REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
BERNARD M. JONES, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff, Ashley Thurston, seeks judicial review of the Social Security Administration's denial of disability insurance benefits (DIB). This matter has been referred by United States District Judge Scott L. Palk for proposed findings and recommendations. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C). The Commissioner has filed the Administrative Record (AR) [Doc. No. 13], and both parties have briefed their respective positions.1 For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the Commissioner's decision be affirmed.
I. Procedural Background
On April 8, 2014, Plaintiff protectively filed an application for DIB. See AR 17. The Social Security Administration (SSA) denied the application initially and on reconsideration. AR 106-107. Following a hearing, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued an unfavorable decision dated June 29, 2016. AR 14-36. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review. AR 1-6. Thus, the decision of the ALJ became the final decision of the Commissioner. Krauser v. Astrue, 638 F.3d 1324, 1327 (10th Cir. 2011). Plaintiff seeks judicial review of this final agency decision.
II. The ALJ's Decision
The ALJ followed the sequential evaluation process required by agency regulations. See Fischer-Ross v. Barnhart, 431 F.3d 729, 731 (10th Cir. 2005) (explaining five-step sequential evaluation process); see also 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. The ALJ first determined Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity during the period from her alleged onset date of May 10, 2013 through her date last insured of December 31, 2015. AR 19.
At step two, the ALJ determined Plaintiff suffers from the following severe impairments: multiple sclerosis; anxiety disorder; right side visual loss secondary to optic neuritis; DJD of right hip, status post surgical repair of torn labrum; chronic diarrhea/IBS; obesity; DJD of the right knee, state post arthroscopic repair; mild cognitive impairment; and depression. AR 19-24. At step three, the ALJ found Plaintiff's impairments do not meet or medically equal any of the impairments listed at 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. AR 25-26.
The ALJ next determined Plaintiff's residual functional capacity (RFC), concluding:
[Plaintiff] has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except with nonexertional limitations. [Plaintiff] can: lift/carry 20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; walk/stand up to 6 of 8 hours with normal breaks; and sit for up to 6 of 8 hours. [Plaintiff] can occasionally balance. [Plaintiff] should avoid exposure to unprotected heights, moving mechanical parts, and hazards. [Plaintiff] should never climb ladders/ropes/scaffolds. [Plaintiff] can understand, remember and carry out simple and detailed instructions, and she can have occasional interaction with public, coworkers and supervisors.
AR 27-30. The ALJ then found Plaintiff could not perform any past relevant work. AR 30. Relying on the testimony of a vocational expert (VE), the ALJ found there were other jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform—routing clerk, collator operator, and mail sorter. AR 30-31. The ALJ concluded, therefore, that Plaintiff was not disabled for purposes of the Social Security Act. AR 32.
III. Standard of Review
Judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision is limited to determining whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole and whether the correct legal standards were applied. See Poppa v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 1167, 1169 (10th Cir. 2009). "Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Doyal v. Barnhart, 331 F.3d 758, 760 (10th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted). A decision is not based on substantial evidence if it is overwhelmed by other evidence in the record or if there is a mere scintilla of evidence supporting it. Branum v. Barnhart, 385 F.3d 1268, 1270 (10th Cir. 2004). The court "meticulously examine[s] the record as a whole, including anything that may undercut or detract from the ALJ's findings in order to determine if the substantiality test has been met." Wall v. Astrue, 561 F.3d 1048, 1052 (10th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted). While the court considers whether the ALJ followed the applicable rules of law in weighing particular types of evidence in disability cases, the court does not reweigh the evidence or substitute its own judgment for that of the Commissioner. Bowman v. Astrue, 511 F.3d 1270, 1272 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotations and citations omitted).
IV. Claims Presented for Judicial Review
Plaintiff asserts the ALJ did not adequately account for her visual limitations in the RFC. The Court finds that Plaintiff's argument does not merit reversal.
V. Analysis
Plaintiff asserts the "the ALJ fail[ed] to properly include the functionally distinct limitations at step four when determining [the RFC]" despite the ALJ considering Plaintiff's right side visual loss secondary to optic neuritis a severe impairment. Pl.'s Br. 2 (emphasis in original). The Court first notes it is well-established that "[t]he mere diagnosis of a condition does not establish its severity or any resulting work limitations." Paulsen v. Colvin, 665 F. App'x 660, 666 (10th Cir. 2016) (unpublished). Plaintiff also cites a district court case for the proposition that extremely low vision in one eye would necessarily lead to non-physical limitations. See James v. Colvin, CIV-12-851-W, 2013 WL 4077865 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 12, 2013).2 James is distinguishable as the plaintiff therein suffered from much worse vision loss than is present in this case. See id. at *3.3 Therefore, the Court must look to the specific findings and evidence considered by the ALJ.
The ALJ noted that the RFC included hazard precautions and balance restrictions after "giving credence to [Plaintiff's] testimony regarding balance issues and in light of [Plaintiff's] vision deficits, as well as obesity and musculoskeletal complaints." AR 28. Plaintiff acknowledges the ALJ's consideration of the hazard and balance restrictions, but contends the ALJ should have included additional limitations in the RFC related to vision. More specifically, Plaintiff cites her testimony that she sees shadows, does not see color, and how "everything moves" when looking out of her right eye. Pl.'s Br. 3-4 (citing AR 88-89). She also cites to testimony that those symptoms affect her near vision, far vision, depth perception, and peripheral vision. Id. at 4. Finally, Plaintiff notes that reading is "bothersome" for her in general and recited one instance where reading for two minutes on her Kindle made her head pound. Id.
The ALJ considered most of these issues when summarizing the evidence. The Court notes that after determining Plaintiff's right side visual loss secondary to optic neuritis amounted to a severe impairment, the ALJ included many references to Plaintiff's vision in his detailed summary of the medical records. By way of example, the ALJ referenced the following evidence:
• Plaintiff was found to have no light perception in her right eye in May 2013. AR 19.
• In December 2013, Plaintiff's vision was improved but not back to normal as she had dull color vision. AR 20.
• Plaintiff reported to a physical consultative examiner in May 2014 that her peripheral vision was so poor that she no longer drove. Her visual acuity with the assistance of contact lenses was 20/70 in her right eye and 20/25 in her left eye. AR 23.
• Plaintiff's vision was improved but not back to normal in July 2014. AR 20.
• In July 2015, Plaintiff reported no recent changes in her vision and noted her vision had never completely recovered. AR 21.
• In September 2015, Plaintiff had visual acuity with the assistance of contact lenses of 20/70 in her right eye and 20/30 in her left eye. AR 22.
The ALJ also addressed Plaintiff's testimony that she cannot see color in her right eye and has blurred vision. AR 28. The ALJ further noted Plaintiff testified she had trouble reading due to her inability to focus in her right eye. AR 28.
Thus, although Plaintiff contends additional limitations are supported by the record,4 considering the ALJ's comprehensive consideration of the medical evidence and Plaintiff's testimony, Plaintiff's argument amounts to no more than a request for the Court to reweigh the evidence, a task it is not permitted to do. Bowman v. Astrue, 511 F.3d 1270, 1272 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotations and citations omitted). As such, there is no error.
Even if the ALJ erred in his consideration of Plaintiff's vision, the error is harmless because Plaintiff can perform one of the jobs identified by the ALJ and VE at step five notwithstanding the asserted visual limitations. A finding of harmless error is appropriate when the court can "confidently say that no reasonable administrative factfinder, following the correct analysis, could have resolved the factual matter in any other way." Allen v. Barnhart, 357 F.3d 1140, 1144 (10th Cir. 2004). Here, the ALJ determined Plaintiff could perform the duties of collator operator. The Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) considers near acuity, far acuity, depth perception, and color vision to be "not present" in the requirements of a collator operator. DOT § 208.685-101, 1991 WL 671753.5 Therefore, Plaintiff's argument that he lacks such capabilities is irrelevant to his performance of the job. See Jones v. Berryhill, ___ F. App'x ___, No. 17-1107, 2017 WL 6523332, at *2 (10th Cir. Dec. 21, 2017) (finding claimant could work as a dishwasher because it required no near acuity, far acuity, depth perception, or accommodation, tasks which the claimant contended he could not perform).6
The ALJ and VE noted there are 450 collator operator jobs in Oklahoma and 81,300 nationally. AR 31, 92. In Rogers v. Astrue, 312 F. App'x 138 (10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished), the court implied that 11,000 nationally available jobs in one occupation was a significant number supporting a finding of nondisability, id. at 142, and in Lynn v. Colvin, 637 F. App'x 495 (10th Cir. 2016) (unpublished), the court found that 24,900 jobs available throughout the nation was "significant." Id. at 499; see also Raymond v. Astrue, 621 F.3d 1269, 1274, n.2 (10th Cir. 2009) (noting that with regard to a finding of a significant number of jobs "the relevant test is either jobs in the regional economy or jobs in the national economy"). Applying these cases, the Court has no difficulty concluding that 81,300 jobs is a significant number for purposes of step five of the sequential process.
RECOMMENDATION
For the foregoing reasons, it is recommended that the Commissioner's decision be affirmed.
NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
The parties are advised of their right to object to this Report and Recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636. Any objection must be filed with the Clerk of the District Court by May 9, 2018. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). Failure to make timely objection to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate review of the factual and legal issues addressed herein. Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656 (10th Cir. 1991).
STATUS OF REFERRAL
This Report and Recommendation terminates the referral by the District Judge in this matter.
