ORDER

JAMES D. WHITTEMORE, District Judge.

BEFORE THE COURT are Plaintiff's First Amended Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees Pursuant to Equal Access to Justice Act 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (Dkt. 31), Defendant's Response in Opposition (Dkt. 32), and Plaintiff's Reply (Dkt. 35). Upon consideration, Plaintiff's motion (Dkt. 31) is GRANTED.

Plaintiff seeks an award of attorney's fees of $3,527.28 pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"), 28 U.S.C. § 2412 et seq., which permits an award of fees against the United States if the party seeking the award is the prevailing party, the application is timely filed, the government's position was not "substantially justified," and there are no "special circumstances" making such an award unjust. Myers v. Sullivan, 916 F.2d 659, 666-67 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A),(B)). A plaintiff who obtains remand in a social security case is a prevailing party for purposes of the EAJA. See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 300-01 (1993).

The Court reversed and remanded Defendant's decision, and judgment was entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Dkts. 26, 27). Plaintiff, therefore, is the prevailing party. Shalala, 509 U.S. at 300-01. Her motion for an award of attorneys' fees is timely because she filed the motion within thirty days of the judgment becoming final and not appealable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B), (d)(2)(G). Her counsel claims 18.40 hours of time for services in this case at the 2016 EAJA rate of $191.70. (Affidavit, Dkt. 31-1). Defendant does not dispute that Plaintiff is the prevailing party, the motion for an award of attorney's fees is timely, or the amount of fees sought is reasonable, but rather argues that Plaintiff is not entitled to an award of fees because Defendant's position was substantially justified. (Dkt. 32 at p. 2).

"`The government bears the burden of showing that its position was substantially justified.'" United States v. Jones, 125 F.3d 1418, 1425 (11th Cir. 1997) (quoting City of Brunswick, Ga. v. United States, 849 F.2d 501, 504 (11th Cir. 1988)). "The government's position is substantially justified under the EAJA when it is `justified to a degree that would satisfy a reasonable person' — i.e. when it has a reasonable basis in both law and fact." United States v. Douglas, 55 F.3d 584, 588 (11th Cir. 1995) (quoting Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988)). "[T]he EAJA — like other fee-shifting statutes — favors treating a case as an inclusive whole, rather than as atomized line-items." Commissioner, I.N.S. v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 161-62 (1990). Accordingly:

Myers, 916 F.2d at 666 n.5; see also City of Brunswick, Ga., 849 F.2d at 504-06 (reviewing the government's position at the administrative level and at litigation).

Because the EAJA constitutes a partial waiver of sovereign immunity, the waiver must be strictly construed in favor of the United States. Douglas, 55 F.3d at 588 (citing Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 137 (1991)). "The fact that the government lost its case does not raise a presumption that the government's position was not substantially justified." White v. United States, 740 F.2d 836, 839 (11th Cir. 1984). "Nor is the government required to establish that its decision to litigate was based on a substantial probability of prevailing." Id.

Plaintiff argues that Defendant's position was not substantially justified because the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") failed to clearly articulate reasons for rejecting the opinion of Plaintiff's treating physician, Dr. Jay Azneer, D.O., of M.D. D.O. Associates. (Dkt. 31). The opinion of a treating physician "must be given substantial or considerable weight unless `good cause' is shown to the contrary." Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997); see also Jones v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1001, 1005 (11th Cir. 1986) ("[A]bsent `good cause,' the opinion of a claimant's treating physician must be accorded `substantial' weight."). "`[G]ood cause' exists when the: (1) treating physician's opinion was not bolstered by the evidence; (2) evidence supported a contrary finding; or (3) treating physician's opinion was conclusory or inconsistent with the doctor's own medical records." Phillips v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1232, 1241 (11th Cir. 2004). "With good cause, an ALJ may disregard a treating physician's opinion, but he `must clearly articulate [the] reasons' for doing so." Winschel v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting Phillips, 357 F.3d at 1240-41).

Dr. Azneer was Plaintiff's primary care physician from 2011 to 2014. (Treatment Records, Dkt. 13-9 at pp. 346-89). Dr. Azneer completed two Social Security Administration Questionnaires, in which he stated his opinions regarding Plaintiff's physical and mental condition. (Dkt. 13-9 at pp. 329-33). For example, Dr. Azneer checked a space indicating that Plaintiff was not capable of performing fine/gross manipulations on a sustained basis, explained that Plaintiff's "grip strength decreases over time with use," and wrote that "she has no emotional resources to deal with the stress" of holding a job. (Id.). Plaintiff's counsel provided a written summary of the case that relied on those questionnaires to the ALJ in advance of her disability hearing. (Dkt. 13-8 at pp. 318-20). The summary provided to the ALJ states, "I believe both statements are from Dr. Azneer." (Id.). Further, the questionnaire forms indicate that they were sent to M.D. D.O. Associates, where Dr. Azneer practices medicine. (Dkt. 13-9 at pp. 329-33).

However, because the signatures on the questionnaire forms are illegible and Dr. Azneer did not print his name anywhere in his responses, the ALJ determined that he could not identify the source of the statements, "there is no indication that the author was an acceptable medical source," and afforded little weight to the statements on those grounds. (Decision, Dkt. 13-2 at pp. 28-29). The ALJ also addressed the content of the questionnaire responses:

(Id.). After the ALJ's decision, Plaintiff provided evidence to the Appeals Council confirming that Dr. Azneer wrote the questionnaire responses. (Dkt. 13-13 at pp. 603-08); (Dkt. 13-14 at pp. 609-16). Notwithstanding, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review of the ALJ's decision. (Dkt. 13-2 at pp. 1-6).1

Defendant's prelitigation position was not substantially justified. The ALJ afforded little weight to Dr. Azneer's opinions primarily because he could not determine, from the record before him, the identity of the person who completed the questionnaire. See (Decision, Dkt. 13-2 at p. 28) ("However, because this opinion's signature is illegible, and since there is no indication that the author was an acceptable medical source, its probative value is minimal."). "[T]he ALJ has a duty to develop the record fully and fairly." Wilson v. Apfel, 179 F.3d 1276, 1278 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam) (citing Graham v. Apfel, 129 F.3d 1420, 1422-23 (11th Cir. 1997)). "This is an onerous task, as the ALJ must `scrupulously and conscientiously probe into, inquire of, and explore for all relevant facts.'" Henry v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 802 F.3d 1264, 1267 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (quoting Cowart v. Schweiker, 662 F.2d 731, 735 (11th Cir. 1981) (internal quotation marks omitted)). "Remand for further factual development of the record before the ALJ is appropriate where `the record reveals evidentiary gaps which result in unfairness or clear prejudice.'" Id. (quoting Brown v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 931, 935 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (inernal quotation marks omitted)).

The ALJ's rejection of Dr. Azneer's opinions for the primary reason of the illegibility of the signatures was not substantially justified because the ALJ did not probe into, inquire of, or explore for the facts relating to the source of the questionnaire responses. See Henry, 802 F.3d at 1267. The identity of the person who completed the questionnaires is relevant because the opinions of treating physicians are entitled to considerable weight absent good cause to the contrary. Lewis, 125 F.3d at 1440. And Plaintiff's counsel provided a summary to the ALJ stating that the questionnaire responses "are from Dr. Azneer." (Dkt. 13-8 at pp. 318-320). The ALJ's decision to afford little weight to the questionnaire responses without determining the identity of the person who completed them, therefore, was not substantially justified. See Henry, 802 F.3d at 1267 (holding that the government's duty to fully and fairly develop the record is an "onerous" task that requires further factual development when there is an evidentiary gap). Further, the Appeals Council's denial of Plaintiff's request to review the ALJ's decision was not substantially justified because Plaintiff demonstrated to the Appeals Council that the ALJ's decision was not based on a fully and fairly developed record and, therefore, lacked a reasonable basis in fact. See Douglas, 55 F.3d at 558; see also Henry, 802 F.3d at 1270 ("The underdeveloped record presents evidentiary gaps that make assessment of [the claimant's] . . . limitations unfair and clearly prejudicial.").2

Notwithstanding the ALJ's decision to afford little weight to the questionnaire responses because he could not determine their source, Defendant argues that the ALJ "explicitly identified" several reasons for affording little weight to the substance of the responses. (Dkt. 32). That argument is unpersuasive. As shown by the relevant excerpts from the ALJ's decision reproduced in this Order, the ALJ determined, without explanation, that Dr. Azneer's opinions were conclusory, contradicted the findings in the questionnaire responses, were not supported by the medical record and clinical signs, and overstated Plaintiff's limitations. (Dkt. 13-2 at 28-29). Contrary to the ALJ's statements, Dr. Azneer's findings in the questionnaire responses are not clearly inconsistent with his opinions. See (Dkt. at pp. 329-33). The ALJ also did not cite any specific examples where Plaintiff's medical record contradicted Dr. Azneer's opinions. See (id.). And, as noted in the Order reversing Defendant's decision, there is evidence in Plaintiff's medical record consistent with Dr. Azneer's opinions that the ALJ did not address.3 This is not a case where the ALJ's decision pointed to specific portions of the medical record or evidence of the claimant's daily activities that contradicted a treating physician's opinion. See (Response, Dkt. 32) (citing Forrester v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 455 F. App'x 899, 902 (11th Cir. 2012)). Accordingly, the ALJ's decision was not substantially justified for the additional reason that the failure to clearly articulate reasons for affording little weight to Dr. Azneer's opinions shows that the decision lacks a reasonable basis in law. See Douglas, 55 F.3d at 588.

Because the EAJA requires that Defendant's position be substantially justified at both the prelitigation and litigation stage, and because Defendant has failed to meet its burden of establishing that the ALJ's prelitigation position was substantially justified, Plaintiff is entitled to an award of attorneys' fees under the EAJA. See Myers, 916 F.3d at 666 n.5; City of Brunswick, 849 F.2d at 504. Accordingly, there is no need to separately determine whether Defendant's defense of the ALJ's decision during litigation was substantially justified. Myers, 916 F.3d at 666 n.5.4

Plaintiff's First Amended Motion for Award of Attorney's Fees Pursuant to Equal Access to Justice Act 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (Dkt. 31) is GRANTED. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), Plaintiff is awarded, and Defendant is directed to pay to Plaintiff $3,527.28 in EAJA fees for 18.40 hours of work at a rate of $191.70, both of which are reasonable.

DONE AND ORDERED