KATHERINE E. OLER, Special Master.
On October 27, 2016, Marc Meyer ("Petitioner"), filed a petition for compensation in the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program ("the Program"),
On November 27, 2017, Petitioner filed a motion for attorneys' fees and costs (AFC Motion), requesting $23,056.70 in attorneys' fees, and $1,625.60 in costs, for a total of $24,682.30. Petitioner's ("Petr's") Application ("App.") dated November 27, 2017, ECF No. 29 at 1-2.
This case was transferred to my docket on December 6, 2017. ECF No. 30. On February 21, 2018, Respondent filed a response to Petitioner's AFC motion.
Petitioner filed a reply to Respondent's response on February 22, 2018. ECF No. 33. Petitioner argues (1) that Respondent's position regarding Petitioner's AFC Motion is "overly burdensome on the Court and prejudices Petitioner" (id. at 2); (2) that "Petitioner has met his burden of establishing reasonable fees and costs" (id. at 3); and (3) that his "attorneys' fees should be paid and his case costs reimbursed" (id. at 4). This matter is now ripe for decision.
The Vaccine Act permits an award of "reasonable attorneys' fees" and "other costs." § 15(e)(1). If a petitioner succeeds on the merits of his or her claim, the award of attorneys' fees is automatic. Id.; see also Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369, 373 (2013). A petitioner need not prevail on entitlement to receive a fee award, however, as long as the petition was brought in "good faith" and there was a "reasonable basis" for the claim to proceed. §15(e)(1). Respondent does not argue that this case lacks good faith or a reasonable basis. Upon my review of the record, and an examination of the overall circumstances of this case, I also agree that this case was filed in "good faith," and with a "reasonable basis."
The Federal Circuit has endorsed the use of the lodestar approach to determine what constitutes "reasonable attorneys' fees" and "other costs" under the Vaccine Act. Avera v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Under this approach, "[t]he initial estimate of a reasonable attorney's fee" is calculated by "multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate." Id. at 1347-48 (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984)). That product is then adjusted upward or downward based on other specific findings. Id.
Special masters have substantial discretion in awarding fees and may adjust a fee request sua sponte, apart from objections raised by Respondent, and without providing petitioners with notice and opportunity to respond. See Sabella v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 86 Fed. Cl. 201, 209 (2009). Special masters need not engage in a line-by-line analysis of petitioner's fee application when reducing fees. See Broekelschen v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 102 Fed. Cl. 719, 729 (2011).
A "reasonable hourly rate" is defined as the rate "prevailing in the community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation." Avera, 515 F.3d at 1348 (quoting Blum, 465 U.S. at 896 n.11). In general, this rate is based on "the forum rate for the District of Columbia" rather than "the rate in the geographic area of the practice of petitioner's attorney." Rodriguez v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 632 F.3d 1381, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (citing Avera, 515 F.3d at 1349). There is a "limited exception" that provides for attorney's fees to be awarded at local hourly rates when "the bulk of the attorney's work is done outside the forum jurisdiction" and "there is a very significant difference" between the local hourly rate and forum hourly rate. Id. This is known as the Davis County exception. See Hall v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 640 F.3d 1351, 1353 (2011) (citing Davis Cty. Solid Waste Mgmt. & Energy Recovery Special Serv. Dist. v. U.S. EPA, 169 F.3d 755, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
Petitioner's counsel of record, Ms. Haskins, performed work on this case from her law firm's Sarasota, Florida office (see Petr's App. at 3; see also Ex. 17), and the billing invoices filed in connection with the present fee request reveal the work she performed on the matter (see generally Ex. 14). In a prior case, Special Master Corcoran found attorneys from Ms. Haskin's law firm based in Sarasota, Florida, to be entitled to forum rates. See Dezern v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 13-643V, 2016 WL 6678496 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Oct. 14, 2016). I find Special Master Corcoran's analysis to be well-reasoned and persuasive, and will follow his approach in this instant fees request; thus, forum rates apply in this case.
For cases in which forum rates apply, McCulloch provides the framework for determining the appropriate hourly rate range for attorneys' fees based upon the attorneys' experience. See McCulloch v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 09-293V, 2015 WL 5634323 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 1, 2015). The Office of Special Masters has accepted the decision in McCulloch and has issued a Fee Schedule for subsequent years.
Accordingly, I find the requested hourly forum rates for Ms. Haskins — i.e., $324.00 for work performed in 2016, and $348.00 for work performed in 2017 (see Ex. 14 at 10) — to be reasonable.
Based on my review of the billing records submitted with Petitioner's AFC Motion (see generally Ex. 14), the hours expended on this matter by Petitioner's counsel appear to be reasonable, and I find no cause to reduce the total attorney or paralegal hours spent on this case.
As outlined above, Petitioner is awarded the entirety of his requested $23,056.70 in attorneys' fees.
Similar to attorneys' fees, a request for reimbursement of costs must be reasonable. Perreira v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 27 Fed. Cl. 29, 34 (Fed. Cl. 1992). Petitioner requests $1,625.60 in attorneys' costs, the bulk of which represent costs incurred by his counsel in attempting to secure an expert opinion in this case. See generally Ex. 15, ECF No. 29-2. Additional requested costs consist of filing fees, and service and copying costs associated with prosecuting this claim. Id. After reviewing the costs invoices attached with Petitioner's AFC Motion, I find the requested litigation costs to be reasonable, and will award them in full.
Accordingly, I award