ROBIN L. ROSENBERG, District Judge.
THIS CAUSE is before the Court sua sponte. On July 28, 2015, the Court entered an Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendants, City of Port St. Lucie, Meyer Ghobrial, Michael Ryan Connor, Richard Giaccone, Steve Camara, and William van der Slike's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint [DE 31]. See DE 47. Pursuant to that Order, Counts I, II, III, and IV of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint [DE 29] were dismissed with prejudice on statute of limitations grounds.
This action was brought pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2721 et seq. and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of the Driver's Privacy Protection Act of 1994 ("DPPA") and related violations of Plaintiffs' civil rights. The Court set out the relevant procedural history in detail in its prior Order on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, see DE 47 at 2-4, and will not repeat itself here.
In its prior Order, the Court concluded that a four-year statute of limitations period applies both to Plaintiffs' DPPA claims and to Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims. See id. at 6, 11. With respect to Plaintiffs' DPPA claims, the Court further concluded that the four-year period began to run as to each Defendant on the latest date that Defendant allegedly violated the DPPA. See id. at 6-8. As a result, the Court determined that Plaintiffs' DPPA claims are barred by the statute of limitations. See id. at 8-11. On these points, the Court's prior Order stands.
However, with respect to Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims, the Court has reconsidered the reasoning behind its conclusion that a four-year statute of limitations period applies. The Court has also reconsidered its conclusion that the four-year period began to run when Plaintiffs discovered Defendants' alleged DPPA violations. See id. at 12. For the reasons set forth below, the Court now concludes that the four-year period began to run as to each Defendant on the latest date that Defendant allegedly violated the DPPA. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' DPPA claims and Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims are barred by the statute of limitations.
"A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is appropriate `if it is apparent from the face of the complaint that the claim is time-barred.'" Gonsalvez v. Celebrity Cruises Inc., 750 F.3d 1195, 1197 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting La Grasta v. First Union Sec., Inc., 358 F.3d 840, 845 (11th Cir. 2004)). "Exhibits to the complaint are considered a part of the complaint for all purposes, and may therefore be considered in deciding a motion to dismiss." Lawrence v. United States, 597 F. App'x 599, 602 (11th Cir. 2015) (internal citation omitted).
Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims are predicated exclusively on Defendants' alleged violations of the DPPA. Plaintiffs do not allege "the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws"
The statute of limitations period applicable to Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims is therefore determined not by reference to Florida's personal injury statute of limitations, but by reference to 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a).
The Supreme Court has suggested that a § 1983 claim predicated on the violation of a federal statute enacted after December 1, 1990 is "made possible by" a post-1990 enactment and is therefore governed by § 1658's 4-year statute of limitations.
City of Rancho Palos Verdes, Cal. v. Abrams, 544 U.S. 113, 123 n.5 (2005). Relying in part on this language, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that § 1658's 4-year statute of limitations governs a § 1983 claim for violations of § 1981, as amended in 1991. See Baker v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 531 F.3d 1336, 1338 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Jones, 541 U.S. at 382) (citing Abrams, 544 U.S. at 123 n.5) ("In this case, [plaintiff's] claims arise under a post-1990 Act of Congress. Were it not for the 1991 Act, [plaintiff's] complaint would fail to state a claim under § 1983. . . . [Plaintiff's] claims against [defendant] were `made possible by a post-1990 enactment' and `therefore [are] governed by § 1658's 4-year statute of limitations.").
In the instant case, Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims are predicated on Defendants' alleged violations of the post-1990 DPPA. Thus, Plaintiffs' claims are "made possible by a post-1990 enactment" and "therefore [are] governed by § 1658's 4-year statute of limitations." See Jones, 541 U.S. at 382; Abrams, 544 U.S. at 123 n.5; Baker, 531 F.3d at 1338.
Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims accrued for statute of limitations purposes at the time the alleged violations of Plaintiffs' statutory rights under the DPPA occurred, not at the time Plaintiffs discovered the facts constituting the alleged violations. This conclusion is consistent with Supreme Court precedent and with the text and structure of 28 U.S.C. § 1658:
(1) 2 years after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation; or
(2) 5 years after such violation.
Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims do not involve "fraud, deceit, manipulation, or contrivance in contravention of a regulatory requirement concerning the securities laws." Section 1658(b) and the discovery rule embedded in that subsection are therefore inapplicable to these claims. Rather, Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims—like Plaintiffs' DPPA claims—are governed by § 1658(a).
As the Court noted in its prior Order, § 1658(a) is silent as to when a cause of action accrues for statute of limitations purposes. However, in 2002, Congress added 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b), which enumerates certain types of actions that may accrue upon discovery, and left § 1658(a) unchanged. See Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 647-48 (2010). "Congress can convey its refusal to adopt a discovery rule . . . by implication from the structure or text of the particular statute. . . . Where Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent." TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 27-28 (2001). The Court therefore concludes that Congress did not intend to apply the discovery rule to actions governed by § 1658(a).
For the reasons set forth in the Court's prior Order, Plaintiffs may seek relief under § 1983 only for DPPA violations alleged to have occurred on or after March 5, 2011—four years prior to the date on which Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint was filed. See DE 47 at 8-10. However, it is apparent from the exhibits attached to Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint that none of the alleged DPPA violations occurred within that period of time.
For the foregoing reasons, it is
4. The Clerk of Court is instructed to