ROBIN L. ROSENBERG, District Judge.
Plaintiff's First Amended Class Action Complaint [DE 13] contains three counts for violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (the "FDCPA"). In considering Defendant's Motion, the Court views Plaintiff's First Amended Class Action Complaint in the light most favorable to Plaintiff and accepts all of Plaintiff's well-pleaded facts as true. See Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 480 F.3d 1043, 1066 (11th Cir. 2007).
Plaintiff alleges that on March 30, 2016, Defendant—a "debt collector" as defined in the FDCPA—sent a demand letter to Plaintiff seeking to collect a debt due to Synchrony Bank. In that demand letter, a copy of which is attached to Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendant wrote:
See DE 13-1 at 1 (emphasis added).
Counts I and II of Plaintiff's First Amended Class Action Complaint allege that Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3), which requires a debt collector to notify the consumer that he must dispute the validity of the debt within 30 days after receipt of notice:
15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a) (emphasis added). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's demand letter incorrectly states that Plaintiff must dispute the validity of the debt in writing before Defendant may assume the validity of the debt, when § 1692g(a)(3) does not contain a writing requirement.
Count III of Plaintiff's First Amended Class Action Complaint alleges that Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e, which prohibits the use of "any false, deceptive, or misleading representation or means [by a debt collector] in connection with the collection of any debt." Among other conduct, "[t]he use of any false representation or deceptive means to collect or attempt to collect any debt or to obtain any information concerning a consumer" violates this section. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10). Plaintiff alleges that, because 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3) does not require a consumer to dispute the validity of the debt in writing before the debt collector may assume the debt is valid, Defendant's inclusion of a writing requirement in its demand letter was false and misleading. Accordingly, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(10).
In its Motion to Dismiss, Defendant urges this Court to conclude, as some courts have done, that 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(3) includes an implicit writing requirement. In response, Plaintiff argues that this Court should side with the greater number of courts that have rejected that conclusion. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has not decided this issue and there is a split among the circuit courts that have. Compare Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 112 (3d Cir. 1991) (concluding that § 1692g(a)(3) includes an implicit requirement that the dispute be in writing) with Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin. Inc., 430 F.3d 1078, 1080 (9th Cir. 2005) (disagreeing with Graziano), Hooks v. Forman, Holt, Eliades & Ravin, LLC, 717 F.3d 282, 286 (2d Cir. 2013) (same), and Clark v. Absolute Collection Serv., Inc., 741 F.3d 487, 490 (4th Cir. 2014) (same). Within the Southern District of Florida, courts have sided with the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits in concluding that § 1692g(a)(3) does not contain any writing requirement. See Baez v. Wagner & Hunt, P.A., 442 F.Supp.2d 1273 (S.D. Fla. 2012); Mello v. Walled Lake Credit Bureau, LLC, No. 13-14226-CIV, 2013 WL 12077491, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 17, 2013).
Upon review, this Court agrees with the Second, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits, and with its fellow courts in the Southern District of Florida, that § 1692g(a)(3) does not require a consumer to dispute the validity of the debt in writing before the debt collector may assume the debt is valid. The Court adopts the reasoning set forth in such cases as Camacho, Hooks, Clark, and Baez, and therefore concludes that Plaintiff has not failed to state a plausible claim to relief.
Accordingly, it is