LYDIA KAY GRIGGSBY, Judge.
Plaintiff, Josiah E. Nicely, a former United States Marine Corps ("USMC") Captain, brings this military pay action against the United States alleging that he has been wrongly discharged from the USMC and seeking back pay and injunctive relief, pursuant to the Military Pay Act, 37 U.S.C. § 204(a). See generally Compl. The government has moved to remand this matter to the Board for Correction of Naval Records ("BCNR"), pursuant to Rule 52.2 of the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims ("RCFC"). For the reasons discussed below, the Court
In this military pay act matter, plaintiff, Josiah E. Nicely, alleges that he has been wrongfully discharged from the USMC and seeks to recover back pay and certain injunctive relief. See generally Compl. Plaintiff served on active duty in the USMC for more than ten years, until October 7, 2011, when he was involuntarily discharged. Compl. at ¶ 2.
On January 22, 2010, plaintiff was arrested by a Beaufort, South Carolina Police Department Officer and charged with speeding and driving under the influence ("DUI"). AR at 006; see also Compl. ¶ 5; Def. Mot. at 2. After the arrest, plaintiff was taken into civilian custody, and he did not report to work at his prescribed start time. Def. Mot. at 2; see also AR at 064. After plaintiff successfully contested the DUI charges, these charges were dismissed on March 4, 2010. Compl. ¶¶ 5, 12-15, 22.
Although the DUI charges against plaintiff had been dismissed, plaintiff's arrest led to administrative and disciplinary proceedings within the USMC and, ultimately, to plaintiff's involuntary separation from the USMC. AR at 007-014, 091-93, 526-29; see also id. ¶¶ 2, 7-11, 16-83; Def. Mot. at 2. On April 7, 2010, plaintiff received an adverse fitness report for the period August 4, 2010 to January 25, 2010, which noted that plaintiff had been apprehended for an "alcohol related incident." AR at 022, 420, 423-24; see also Def. Mot. at 3. And so, plaintiff was relieved of his duties as a public affairs officer for the USMC for cause on September 23, 2010. AR at 424, 429; see also Def. Mot. at 3-4.
The USMC also referred charges against plaintiff to a general court martial for unauthorized absence, driving under the influence of alcohol, and being drunk on duty. AR at 021-22; see also Compl. ¶¶ 21, 28; Def. Mot. at 2-4. Subsequently, the charge of being drunk on duty was dismissed and replaced with a charge of incapacitation for duty through wrongful indulgence in alcohol. AR at 026-027. Following an agreement reached between the parties, the USMC dismissed the charges in plaintiff's general court martial, and plaintiff was notified of the USMC's intent to, instead, impose a non-judicial proceeding. Id. at 028-30, 197. The USMC conducted a non-judicial proceeding to consider the charges against plaintiff on June 9, 2010. Id. at 031, 207; see also Def. Mot. at 4; Compl. ¶ 44. During these proceedings, the Commanding General Marine Corps Installations-East ("CG MCI-East") found plaintiff to be guilty of the charges of unauthorized absence, driving under the influence of alcohol, and incapacitation for duty through wrongful indulgence. AR at 021-22, 026-27, 217; see also Compl. ¶¶ 49, 53; Def. Mot. at 4-5. And so, the CG MCI-East imposed punishment, which consisted of a punitive letter of reprimand, forfeiture of pay, and the convening of a board of inquiry to show cause why plaintiff should be retained in the USMC. Id.
On July 2, 2010, plaintiff received another adverse fitness report that was triggered by his non-judicial proceeding. AR at 033; see also Def. Mot. at 5. On July 8, 2010, plaintiff submitted a rebuttal challenging the fitness report and he also challenged several aspects of his USMC disciplinary proceedings. AR at 033-35. Specifically relevant to this dispute, plaintiff alleged that a stipulation of facts that he signed prior to the non-judicial proceeding was missing important information and that, "[g]iven the duress of the situation, refusing to sign that stipulation would have broken the pretrial agreement, forcing [him] back to general court martial where [he] faced the risk of a federal conviction." Id. at 034; see also Compl. ¶¶ 59-61; Def. Mot. at 5. As a result of plaintiff's statement, the CG MCI-East initiated an Inspector General inquiry to determine whether plaintiff's allegations of a "duress of the situation" met the legal definition of "duress." AR at 035, 040; see also Compl. ¶ 61-63, 65-67; Def. Mot. at 5. On September 14, 2010, the Inspector General found that plaintiff's allegation of duress was not substantiated by the evidence. AR 043; see also Def. Mot. at 6.
On January 12-13, 2011, a board of inquiry was convened to make a recommendation regarding plaintiff's retention in the USMC, due to the allegations of misconduct and substandard performance brought against plaintiff. AR at 045-046, 278-79; see also Def. Mot. at 7. On February 3, 2011, a report of the board of inquiry recommended that plaintiff "be separated from Naval Service and that his service be characterized as General (under honorable conditions)." AR at 046; 312-14; see also Compl. ¶ 71; Def. Mot. at 7.
Plaintiff unsuccessfully contested the results of the board of inquiry by submitting a respondent statement to a board of review. AR at 323-26. And so, plaintiff was ultimately discharged from the USMC with a general discharge under honorable conditions on October 7, 2011. Id. at 463-69, 526-29; see also Def. Mot. at 7-9; Compl. ¶¶ 2, 76-77, 81.
On November 4, 2012—after his involuntary separation from the USMC—plaintiff filed an application for correction of his military record with the BCNR, in which he challenged several aspects of his involuntary separation and the military proceedings surrounding his involuntary separation. AR at 121-53; see also Def. Mot. at 9; Compl. ¶ 82. In the application, plaintiff requested that the BCNR correct his military record by: (1) directing the removal of the fitness report covering the period of August 4, 2009 until January 25, 2010 from his naval record; (2) setting aside plaintiff's administrative separation from the USMC for misconduct, as well as the board of inquiry that lead to that separation; (3) reinstating plaintiff to active duty and providing plaintiff with back pay; and (4) ordering such additional relief as may be required to afford plaintiff adequate relief. AR at 122.
On August 13, 2015, the BCNR found that the evidence submitted by plaintiff "was insufficient to establish the existence of probable material error or injustice." Id. at 091-93; see also Compl. ¶ 83; Def. Mot. at 10. And so, the BCNR denied plaintiff's requests for relief. Id.
Plaintiff commenced this action on October 4, 2016. See generally Compl.
On October 4, 2016, plaintiff filed the complaint in this military pay action. Id. On February 15, 2017, the government filed a motion for remand in this matter to the BCNR. See generally Def. Mot.
On March 9, 2017, plaintiff filed a response to the government's motion for remand. See generally Pl. Resp. On March 24, 2017, the government filed a reply in support of its motion for remand. See generally Def. Reply.
The government's motion for remand having been fully briefed, the Court addresses the pending motion.
The Tucker Act grants this Court the authority "to remand appropriate matters to any administrative or executive body or official with such direction as it may deem proper and just." 28 USC §1491(a)(2). In addition, RCFC 52.2 provides the procedural framework that governs the remand process. RCFC 52.2; see also Santiago v. United States, 71 Fed. Cl. 220 (2006) (denying the government's motion for partial dismissal and for judgment upon the administrative record, granting in part plaintiffs' cross-motion for judgment on the administrative record, and remanding the case to the Secretary of the Army for further proceedings.).
In this regard, RCFC 52.2 provides that, "[i]n any case within its jurisdiction, the court, on motion or on its own, may order the remand of appropriate matters to an administrative or executive body or official." RCFC 52.2. RCFC 52.2 further provides that the Court's remand order must direct the parties as the Court deems proper; establish the duration of the remand for a period of up to six months; specify whether Court proceedings will be stayed during the remand period; and ask the parties to report to the Court at least every 90 days regarding the status of the remand proceedings. Id. A certified copy of the Court's remand order must also be served on each party, as well as "the administrative or executive body or official to whom the order is directed." Id.
The Supreme Court has also held that, except in rare circumstances, a remand to an agency is appropriate for additional investigation or explanation, "[i]f the record before the agency does not support the agency action, if the agency has not considered all relevant factors, or if the reviewing court simply cannot evaluate the challenged agency action on the basis of the record before it." Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985). This is so because, "[t]he reviewing court is not generally empowered to conduct a de novo inquiry into the matter being reviewed and to reach its own conclusions based on such an inquiry." Id.
Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has explained that a remand to an agency may be appropriate where, an agency seeks "a remand because of intervening events outside of the agency's control," like "a new legal decision or the passage of new legislation," and that "[a] remand is generally required if the intervening event may affect the validity of the agency action." SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 254 F.3d 1022, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citations omitted). But, even where there are no intervening events, an agency may request a remand without confessing error, in order to reconsider its previous position. Id. at 1029. In such a situation, "the reviewing court has discretion over whether to remand." Id. (citing Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 10 F.3d 892, 896 (D.C. Cir. 1993)).
An agency may also request a remand "because it believes that its original decision is incorrect on the merits and wishes to change the result." Id. And so, a "remand to an agency is generally appropriate to correct simple errors, such as clerical errors, transcription errors, or erroneous calculations." Id. (citation omitted). In addition, while an agency's request for a remand "may be refused if [it] is frivolous or in bad faith," if an agency's concerns are "substantial and legitimate, a remand is usually appropriate." Id.
A remand of this matter to the Board for Correction of Naval Records is appropriate and warranted. In its motion for remand, the government seeks a remand of this matter to the BCNR, because that board has not considered all of the relevant factors regarding whether the Secretary of the Navy's action in involuntarily separating plaintiff from the USMC was in accordance with applicable regulations. Def. Mot. at 1. Specifically, the government requests that this matter be remanded to the BCNR so that the board can consider: (1) whether the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower & Reserve Affairs) followed the applicable regulations in approving the recommendation of the board of inquiry to separate plaintiff from the USMC; (2) whether the board of inquiry's consideration of allegedly protected communications was in accordance with the Military Whistleblower Protection Act; and (3) which documents constitute the administrative record for this matter. Id. at 1-2, 11-12.
Plaintiff agrees that a remand to the BCNR is warranted. Pl. Resp. at 1-3. But, plaintiff seeks to expand the scope of any remand to the BCNR to also include consideration of: (1) whether the inclusion in plaintiff's Official Military Personnel File of the adverse fitness report covering the reporting period ending January 25, 2010, violated certain military regulations; (2) whether the BCNR applied the proper rules of evidence; and (3) any additional evidence presented by plaintiff. Id. at 2-4.
The Supreme Court has held that a remand to an agency is appropriate for additional investigation or explanation, if the agency has not considered all relevant factors. Fla. Power & Light Co., 470 U.S. at 744. That is precisely the circumstance presented in this case.
The parties agree that the BCNR has not yet fully considered, or addressed, whether the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Manpower & Reserve Affairs) followed the applicable regulations in approving the recommendation to involuntarily separate plaintiff from the USMC, nor whether the board of inquiry's consideration of allegedly protected communications was in accordance with the Military Whistleblower Protection Act. Def. Mot. at 1-2, 11-12; See generally Pl. Resp. Although the government does not believe that a remand is necessary for the BCNR to consider whether the inclusion an adverse fitness report for the period ending on January 25, 2010 in plaintiff's Official Military Personnel File violated any military regulations—or whether the BCNR applied the proper rules of evidence in considering plaintiff's request to correct his naval records—as plaintiff requests, the government does not a oppose a remand to the BCNR to consider those matters. Def. Reply at 1-2. And so, a remand to the BCNR to consider and address these issues is warranted and appropriate in this case.
In addition, a remand to the BCNR will clarify what documents are a part of the administrative record in this matter and aide the Court in resolving this dispute. As the government notes in its motion for remand, the BCNR's letter denying plaintiff's request to correct his naval records does not state whether a pertinent report by the Department of Defense Inspector General factored into the board's decision to deny plaintiff's request. Def. Mot. at 1-2. The BCNR's letter denying plaintiff's request also makes reference to materials that are not contained in the administrative record currently before the Court. Id. And so, the BCNR's full consideration of all of these matters is warranted before the Court proceeds with resolving this dispute.
In sum, the Court concurs with the parties' view that the Court should refrain from reviewing the matters raised in plaintiff's complaint until the BCNR has had the opportunity to fully consider and address the outstanding issues discussed above. And so, the Court grants the government's motion for remand of this matter to the BCNR. RCFC 52.2.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court
It is further
