MICHAEL S. NACHMANOFF, Magistrate Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff's Statement of Fees and Costs (Dkt. No. 105-1). On June 6, 2018, Plaintiff submitted this statement to Defendant, pursuant to the Court's Order dated May 30, 2018, requesting $27,324.00 in attorney's fees and $247.50 in costs expended in connection with Plaintiff's Motion to Compel and Dr. Metters' Motion to Quash. See Non-Party Dr. Samuel Metters' Opp'n to Plaintiff's Statement of Fees & Costs [hereinafter Dr. Metters' Opp'n] at 1 (Dkt. No. 105); see Ex. A (Dkt. No. 105-1). On June 13, 2018, Dr. Metters filed his Opposition to Plaintiff's Statement of Fees and Costs (Dkt. No. 105), arguing that the Court should deny Plaintiff's request based upon its failure "to comply with the law requiring documentation and verification of fees and costs." Id. at 2. Dr. Metters argued that, in the alternative, Plaintiff is not entitled to the full amount sought in the statement. See id. at 2. Because the Court finds no basis for Dr. Metters' attempt to avoid paying fees and costs and deems Plaintiff's documentation to be sufficient, it focuses on his latter argument.
Upon determining that an award of attorney's fees and costs is appropriate, a court employs the lodestar method to assess the amount. See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 801 (2002). The lodestar method consists of "multiplying the number of reasonable hours expended times a reasonable rate." McAfee v. Boczar, 738 F.3d 81, 88 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Robinson v. Equifax Information Servs., LLC, 560 F.3d 235, 243 (4th Cir. 2009)). To establish such hours and rate, a court considers the following:
Barber v. Kimbrell's Inc., 577 F.2d 216, 226 n.28 (4th Cir. 1978) (citing Johnson v. Ga. Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 (5th Cir. 1974)). A court thereafter "subtract[s] fees for hours spent on unsuccessful claims unrelated to successful ones" and "award[s] some percentage of the remaining amount, depending on the degree of success enjoyed." McAfee, 738 F.3d at 88 (citations omitted) (quotation marks omitted). Lastly, a court reviews the costs.
Upon a review of the 12 factors above, the Court finds that factors (2) novelty of and difficulty of the questions raised, (4) the attorney's opportunity costs in pressing the instant litigation, (6) the attorney's expectations at the outset of the litigation, (7) the time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances, (8) the amount in controversy, (10) the undesirability of the case, and (11) the nature and length of the attorney-client relationship are not significant. Rather, factors (1) time and labor expended, (3) skill required, (5) customary fee, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney, and (12) fee awards in similar cases are noteworthy. The Court first evaluates Plaintiff's counsel, John Pennington's time and labor expended and then applies factors 3, 5, 9, and 12 to assess his rate.
Plaintiff asserts that Dr. Metters' filing of a "baseless [M]otion to [Q]uash" and "baseless opposition" to its Motion to Compel required it to "research, draft, and file three separate briefs and to undertake the exhaustive effort of searching for, collecting, and reviewing documents that would contradict the CEO of Metters' counsel's false statements."
Accordingly, the Court finds it reasonable to reduce Mr. Pennington's hours by the time expended on the Opposition to the Motion to Compel, 16.9 hours. Moreover, Plaintiff's counsel spent 31 hours
The Court consistently employs the Vienna Metro matrix in determining the customary rates for attorneys engaged in commercial litigation in northern Virginia. See Vienna Metro LLC v. Pulte Home Corp., 786 F.Supp.2d 1090 (E.D. Va. 2011). The matrix provides a range of hourly rates appropriate for attorneys with varying years of experience:
It is applicable in this case, as it has been in other recent commercial litigation cases before this Court. See, e.g., Burke v. Mattis, No. 1:16-cv-1256, 2018 WL 2717225, at *3-*4 (E.D. Va. June 4, 2018) (finding Vienna Metro matrix rates reasonable with some downward adjustment); Hair Club for me, LLC v. Ehson, No. 1:16-cv-236, 2017 WL 1250998, at *8 (E.D. Va. Apr. 3, 2017) (holding that lower end of Vienna Metro rates range is reasonable); BMG Rights Mgmt. (US) LLC v. Cox Commc'ns, Inc., 234 F.Supp.3d 760, 770-73 (E.D. Va. 2017) (finding Vienna Metro matrix rates reasonable), vacated on other grounds by 881 F.3d 293 (4th Cir. 2018).
The Vienna Metro matrix accounts for factors (3) skill required, (5) customary fee, (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney, and (12) fee awards in similar cases by providing a stable and consistent rate for attorneys in the Northern Virginia area based on their skill in commercial litigation cases and years of experience. The Court finds no reason to deviate from the reasonable range of rates provided in the Vienna Metro matrix.
As Mr. Pennington's hourly rate, $360.00, is in accordance with the Vienna Metro matrix based upon his years of experience, the Court finds his hourly rate to be reasonable. See Pl.'s Response to Metters' Opp'n at 18; Pennington Decl. ¶ 13 (Dkt. No. 110-8). It falls within the lower range of the Vienna Metro matrix for attorneys with four to seven years of experience.
After applying the reductions described above, Mr. Pennington is entitled to the following award:
Accordingly, the final results of the lodestar calculation generate a total of $10,836.00 for Plaintiff's attorney's fees in pursuing the Motion to Compel and opposing the Motion to Quash. Because the Court finds that Plaintiff was the prevailing party on both motions, it need not further reduce the lodestar figure.
Plaintiff also requests $247.50 in costs related to Dr. Metters' failure to appear for his first noticed deposition. See Ex. A (Dkt. No. 105-1). The Court determines this cost to be reasonable and in accordance with its Order dated May 30, 2018, granting Plaintiff's Motion to Compel and denying Dr. Metters' Motion to Quash (Dkt. No. 103).
For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED that Dr. Metters or his defense counsel shall pay