
U.S. Patent No. 9,306,952 col. 34, l. 51-col. 35, l. 48. Claim 1 contains two elements, the second of which contains five sub-elements, the first and second of which in turn each contain four sub-sub-elements. See id.
The FAC does not contain allegations that the Accused Games contain each limitation of Claim 1 of the '952 Patent. (See First Am. Compl. ¶¶ 160-65). Even assuming for the sake of argument that the screen shots of the Accused Games incorporated into the FAC may substitute for written allegations of fact and that each screen shot presented establishes the practice of the respective elements of Claim 1 to which Plaintiffs have compared them, Plaintiffs have not addressed each element of Claim 1. The FAC addresses only the second element, (id. ¶ 160), the first sub-element thereof, (id.), the second sub-sub-element thereof, (id.), the third and fourth sub-sub-elements thereof, (id. ¶ 161), the second sub-element of the second element and the first three sub-sub-elements thereof, (id. ¶ 162), and the third through fifth sub-elements of the second element, (id. ¶¶ 163-65). Plaintiffs make no allegations as to the first element of Claim 1, i.e., the "processor" element, see U.S. Patent No. 9,306,952 col. 34, l. 52, the first sub-sub-element of the first sub-element of the second element, see id. col. 34, ll. 58-60, or the fourth sub-subelement of the second sub-element of the second element, see id. col. 35, ll. 23-28. The Court therefore dismisses the claim of infringement of the '952 Patent, with leave to amend.
Finally, the Court addresses the sufficiency of the allegations of willfulness under Cause of Action 13. Plaintiffs allege:
(Am. Compl. ¶ 169; Notice Letter, July 15, 2014, ECF No. 31-1). The date of notice as to the existence of asserted patents is crucial to allegations of willful infringement.
In re Seagate Technology, LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (citations omitted). The present lawsuit was filed on April 8, 2016. Accordingly, of the Patents that survive as to invalidity, only the '818, '511, and '166 Patents have been sufficiently alleged to have been willfully infringed (assuming the FAC is amended to sufficiently allege infringement of those patents generally). The Court rejects the argument that Defendant was on sufficient notice of its alleged infringement of related patents via Plaintiffs' indication in the letter that the allegedly infringed patents were "part of a much larger portfolio." The Court dismisses the willful infringement claim as to the '058, '664, '518, and '952 Patents, with leave to amend.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion to Sever (ECF No. 46) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Stay (ECF No. 45) is DENIED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 44) is GRANTED, with leave to amend.
IT IS SO ORDERED.