PARIENTE, J.
The issue in this case arises from Florida's "Stand Your Ground" law, section 776.032, Florida Statutes (2011), which provides for immunity from prosecution when a defendant has used force in accordance with certain specified statutory circumstances. Specifically, we address the burden of proof in a pretrial evidentiary hearing where the defendant has filed a motion to dismiss, claiming this statutory immunity from prosecution.
In Bretherick v. State, 135 So.3d 337, 340 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013), the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that the defendant has the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence at the pretrial evidentiary hearing, that he or she is entitled to immunity from prosecution. The Fifth District then certified the following question of great public importance for this Court's review as to whether the defendant or State bears the burden of proof under the Stand Your Ground law:
Id. at 341. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.
We conclude that the Fifth District correctly determined that the defendant bears the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, to demonstrate entitlement to Stand Your Ground immunity at the pretrial evidentiary hearing. We therefore answer the certified question in the negative and approve the Fifth District's decision.
In Dennis v. State, 51 So.3d 456 (Fla. 2010), we approved the procedure of a pretrial evidentiary hearing set forth in Peterson v. State, 983 So.2d 27 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008), for evaluating a claim of immunity under the Stand Your Ground law. Although in Dennis we did not separately discuss the burden of proof, we quoted extensively from the First District Court of Appeal's opinion in Peterson, including portions in which the First District explicitly stated that the defendant would bear the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, entitlement to immunity from prosecution at the pretrial evidentiary hearing. See Dennis, 51 So.3d at 459-60.
We now make explicit what was implicit in Dennis — the defendant bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence at the pretrial evidentiary hearing. This is the conclusion reached by every Florida appellate court to consider
We therefore reject Bretherick's position and the position advanced by the dissent that the State must disprove entitlement to Stand Your Ground immunity beyond a reasonable doubt at the pretrial evidentiary hearing, as is the State's burden to obtain a conviction at trial. The dissent's view has never previously been embraced by any state with an analogous immunity law and is actually inconsistent with the procedure for resolving motions to dismiss involving other types of statutory immunity. Placing the burden of proof on the defendant at the pretrial evidentiary hearing is principled, practical, and supported by our precedent.
The defendant, Jared Bretherick, was charged by information with aggravated assault with a firearm under section 784.021(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2011), for his conduct during an encounter with another driver on a highway in 2011. Bretherick filed a motion to dismiss under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(b), claiming immunity from prosecution under section 776.032, Florida Statutes, Florida's "Stand Your Ground" law. The Stand Your Ground law provides that when a person uses force as permitted by sections 776.012, 776.013, or 776.031, Florida Statutes (2011), the person is entitled to immunity from criminal prosecution. Bretherick sought a pretrial evidentiary hearing on his motion to dismiss, consistent with this Court's decision in Dennis, 51 So.3d at 463, which approved the procedure of a pretrial evidentiary hearing to consider a defendant's claim of entitlement to stand Your Ground immunity.
The Fifth District summarized the trial court's factual findings based on the evidence elicited at the evidentiary hearing as follows:
Bretherick, 135 So.3d at 338-39.
Based on its factual findings following the evidentiary hearing, the trial court concluded that Bretherick did not establish entitlement to immunity by a preponderance of the evidence and denied Bretherick's motion to dismiss. The trial court explained as follows:
(Footnotes omitted.)
After the trial court subsequently denied Bretherick's motion to reconsider its denial of his motion to dismiss, Bretherick filed a petition for writ of prohibition in the Fifth District. The Fifth District concluded that under the procedure for Stand Your Ground pretrial evidentiary hearings set forth in Dennis, "the trial court properly placed the burden of proof on [Bretherick]." Id. at 340. The Fifth District then concluded that Bretherick was not entitled to Stand Your Ground immunity, determining that "based on the trial court's findings of fact, which are supported by competent, substantial evidence,... the motion to dismiss was properly denied." Id. The Fifth District reasoned as follows:
Id. at 340-41. The Fifth District also noted, in certifying the question for this Court's consideration, that "[t]he issue of who bears the burden of proof may well be significant where the case is an extremely close one, or where only limited evidence is presented for the trial court's consideration." Id. at 341. While both the trial court and the Fifth District agreed that Bretherick had not sustained his burden of proof at the pretrial stage, neither court held that Bretherick was foreclosed from raising self-defense as an affirmative defense to be considered by the jury at trial.
Judge Schumann concurred specially and commented that if she had not felt "bound" by Dennis, she "would find that the trial court erred in placing the burden of proof at the pretrial hearing on the Defendant." Id. at 341, 344 (Schumann, J., concurring specially). Judge Schumann stated that she would follow the reasoning of courts in Kentucky and Kansas and place the burden of proof upon the State at the pretrial stage to demonstrate that the use of force was unjustified, because, she reasoned, "[p]lacing the burden of proof on the State throughout each phase of criminal prosecution best fulfills the legislative intent to create a broad grant of immunity." Id. at 344.
The certified question asks this Court whether the State or the defendant bears the burden of proof with respect to demonstrating entitlement to immunity under the Stand Your Ground law. This is an issue of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo. See J.A.B. v. State, 25 So.3d 554, 557 (Fla.2010).
In analyzing this issue, we begin by reviewing the statute and this Court's decision in Dennis. Then, we determine whether the burden of proof was decided as part of the Dennis holding. After concluding that the burden of proof was not a specific holding of Dennis, we consider whether placing the burden of proof on the defendant to prove entitlement to immunity from prosecution by a preponderance of the evidence at a pretrial evidentiary hearing — the procedure that has been followed by all of the district courts of appeal after Dennis — is both appropriate and consistent with the statutory scheme.
Florida's Stand Your Ground law provides in pertinent part as follows:
§ 776.032, Fla. Stat. (emphasis added).
This Court has explained that the "[l]egislative intent guides statutory analysis." Fla. Dep't of Children & Family Servs. v. P.E., 14 So.3d 228, 234 (Fla. 2009) (citing Knowles v. Beverly Enterprises-Fla., Inc., 898 So.2d 1, 5 (Fla.2004)). In discerning legislative intent, we look first to the actual language used in the statute because "the statute's text is the most reliable and authoritative expression of the Legislature's intent." Fla. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Cox, 967 So.2d 815, 820 (Fla.2007) (quoting V.K.E. v. State, 934 So.2d 1276, 1286 (Fla.2006)). Further, statutory enactments "are to be interpreted so as to accomplish rather than defeat their purpose." Reeves v. State, 957 So.2d 625, 629 (Fla.2007) (quoting Lewis v. Mosley, 204 So.2d 197, 201 (Fla.1967)).
In order to effectuate legislative intent, we held in Dennis that "the plain language of section 776.032 grants defendants a substantive right to assert immunity from prosecution and to avoid being subjected to a trial." 51 So.3d at 462. Recognizing that the statute was silent as to how to best effectuate the defendant's substantive right to this immunity from prosecution, we rejected the Fourth District Court of Appeal's decision in Dennis v. State, 17 So.3d 305 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009), thereby also rejecting the argument advanced by the State, that the existence of disputed issues of material fact required the denial of a defendant's motion to dismiss under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(c)(4).
Id.
Regarding the applicable procedure for claiming Stand Your Ground immunity, this Court determined that "Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(b) — rather than rule 3.190(c)(4) — provides the appropriate procedural vehicle for the consideration of a claim of section 776.032 immunity." Id. at 462. This Court thus rejected the Fourth District's view that all the State had to do to defeat a motion to dismiss was to demonstrate, under a rule 3.190(d) traverse or demurrer, the existence of a factual dispute as to whether the defendant's use of force was justified. Id. at 458. Instead, we agreed with the First District's approach in Peterson that provided for an evidentiary hearing during which the trial court would determine whether the defendant is entitled to statutory immunity. Id. at 463. We stated as follows:
Id. at 458.
The burden of proof was discussed in both initial and supplemental briefing in Dennis, and the defendant, who was represented by the Public Defender's Office, urged that we adopt the remedy of an evidentiary hearing where the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the charges should be dismissed because he or she is entitled to Stand Your Ground immunity. This position was confirmed by counsel for the defendant during oral argument in Dennis.
Yet, the only mention of the burden of proof in the Dennis opinion is within the following extensive excerpt from Peterson, in which this Court recited the district court's holding:
51 So.3d at 459-60 (emphasis added) (quoting Peterson, 983 So.2d at 29-30).
After analyzing the appropriate procedure for pretrial claims of Stand Your Ground immunity, we concluded that the procedure set forth in Peterson "best effectuates the intent of the Legislature." Id. at 463. However, although this Court adopted the Peterson procedure and quoted
After our decision in Dennis, each of the district courts, in reliance on either Peterson or Dennis, have placed the burden of proof on the defendant to establish entitlement to immunity by a preponderance of the evidence at the pretrial evidentiary hearing. See, e.g., Mederos v. State, 102 So.3d 7, 11 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012); State v. Gallo, 76 So.3d 407, 409 & n. 2 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011); State v. Vino, 100 So.3d 716, 717 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012); Joseph v. State, 103 So.3d 227, 230 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012); Bretherick, 135 So.3d at 340. Even before this Court's decision in Dennis, all of Florida's district courts other than the Fourth District had addressed this issue and had explicitly agreed with the First District in Peterson to require a pretrial evidentiary hearing, in which the defendant has the burden to prove entitlement to Stand Your Ground immunity by a preponderance of the evidence. See McDaniel v. State, 24 So.3d 654, 656 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009); State v. Yaqubie, 51 So.3d 474, 475 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010); Gray v. State, 13 So.3d 114, 115 (Fla. 5th DCA 2009).
We now agree with all of the district courts and hold that the defendant bears the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, to demonstrate entitlement to Stand Your Ground immunity at the pretrial evidentiary hearing. Numerous reasons support our conclusion.
First, in providing for the Stand Your Ground immunity, the Legislature did not confer upon every person in Florida blanket immunity from criminal prosecution, but instead provided immunity only to those whose use of force was justified, as specified by statute. See § 776.032, Fla. Stat. (providing that the use of force is justified only when used as permitted by sections 776.012, 776.013, or 776.031). Although the Legislature did not set forth a procedure to test a defendant's claim of statutory immunity, the procedure this Court adopted in Dennis gave effect to the Legislature's intent to provide an eligible defendant with statutory protection extending beyond the ability to assert at trial the affirmative defense of self-defense. The resulting procedure allows a defendant to establish, at a pretrial evidentiary hearing, that he or she acted in accordance with the statutory requirements and is thus entitled to the immunity, in order to avoid criminal prosecution.
Second, as the State points out, no court in this country has required, at a pretrial evidentiary hearing, the prosecution to disprove beyond a reasonable doubt that the use of force by a defendant was justified. The highest courts in three states — Colorado, Georgia, and South Carolina — agree with a procedure similar to that described in Peterson, as approved by Dennis. See State v. Duncan, 392 S.C. 404, 709 S.E.2d 662, 665 (2011); Bunn v. State, 284 Ga. 410, 667 S.E.2d 605, 608 (2008); People v. Guenther, 740 P.2d 971, 972 (Colo.1987). These courts have adopted a procedure in which the defendant bears the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence at a pretrial evidentiary hearing, in the context of their analogous immunity laws.
Bretherick's reliance on cases from Kentucky and Kansas is misplaced because neither of those states has adopted a procedure in which the burden of proof is on the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt at the pretrial stage. In Rodgers v. Commonwealth,
The Supreme Court of Kansas similarly concluded that the prosecution merely had to establish probable cause that the defendant's use of force was unlawful, but declined to address whether the defendant was entitled to a pretrial evidentiary hearing. See State v. Ultreras, 296 Kan. 828, 295 P.3d 1020, 1031 (2013). In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court of Kansas specifically distinguished the Kansas statute from the Florida statute and concluded that the Rodgers rationale from Kentucky was more consistent with the Kansas statute than the decisions from Florida and Colorado. Id. at 1030-31. Because the Florida Legislature intended to foster more protection from prosecution, Florida's statute is distinguishable, and the decisions from Kansas and Kentucky therefore do not support Bretherick's position.
Third, placing the burden of proof on the defendant is consistent with how other types of motions to dismiss are handled under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.190(b). Rule 3.190(b) sets out procedures for the filing and consideration of a motion to dismiss in a criminal proceeding. As then-Chief Judge Gross explained in his special concurrence in Govoni v. State, 17 So.3d 809 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009), quashed, 67 So.3d 1048 (Fla.2011), the procedure set forth in rule 3.190(b) is well-suited for motions to dismiss based on statutory immunity and is consistent with jurisprudence that requires the defendant, who is seeking the immunity, to bear the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence:
17 So.3d at 810-11 (Gross, C.J., concurring specially) (alterations in original). As explained by Judge Gross, the procedures for pretrial motions to dismiss, based on this Court's precedent, all require the defendant to offer the evidence in support of the motion, rather than placing the burden on the State.
Fourth, to place the burden on the State to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant was not entitled to immunity would require the State to establish the same degree of proof twice — once pretrial and again at trial. This would essentially result in two full-blown trials: one before the trial judge and then another before the jury. Additionally, the pretrial evidentiary issue focuses not on whether the defendant has committed the crime with which he or she is charged, but rather on whether the defendant was justified in "standing his or her ground." As the Colorado Supreme Court has recognized, "the accused presumably has a greater knowledge of the existence or nonexistence of the facts which would call into play the protective shield of the statute and, under these circumstances, should be in a better position than the prosecution to establish the existence of those statutory conditions which entitle him to immunity." Guenther, 740 P.2d at 980.
Placing the pretrial burden on the State beyond a reasonable doubt would provide no disincentive for a defendant to file a motion to dismiss in order to obtain a complete preview of the State's entire case, including its rebuttal of the defendant's potentially meritless argument — which may not be supported by any evidence — that the use of force was justified. If, at the pretrial stage of litigation, the State did not possess all the evidence to refute the alleged justifications for a defendant's use of force, the defendant would be found immune from prosecution because the State could not disprove the justifications for the use of force beyond a reasonable doubt. The State has aptly described the result: "a process fraught with potential for abuse."
Finally, we reject Bretherick's argument that the standard for determining immunity for claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 should be applied in the context of immunity under the Stand Your Ground law. This argument lacks merit. Bretherick has not presented this Court with a single case in which the standard for determining immunity from claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was applied in the context of a criminal defendant seeking immunity from prosecution in state court.
The considerations involved in determining immunity from suit in the context of § 1983 for law enforcement officials are different from those involved in evaluating claims of immunity from prosecution under the Stand Your Ground law. The two statutes concern different actors operating in completely different capacities and were enacted by different legislative bodies based upon vastly different policy rationales. See, e.g., Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 167, 112 S.Ct. 1827, 118 L.Ed.2d 504 (1992) (noting that "special policy concerns" mandating qualified immunity for government officials under § 1983 included the need to "preserve their ability to serve the public good or to ensure that talented candidates were not deterred by the threat of damages suits from entering public service"). Even in cases involving § 1983 immunity, however, the individuals claiming immunity carry the initial burden of establishing that they were qualified for immunity at the time of the incident. See, e.g., Gentile v. Bauder, 718 So.2d 781, 784 (Fla.1998) (explaining that a government official claiming qualified immunity has the initial burden of demonstrating that he was acting within his discretionary authority before the burden shifts to the plaintiff).
In conclusion, although the Legislature has not explicitly stated which party should bear the burden of proof in establishing whether a defendant is entitled to immunity under the Stand Your Ground law, there is nothing in the statutory scheme, in our prior jurisprudence, or in jurisprudence throughout the country that would dictate placing the burden at the pretrial evidentiary hearing on the State to disprove the claim of immunity beyond a reasonable doubt. Not only does the defendant have the opportunity to challenge the initial probable cause determination for the arrest, he or she has an additional opportunity to avoid a trial altogether by proving entitlement to immunity at the pretrial evidentiary hearing and, if the immunity is denied, to challenge the trial court's denial of the motion to dismiss via a petition for writ of prohibition to the appellate court. These procedures are available to the defendant who is unsuccessful at each stage of establishing immunity, before the trial has even begun. Then, if the motion to dismiss and the petition for writ of prohibition are denied, as in Bretherick's case, the defendant has yet another opportunity to claim self-defense as an affirmative defense at trial. Thus, we effectuate the legislative intent to provide this immunity to eligible defendants while not
We conclude that placing the burden of proof on the defendant to establish entitlement to Stand Your Ground immunity by a preponderance of the evidence at the pretrial evidentiary hearing, rather than on the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's use of force was not justified, is consistent with this Court's precedent and gives effect to the legislative intent. While we recognize that the Stand Your Ground law is intended to be an immunity from prosecution as opposed to just an affirmative defense, the immunity is not a blanket immunity, but rather, requires the establishment that the use of force was legally justified.
Accordingly, for the reasons we have explained, we answer the certified question in the negative, approve the decision of the Fifth District, and remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
LABARGA, C.J., and QUINCE and PERRY, JJ., concur.
LEWIS, J., concurs in result.
CANADY, J., dissents with an opinion, in which POLSTON, J., concurs.
CANADY, J., dissenting.
I would answer the certified question in the affirmative, quash the Fifth District's decision, and disapprove the other decisions that have held that a defendant has the burden of establishing entitlement to Stand Your Ground immunity in order to avoid trial. Accordingly, I dissent.
As the majority recognizes, our core holding in Dennis v. State, 51 So.3d 456, 458 (Fla.2010), was that "where a criminal defendant files a motion to dismiss on the basis of section 776.032, the trial court should decide the factual question of the applicability of the statutory immunity." We reached this conclusion because "the plain language of section 776.032 grants defendants a substantive right to assert immunity from prosecution and to avoid being subjected to a trial." Id. at 462.
The majority's decision here, however, fails to recognize the essential nature of the factual question that the trial court must decide. The factual question raised by the assertion of Stand Your Ground immunity in a pretrial evidentiary hearing is the same as the factual question raised by a Stand Your Ground defense presented at trial: whether the evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's conduct was not justified under the governing statutory standard. The State does not dispute that a defendant presenting a Stand Your Ground defense can only be convicted if the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defense does not apply. See, e.g., Alexander v. State, 121 So.3d 1185, 1188 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013); Leasure v. State, 105 So.3d 5, 13 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); Montijo v. State,
The majority's argument that the burden should be placed on the defendant because it is easier for a defendant to prove entitlement to immunity than it is for the State to disprove entitlement to immunity has no more force in the context of a pretrial evidentiary hearing than it does in the context of a trial, where it admittedly has no application. That argument has no basis in the text of the Stand Your Ground law. Similarly, the majority's concern that placing the burden of proof on the State in the pretrial evidentiary hearing will potentially result in "two full-blown trials" — by no means a specious concern — cannot justify curtailing the immunity from trial under the Stand Your Ground law for those individuals whose use of force or threat of force is legally justified under the governing statutory standard. Practical problems raised by the Stand Your Ground law are a matter for the Legislature to consider and resolve.
The State has conceded that if the certified question is answered in the affirmative, this case should be remanded to the trial court for reconsideration in light of the appropriate burden of proof. Having concluded that the certified question should be answered in the affirmative, I would therefore quash the decision on review and remand the case for reconsideration by the trial court.
POLSTON, J., concurs.
Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.190.
