SUSAN C. BUCKLEW, District Judge.
This cause comes before the Court on two motions: (1) Defendant Baker's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 16), which Plaintiff opposes (Doc. No. 19); and (2) Defendants Centurion of Florida, LLC ("Centurion") and MHM Health Professionals, Inc.'s ("MHM") Motion to Dismiss Count III (Doc. No. 17), which Plaintiff opposes (Doc. No. 22). As explained below, the Court finds that the motions should be granted.
In deciding a motion to dismiss, the district court is required to view the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.
Plaintiff Vanessa Blain was a Pharmacist Tech/Nursing Assistant at Hardee Correctional Institution ("HCI"), a state prison. Plaintiff was employed by Defendant Centurion. Centurion subcontracts with Defendant MHM to provide medical staffing to Defendant HCI. Defendant Shane Baker is the prison warden at HCI.
Plaintiff contends that Defendants terminated her employment based on race discrimination and retaliation. Specifically, Plaintiff alleges the following in her complaint (Doc. No. 1):
(Doc. No. 1-1).
Plaintiff asserts four claims in her complaint: (1) a race discrimination claim under the Florida Civil Rights Act ("FCRA"), (2) a retaliation claim under the FCRA, (3) a § 1983 claim, and (4) a § 1981 claim. In response, Defendants Baker, Centurion, and MHM filed motions to dismiss.
Pending before the Court are two motions to dismiss, which the Court will consider together. Collectively, Defendants make the following arguments: (1) the complaint should be dismissed because Plaintiff lumps all of the defendants together and does not identify the separate acts of each defendant; and (2) Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to support any of her claims. Accordingly, the Court will address these arguments.
Defendants argue that the complaint should be dismissed because Plaintiff lumps all of the defendants together and does not identify the separate acts of each defendant. The only specific acts alleged in the complaint taken by specific defendants are the following: (1) Centurion employed Plaintiff (Doc. No. 1-1, ¶ 2); and (2) Baker revoked Plaintiff's prison access, which was in retribution for Plaintiff complaining about racial discrimination and driven by racial animus (Doc. No. 1-1, ¶ 9, 17). There is no specific allegation that MHM, Baker, or HCI employed Plaintiff, nor are there any other specific acts alleged to have been done by specific defendants. The Court agrees that Plaintiff has improperly lumped all of the defendants together within her complaint, and as such, dismissal without prejudice is warranted. The Court will grant Plaintiff leave to amend, and she must allege the specific acts that each defendant took that give rise to their alleged liability.
Next, Defendants argue that Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts to support any of her claims. A review of the elements of Plaintiff's claims shows that this argument is well-founded, and her claims are subject to dismissal.
Plaintiff asserts a race discrimination claim under the FCRA. The FCRA provides that "[i]t is an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . [t]o discharge . . . any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race." Fla. Stat. § 760.10(1)(a). In order to state a race discrimination claim under the FCRA against each defendant, Plaintiff must allege the following: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; (3) she was qualified for the position; and (4) she was replaced by a person outside of her protected class or was treated less favorably than a similarly-situated individual outside of her protected class.
Plaintiff has alleged that she is African-American and that she was terminated, but she fails to allege that she was replaced by a person outside of her protected class or that she was treated less favorably than a similarly-situated individual outside of her protected class. She also does not allege that any of the defendants other than Centurion employed her. Accordingly, the Court agrees that Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege a race discrimination claim under the FCRA.
Next, Plaintiff asserts a retaliation claim under the FCRA. The FCRA provides that "[i]t is an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate against any person because that person has opposed any practice which is an unlawful employment practice under this section, or because that person has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this section." Fla. Stat. § 760.10(7). In order to state a retaliation claim under the FCRA against each defendant, Plaintiff must allege three things: (1) she engaged in a statutorily protected activity; (2) she suffered a materially adverse action; and (3) there was a causal connection between the statutorily protected activity and the adverse action.
Plaintiff has alleged that she complained to her employer about race discrimination and that she was fired, but Plaintiff fails to connect her discrimination complaint to her termination. Instead, she contends that Baker retaliated against her for complaining by revoking her prison access. However, she does not allege that Baker was her employer or that Baker fired her. Nor does Plaintiff allege that MHM or HCI was her employer. Furthermore, her allegation connecting the rescission of her prison access to her complaint of discrimination is not made within her retaliation claim. (Doc. No. 1-1, ¶ 17). Finally, Plaintiff has not set forth the approximate dates for her complaint of discrimination and her termination to show a causal connection between them. Accordingly, the Court agrees that Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege a retaliation claim under the FCRA.
Next, Plaintiff asserts a § 1981 claim, alleging that she has been denied her employment and access to HCI based on the racial animus of the parties. In order to state a claim under §1981 in this case against each defendant, Plaintiff must allege the following: (1) she is a member of a racial minority; (2) each defendant intended to discriminate against her on the basis of her race; and (3) the discrimination concerned her employment.
Discrimination and retaliation claims brought under §1981 are evaluated under the same framework as FCRA claims.
Next, Plaintiff asserts a § 1983 claim, alleging that Defendants, acting under color of state law, acted in concert and individually to prevent her from keeping her job, or from obtaining similar positions in other prisons. In order to state a §1983 claim against each defendant, Plaintiff first must allege two things: (1) an act or omission by each defendant that deprived her of a constitutional or other federal right; and (2) the act or omission was done by a person acting under color of law.
In response to the motions, Plaintiff argues that Defendants violated her procedural due process rights with respect to her employment.
Furthermore, assuming that Plaintiff can show that each defendant was acting under color of state law, liability under §1983 cannot be based on respondeat superior.
As previously stated, the Court will grant Plaintiff leave to amend in order to correct the deficiencies identified in this order. When amending the complaint, Plaintiff should also consider two more things. First, MHM contends that it is not properly named in the complaint. (Doc. No. 17, p. 1 n.1). Second, it is unclear why Plaintiff is suing both Baker in his official capacity and HCI, because a claim against Baker in his official capacity as the warden of HCI is equivalent to a claim against HCI.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that:
(1) Defendant Baker's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 16) is
(2) Defendants Centurion and MHM's Motion to Dismiss Count III (Doc. No. 17) is
(3) The complaint is dismissed without prejudice.
(4) Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint by
DONE AND ORDERED.