THOMAS B. SMITH, District Judge.
Pending before the Court is the Parties' Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement Agreement and Dismissal of the Action with Prejudice (Doc. 98), in which they request Court approval of their proposed settlement of Plaintiff's Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA") claims. I have examined the motion and the Parties' Settlement Agreement (the "Agreement") and for the following reasons respectfully recommend that the Court grant the motion.
Plaintiff Dan Capers, Jr. alleges in his Amended Complaint that his former employer, Defendant Noah's Ark Repair Service, Inc. and its owner, Michael Potter, are liable for violations of the FLSA, 129 U.S.C. §§ 201, et. seq. (Doc. 1). Plaintiff worked for Defendants from October 2006 until January 5, 2011 as an hourly "repair technician." (
After Plaintiff filed this action the parties participated in an unsuccessful settlement conference. (Doc. 29). They engaged in discovery and then held a second settlement conference that was also unsuccessful (Doc. 98, ¶ 6). Then the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment (Docs. 59, 60), which were denied (except the Court found Defendant Michael Potter was an employer for purposes of the FLSA) (Doc. 85). Following the denial of their motions, the parties agreed to settle and informed the Court that they had settled all of their claims. The parties' Agreement provides that Defendants will pay Plaintiff: (1) $250 in overtime damages, (2) $250 in liquidated damages, and (3) 14,000 in attorneys' fees and costs.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has explained that an
FLSA claim can be settled and resolved in two ways. First, an employee may settle and waive claims under the FLSA if the payment of unpaid wages by the employer to the employee is supervised by the Secretary of Labor. 29 U.S.C. § 216(c);
Before approving a settlement, the district court must scrutinize the agreement and determine whether it is a "fair and reasonable resolution of a bona fide dispute" of the FLSA issues.
The Court must first decide whether the Agreement is fair and reasonable to Plaintiff. If the Court finds the Agreement is fair, then it examines whether the Agreement otherwise "impermissibly frustrates implementation of the FLSA (factors "external" to the compromise).
Plaintiff has agreed to this settlement to avoid the uncertainty of a trial and the possibility that a jury would return a defense verdict; to avoid the possibility that he would be liable for Defendants' costs; and to avoid the expense of attending a trial (Plaintiff lives out of state). Defendants have agreed to settle to end their on-going legal expenses and avoid the risk associated with taking the case to trial (
The Agreement includes mutual general releases and a mutual non-disparagement clause. (Doc. 98-1, ¶¶ 6-8). "To the extent that the employee receives a full wage but relinquishes something else of value, the agreement . . . involves a `compromise[.]'"
The parties represent and agree that the amounts to be paid to Plaintiff's attorneys as fees were negotiated separately from Plaintiff's recovery, without regard to the amount of the settlement sum, and that Plaintiff's recovery was not adversely affected by the amount of fees paid to his lawyer. (Doc. 98 at 6). This is sufficient to establish the reasonableness of counsel's fees.
Upon due consideration of the foregoing, I find the parties' Agreement is a fair and reasonable resolution of a bona fide dispute and hereby RESPECTFULLY RECOMMEND that the Court:
1. GRANT the Parties' Joint Motion for Approval of Settlement Agreement and Dismissal of the Action with Prejudice (Doc. 98).
2. APPROVE the Parties' Agreement.
3. TERMINATE all other pending motions.
4. DISMISS this action with prejudice.
6. DIRECT the Clerk to close the file.
Specific written objections may be filed in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636, and M.D. FLA. R. 6.02, within fourteen (14) days after service of this report and recommendation. Failure to file timely objections shall bar the party from a de novo determination by a district judge and from attacking factual findings on appeal.