ORDER

THOMAS B. SMITH, Magistrate Judge.

This Fair Labor Standards Act case is before the Court on Defendant Orange Lake Country Club Realty, Inc.'s Motion to Compel Production of Documents (Doc. 36). Plaintiffs are former sales representatives who sold vacation ownership opportunities for Defendant (Id., ¶ 1). They seek damages for alleged uncompensated off-the-clock work (Doc.22-1). After the motion to compel was filed, the parties tentatively settled all claims except those of Plaintiff Debra Artt1 (Doc. 37). Accordingly, this Order is limited to the motion to compel production from Artt. If necessary, at the request of the parties, the Court is prepared to revisit the motion as it relates to the other Plaintiffs.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b) provides for "discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense. . . ." "The Courts have long held that relevance for discovery purposes is much broader than relevance for trial purposes." Dunkin' Donuts, Inc. v. Mary's Donuts, Inc., No. 01-0393, 2001 WL 34079319, at *2 (S.D.Fla. Nov. 1, 2001). "Discovery should ordinarily be allowed under the concept of relevancy unless it is clear that the information sought has no possible bearing on the subject matter of the action." Id. The Eleventh Circuit has remarked that the Federal Rules "strongly favor full discovery whenever possible." Farnsworth v. Procter & Gamble Co., 758 F.2d 1545, 1547 (11th Cir. 1985).

Requests for discovery must be tailored so that they "appear[] reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." FED.R.CIV.P. 26(b)(1). "Otherwise, the Defendant would be allowed to engage in the proverbial fishing expedition, in the hope that there might be something of relevance in Plaintiff's [social media] account." Tompkins v. Detroit Metro. Airport, 278 F.R.D. 387, 388 (E.D.Mich. 2012).

Rule 26 also requires that discovery be proportional to the needs of the case. When a person signs a discovery request she/he is certifying "that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry" the discovery request is "neither unreasonable nor unduly burdensome or expensive, considering the needs of the case, prior discovery in the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation." FED.R.CIV.P. 26(g)(1)(B)(iii).

This dispute concerns information on social networking sites. "Generally, [social networking site] content is neither privileged nor protected by any right of privacy." Davenport v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., No. 3:11-cv-632-J-JBT, 2012 WL 555759, at *1 (M.D.Fla. Feb. 21, 2012).

Defendant is asking the Court to overrule Artt's objections and compel production of the information sought in the following requests:

Defendant does not seek this information to establish that Artt was engaging in non-work related activities while on the job, or to prove a violation of a workplace policy (Doc. 36 at 7). Instead, Defendant argues that the information is relevant and critical because Artt claims to have worked an average of 15 to 20 hours of overtime per week off-the-clock, but she does not have documents to establish the exact number of hours she is claiming2 (Doc. 36 at 6). Defendant posits that Artt's social media is relevant to show when she was engaging in non-work related activities outside the workplace and, if any of Artt's social media accounts logged the location from which she posted, that information may also show whether Artt was working on a particular day and time (Id., at 7). Defendant argues that its requests are reasonable because it has only asked for social media generated during the hours Artt claims to have worked off-the-clock, the time frame is limited to the 3 year statute of limitations period for FLSA claims, and Defendant has provided instructions on how to easily obtain the requested information from Facebook (Id., at 8-9).

Defendant's representation that Artt claims to have worked an average of 15 to 20 hours per week off-the-clock does not appear to be true. Artt represents that months before the motion to compel was filed, she produced her overtime calculations (Doc. 38 at 8). Those calculations show that Artt is only seeking overtime for days on which she clocked in and out during a workday (Id.). This eliminates more than 69 weeks during which she was employed by Defendant3 (Id., 8-9). Artt's damage calculations also show that Defendant's requests are not focused or tailored to the needs of this controversy.

The parties have not informed the Court of the extent to which Artt uses social media, or the extent to which other discovery has addressed the information sought in Defendant's requests. Still, given the nature of the case, the Court finds that Defendant's request for every online profile, post, message, tweet, reply, retweet, status update, wall comment, group joined, activity stream, blog entry, photograph, video, online communication, and all other information contained in Artt's Facebook, MySpace, Instagram, LinkedIn or other social networking accounts that she posted at any time between 7:00 am and 7:00 pm on any date between June 19, 2011 and her last day of employment with Defendant is on its face, overbroad, unduly burdensome, and unreasonable. Devries v. Morgan Stanley & Co. LLC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27293, at *15-19 (S.D.Fla. Mar. 2, 2015); Palma v. Metro PCS Wireless, Inc., No. 8:13-cv-698-T-33MAP, 18 F.Supp.3d 1346, 1347-48 (M.D.Fla. April 29, 2014); Davenport v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., No. 3:11-cv-632-J-JBT, 2012 WL 555759, at *2 (M.D.Fla. Feb. 21, 2012) (Defendant "does not have a generalized right to rummage at will through information that Plaintiff has limited from public view.").

For these reasons, Defendant's motion is DENIED.

DONE and ORDERED.