Filed: Mar. 25, 2016
Latest Update: Mar. 25, 2016
Summary: ORDER ROY B. DALTON, Jr. , District Judge . This cause is before the Court on the following: 1. Defendant Kesner Joly's Motion to Enforce Plea Agreement (Doc. 51), filed November 16, 2015; 2. United States' Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Enforce Plea Agreement (Doc. 53), filed December 15, 2015; and 3. Movant's Reply to United States['] Response in Opposition (Doc. 57), filed December 28, 2015. Upon consideration, the Court finds that the Motion is due to be denied. BA
Summary: ORDER ROY B. DALTON, Jr. , District Judge . This cause is before the Court on the following: 1. Defendant Kesner Joly's Motion to Enforce Plea Agreement (Doc. 51), filed November 16, 2015; 2. United States' Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Enforce Plea Agreement (Doc. 53), filed December 15, 2015; and 3. Movant's Reply to United States['] Response in Opposition (Doc. 57), filed December 28, 2015. Upon consideration, the Court finds that the Motion is due to be denied. BAC..
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ORDER
ROY B. DALTON, Jr., District Judge.
This cause is before the Court on the following:
1. Defendant Kesner Joly's Motion to Enforce Plea Agreement (Doc. 51), filed November 16, 2015;
2. United States' Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Enforce Plea Agreement (Doc. 53), filed December 15, 2015; and
3. Movant's Reply to United States['] Response in Opposition (Doc. 57), filed December 28, 2015.
Upon consideration, the Court finds that the Motion is due to be denied.
BACKGROUND
On June 18, 2014, the Government returned an amended indictment charging Defendant Kesner Joly ("Defendant") with: (1) one count of knowingly and willfully combining, conspiring, confederating, and agreeing with other persons to distribute and possess, with intent to distribute, five kilograms or more of cocaine (Count One); and (2) two counts of knowingly distributing and possessing, with intent to distribute, 500 grams or more of cocaine (Counts Two and Three). (Doc. 28 ("Indictment").) Defendant subsequently entered into a plea agreement with the Government, whereby Defendant agreed to plead guilty to Count One in exchange for the dismissal of Counts Two and Three ("Plea Agreement"). (Doc. 36, pp. 1, 3.) Additionally, paragraph 10 of the Plea Agreement required the Government to make a determination as to whether any cooperation by Defendant constituted "substantial assistance" warranting the Government's recommendation of a reduced sentence ("Cooperation Provision"). (Id. at 5-6.)
Consistent with the terms of the Plea Agreement, Defendant appeared before the Court on September 3, 2014, and pled guilty to Count One of the Indictment. (See Doc. 37.) Upon finding that Defendant's plea comported with all legal prerequisites, the Court accepted Defendant's guilty plea. (See id.) The Court later sentenced to Defendant to a term of 120 months' imprisonment. (Docs. 47, 48.)
Proceeding pro se, Defendant now moves to enforce his Plea Agreement. (Doc. 51 ("Motion").) Specifically, Defendant seeks to compel specific performance of "the [G]overnment's obligation to exercise in good faith its discretion to move to reduce [his] sentence in accordance with the provisions set forth within the Plea Agreement." (Id. at 1.) The Government responded to the Motion (Doc. 53), and Defendant replied (Doc. 57).1 The matter is now ripe for the Court's adjudication.
STANDARDS
Pursuant to § 5K1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual, at sentencing, the Court may depart from the relevant guideline sentence upon motion by the Government stating that a defendant has provided substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person. Additionally, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(b)(1) authorizes courts to reduce a defendant's sentence upon similar motion by the Government made within one year of the defendant's sentencing. Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b)(1). The Government has the "power, not a duty, to file a motion when a defendant has substantially assisted." Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185 (1992). Such decision is discretionary. See United States v. Forney, 9 F.3d 1492, 1504 (11th Cir. 1993).
Notwithstanding the Government's discretion, "federal district courts have authority to review a prosecutor's refusal to file a substantial-assistance motion and to grant a remedy if they find that the refusal was based on an unconstitutional motive," such as the defendant's race or religion. Wade, 504 U.S. at 185-86 (emphasis added). A defendant, however, is not entitled to a remedy or an evidentiary hearing by merely claiming that he provided substantial assistance. Id. at 186. Because "courts are precluded from intruding into prosecutorial discretion," Forney, 9 F.3d at 1501, "judicial review is appropriate only `when there is an allegation and a substantial showing that the prosecution refused to file a substantial-assistance motion because of a constitutionally impermissible motivation,'" United States v. Dorsey, 554 F.3d 958, 961 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Forney, 9 F.3d at 1502).
DISCUSSION
The Cooperation Provision provides, in relevant part, that:
If [Defendant's] cooperation is completed prior to sentencing, the [G]overnment agrees to consider whether such cooperation qualifies as "substantial assistance" in accordance with the policy of the United States Attorney for the Middle District of Florida, warranting the filing of a motion at the time of sentencing recommending (1) a downward departure from the applicable guideline pursuant to USSG § 5K1.1, or (2) the imposition of a sentence below a statutory minimum . . ., or (3) both. If [Defendant's] cooperation is completed subsequent to sentencing, the [G]overnment agrees to consider whether such cooperation qualifies as "substantial assistance" in accordance with the policy of the United States Attorney for the Middle District of Florida, warranting the filing of a motion for a reduction of sentence within one year of the imposition of sentence pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 35(b).
(Doc. 36, pp. 5-6.)
In the instant Motion, Defendant argues that the Government breached the Plea Agreement by: (1) failing to determine, without reason, whether Defendant provided substantial assistance sufficient to warrant a 5K1.1 motion under the Cooperation Provision; and (2) failing to notify the relevant authorities of the extent and nature of his cooperation pursuant to paragraph 12 of the Plea Agreement. (See Doc. 51, pp. 7-11.) The Government counters that it considered whether to file a 5K1.1 motion at sentencing and determined that it would not. (See Doc. 53, pp. 9-10.) In support of its position, the Government points to inconsistencies between incriminating statements that Defendant made to federal agents before and after his Indictment. (Doc. 53 at 3-4.) These inconsistences, together with other evidence, led the Government to believe that Defendant had not been completely truthful in his cooperation. (Id.) The Government represents that Defendant has not otherwise provided the Government with any information warranting a substantial-assistance motion. (Id. at 10.) The Court is persuaded by the Government's response.
In light of the unambiguous language of the Cooperation Provision, the Government's arguments, and the absence of any claims or showing of an unconstitutional motive on the part of the Government, the Court finds that it lacks jurisdiction to entertain Defendant's Motion.2 See United States v. Nealy, 232 F.3d 825, 831 (11th Cir. 2000) (limiting review of the Government's refusal to file substantial-assistance motions to claims of unconstitutional motive). Consequently, Defendant's Motion is due to be denied.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1. The Clerk is DIRECTED to STRIKE Movant's Reply to United States['] Response in Opposition (Doc. 57) as unauthorized.
2. Defendant Kesner Joly's Motion to Enforce Plea Agreement (Doc. 51) is DENIED.
DONE AND ORDERED.