GERALD BRUCE LEE, District Judge.
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants AT & T Inc. and AT & T Pension Benefit Plan's ("Plan") Motion for Summary Judgment. (Dkt. No. 53.) This case concerns Defendants' alleged failure to notify Plaintiff of a change in the Plan's early retirement eligibility policy, resulting in Plaintiff's alleged loss of eight years of monthly payments to which she was entitled. There are four issues before the Court. The first issue is whether the Court should deny Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's claim for retroactive benefits (Count I) because the administrator's decision was an abuse of discretion where there is not substantial evidence to support the determination that the administrator notified Ms. Helton of the change in the Plan's eligibility requirements. The second issue is whether the Court should deny Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs claim that Defendants did not comply with ERISA's disclosure requirements (Count II) because she was not properly notified of the material changes to the Plan in a timely manner. The third issue is whether the Court should grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's claim for breach of fiduciary duty (Count III) because this claim, as plead, is not recognized as a matter of law, where Plaintiff otherwise has an adequate form of relief on her claim for retroactive benefits. The fourth and final issue is whether the Court should grant Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiff's claim for failure to provide requested information in violation of ERISA § 502(c) (Count IV) because Plaintiff was provided all of the information that was relied upon or considered in making a determination on her claim. First, the Court denies Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count I because the Plan administrator committed an abuse of discretion in denying Plaintiffs claim by not engaging in a reasoned and principled decision-making process, and the determination is not supported by substantial evidence. Second, the Court denies Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count II because there is a dispute of material fact as to whether Defendant employed a method of distribution that was reasonably calculated to ensure actual receipt when it sent out the requisite disclosures of the material changes to the Plan. Third, the Court denies Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Count III because Plaintiff has adequately stated a cognizable claim for breach of fiduciary duty, and Plaintiff does not otherwise have an adequate remedy for Defendants' failure to inform her and correct her misunderstanding of her rights under the Plan. Finally, the Court grants Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment because there is no dispute that Defendants provided to Plaintiff all of the information considered or relied upon in denying her claim for retroactive benefits.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, the Court must grant summary judgment if the moving party demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). Once a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, the opposing party has the burden of showing that a genuine dispute exists. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A "material fact" is a fact that might affect the outcome of a party's case. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; JKC Holding Co. v. Wash. Sports Ventures, Inc., 264 F.3d 459, 465 (4th Cir.2001). Whether a fact is considered to be "material" is determined by the substantive law, and "[o]nly disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Hooven-Lewis v. Caldera, 249 F.3d 259, 265 (4th Cir.2001). A "genuine" issue concerning a "material" fact arises when the evidence is sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict in the nonmoving party's favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Rule 56(e) requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by its own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
The Court denies Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment because the Plan administrator's denial of retroactive benefits was not reasonable and, therefore, was an abuse of discretion. In reviewing the denial of benefits under an ERISA plan, a district court's first task is to consider de novo whether the relevant plan documents confer discretionary authority on the plan administrator to make a benefits-eligibility determination. See Booth v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Associates Health and Welfare Plan, 201 F.3d 335, 340-341 (4th Cir.2000). When an ERISA benefit plan vests with the plan administrator the discretionary authority to make eligibility determinations for beneficiaries, a reviewing court evaluates the administrator's decision for abuse of discretion. Williams v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 609 F.3d 622, 629-30 (4th Cir.2010) (citation omitted). Under this standard, a court will not disturb a plan administrator's decision if the decision is reasonable, even if the court would have come to a contrary conclusion independently. Id. at 630 (citation omitted). "To be held reasonable, the administrator's decision must result from a deliberate, principled reasoning process and be supported by substantial evidence." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit identifies eight nonexclusive factors for courts to consider in reviewing the reasonableness of a plan administrator's decision:
Here, the Plan's determination was not reasonable because it was not based on a reasoned, principled decision-making process and was not supported by substantial evidence; thus, the Plan abused its discretion in denying Plaintiffs claim. Plaintiffs claim was denied based on the determination that Plaintiff received proper notice of the Special Update. Specifically, the Benefit Plan Committee found that Plaintiff was sent the April 28, 1997 letter because "she was an active employee on that date," her address remained the same since at least 1988, and there was no indication that mail had been returned as undeliverable. Further, the Committee found that Ms. Helton requested and was sent a pension commencement package in 2001, which she never returned. In addition, without setting forth any findings as to Defendants' mailing procedures, the Committee found that Plaintiff "should also have received copies of the 1998 and the 2004 AT & TMPP (sic) Summary Plan Descriptions, which provided information on the Special Update and when participants could commence their package." Finally, the Committee found that, on August 31, 2009, an October 1, 2009 pension commencement package was sent to Plaintiff, which she commenced on the effective date. The Committee acknowledged Plaintiffs assertions that she did not (1) receive the 1997 letter or the SPDs or (2) request or receive a commencement package in 2001, but it did not give weight to this evidence or set forth any analysis as to how these assertions impacted its determination. Based on these findings, the Committee upheld the denial of her claim.
The denial of Plaintiff's claim was an abuse of discretion for two reasons. First, the Plan's decision was not reasonable because it was not based on a reasoned, principled decision-making process. The denial was based on the finding that the Plan sent Ms. Helton various notifications regarding the Special Update. However, neither the Plan nor the Committee evaluated the process by which notifications were allegedly sent to Ms. Helton. See 29 CFR § 2520.104b-1 (requiring the plan administrator to furnish notices by measures "reasonably calculated to ensure actual receipt of the materials"). Instead, the Committee seemed to rubberstamp without question the administrator's assertions that the materials were sent. Moreover, the Committee's acceptance of the Plan's assertions was done in the face of Ms. Helton's attestations that she never received any of these materials and never requested a 2001 commencement package as the administrator indicated was requested and sent. Ms. Helton's position, even though it was supported by other circumstantial evidence, such as the fact that the 2001 email did not contain a request for a commencement package, was not given any weight or consideration in the decision-making process. Thus, the decision was not based on a reasoned, principled decision-making process and was, therefore, unreasonable, because the Committee did not evaluate the process by which the Plan allegedly distributed the
Second, the Plan administrator's decision was not reasonable because it was not supported by substantial evidence. The alleged distribution of the notifications is not supported by substantial evidence because there is no evidence demonstrating that the Plan used distribution methods that were "reasonably calculated to ensure actual receipt of the materials," and, as stated above, it appears the Committee simply rubberstamped the Plan's factual assertions without reference to any evidence in support thereof. Notably, there are no physical records of any mailing, mailing lists, or other business records indicating that these materials were mailed to Ms. Helton at all, and certainly no evidence specifically showing that the materials were sent to Ms. Helton at her home address, as Defendants claim. The affidavits of Ms. Stoia and Mr. Adam, while setting forth the mailing procedure that the Plan followed, do not speak to whether Ms. Helton was included on the list of individuals to whom the mailings were to be distributed or whether her home address was the address selected. As set forth in one of the screen shots that Plaintiff supplied in support of her Opposition, Defendants have the option of selecting an employee's home, office, or other location as the employee's mailing address, and there is no indication that Ms. Helton's home was selected, or that the home address was correct. In fact, the only screen shot indicating Ms. Helton's home address has an effective date of 2007, which does not demonstrate that this was the address used in the alleged mailings in 1997, 1998, 2001, or 2004.
In addition, there is a dispute of fact as to Ms. Helton's employment status, which could impact whether she was mailed the 1997 letter. Notably, there is a dispute as to the time period at which an employee needed to be on "active status" to be on the mailing list for the 1997 letter. The Distribution Matrix attached to Ms. Stoia's affidavit indicates that an employee had to be on active status on January 1, 1997. However, the Plan and Committee decisions indicate that an employee needed to be on active status at the time of the mailing. While there does not seem to be a dispute that Ms. Helton was an active employee on January 1, 1997, if she needed to be considered in active employee in April 1997, there is a dispute of fact as to whether Ms. Helton falls within this category based on the alleged leave of absence she took during this time period. Defendants claim that this is a non sequitur because the Distribution Matrix indicates that employees on leave would also receive the April 1997 mailing. However, there is a dispute of fact as to the types of leave that fall within this category and whether Ms. Helton's leave of absence qualified. Accordingly, based on the dispute as to Ms. Helton's status, the time at which Ms. Helton needed to definitively qualify as an active employee for mailing purposes, and whether her leave of absence was such that she was still sent the notification, even if not considered an active employee, it is disputed whether Ms. Helton falls within a category to which the 1997 letter was mailed.
Further, the Committee's findings as to the circumstances surrounding the alleged request for, and receipt of, a commencement package in 2001 are not supported by substantial evidence. There is no evidence that Ms. Helton requested a commencement package in 2001 aside from the case notes referring to a March 2001 email. The 2001 email from Ms. Helton referenced in the case notes does not contain any such request and instead asks whether it was true that she was not eligible for
Finally, the findings about the request for, and distribution of, the commencement package in 2009 are not supported by substantial evidence. In discussing the distribution of the commencement package in 2009, there is no acknowledgment or consideration of the fact that Ms. Helton did not initially receive the package and, only after she followed up on her request, was she sent another package that she actually received.
The Court denies Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count II because there is a dispute of material fact as to whether the administrator complied with the requisite reporting and disclosure provisions regarding the material change to the Plan. ERISA and its interpreting regulations require deferred vested participants to be notified of material changes to a plan's eligibility rules within 210 days of the end of the plan year in which the change is adopted. See 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104b-3. Plan administrators must "use measures reasonably calculated to ensure actual receipt of the material by plan participants," and such materials "must be sent by a method or methods of delivery likely to result in full distribution." 29 C.F.R. § 2520.104b-1(b)(1). "Where the employee's assertion of non-receipt is supported by circumstantial evidence, and the employer provides an equally weak assertion that notice was mailed, the issue of mailing should not be decided at summary judgment." Custer v. Murphy Oil USA, Inc., 503 F.3d 415, 422 (5th Cir.2007).
Here, the Court finds that there is a dispute of material fact regarding the distribution of the 1998 SPD, which is the only communication that would qualify in substance and timeliness under the reporting and disclosure provision, and, therefore,
The Court denies Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs claim for breach of fiduciary duty (Count III) because whether Defendants breached their duty to provide Plaintiff with information is a question of fact, and Defendants have not established that the requested relief is not appropriate as an alternative basis for relief as a matter of law. "Congress intended ERISA's fiduciary responsibility provisions to codify the common law of trusts."
"Moreover, a fiduciary is at times obligated to affirmatively provide information to the beneficiary." Id. "The duty to disclose material information is the core of a fiduciary's responsibility, animating the common law of trusts long before the enactment of ERISA." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "The common law of trusts identifies two instances where a trustee is under a `duty to inform.'" Id. "First, a fiduciary has a duty to give beneficiaries upon request complete and accurate information as to the nature and amount of the trust property." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "Second, in limited circumstances, a trustee is required to provide
Congress provided individual beneficiaries with an avenue to seek equitable relief for a breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA. Id. at 385. Specifically, ERISA § 502(a)(3) provides: "A civil action may be brought ... by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the plan." Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)) (emphasis added). "The phrase `appropriate equitable relief encompasses those categories of relief that were typically available in equity (such as injunction, mandamus, and restitution, but not compensatory damages).'" Id. (quotation omitted). The phrase "any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate" has been limited to back pay, injunctions and other equitable remedies and not to allow awards for compensatory or punitive damages. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). "However, even if the redress sought by a beneficiary under ERISA § 502(a)(3) is a classic form of equitable relief, it must be appropriate under the circumstances." Id. at 385. "For example, such relief is not "appropriate" equitable relief where Congress elsewhere provided adequate relief for a beneficiary's injury and there is no need for further equitable relief." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the Court denies Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count III because there is a question of fact as to whether Defendants breached their fiduciary duty by not responding to Plaintiff's question and apparent misunderstanding in her 2001 email about the Plan's eligibility requirements, and Demonstrates have not demonstrated that the relief Plaintiff seeks is not appropriate equitable relief as a matter of law. First, the facts show that Defendants failed to respond to Ms. Helton's 2001 email, in which she asked whether it was true that she is not entitled to her benefits until age 65. Even if Defendants sent out other notifications of the Special Update, and Ms. Helton had received them, this email demonstrates that she was still operating under the misunderstanding that she was not entitled to benefits until age 65. Defendants had the duty to correct her misunderstanding and inform her that the Plan had changed, such that, inter alia, she was eligible to receive benefits at age 55. Defendants' failure to properly inform Plaintiff of her rights under the Plan may constitute a breach of their fiduciary duty and is a question of fact for trial.
Second, the Court rejects Defendants' position that Plaintiff is not entitled to
The Court grants Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Count IV because there is no dispute that Defendants provided to Plaintiff all of the information relevant to Plaintiff's claim for retroactive benefits. A Plan administrator is required to make available all documents, records, and other information relevant to a claimant's claim for benefits upon request. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(j)(3). Documents are relevant to a claimant if the information was relied upon in making the benefit determination or was submitted, considered, or generated in the course of making the benefit determination. 29 C.F.R. § 2560.503-1(m)(8).
Here, there is no dispute that Plaintiff was provided the administrative record in this case, which includes all of the information relevant to Plaintiffs claim because that was all that the Plan administrator considered or relied upon in denying Plaintiffs claim. As stated above, the denial was not based on substantial evidence, and it appears that the Committee and Plan administrator simply rubberstamped the employer's assertions without reviewing evidence in support thereof. Thus, it would be logically inconsistent to rule on Count I that the denial of Plaintiffs claim was not supported by evidence and then rule as to Count IV that Plaintiff was not provided all of the evidence considered. Accordingly, because Plaintiff was provided with all of the information that was relied upon or considered in the decision to deny her claim, the Court grants Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on Count IV.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies in part and grants in part Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.
Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part. Specifically, Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED as to Counts I-III and GRANTED as to Count IV.
