ORDER ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

LAUREL M. ISICOFF, Judge.

This matter came before me on October 14, 2015 on cross-motions for summary judgment filed by the Plaintiff, American Airlines Federal Credit Union ("Credit Union") and by the Defendant/Debtor Raul Cardona ("Debtor").1 Resolution of this adversary proceeding requires a determination of what is the meaning of "funds received as an educational benefit" in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) for the purposes of determining the non-dischargeability of the Debtor's obligations to the Credit Union. For the reasons outlined below the Credit Union's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and the Debtor's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues as to a material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When considering a summary judgment motion, I must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Kingsland v. City of Miami, 382 F.3d 1220, 1225 (11th Cir. 2004). However, the mere existence of a factual dispute does not preclude entry of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Id. The non-moving party cannot solely rest on allegations to overcome a properly supported motion for summary judgment. Moses v. American Nonwovens, Inc., 97 F.3d 446, 447 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1118 (1997). Instead, the nonmoving party should produce "sufficient evidence of every element that he or she must prove." Rollins v. Techsouth, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1528 (11th Cir. 1987).

FACTS

In this adversary proceeding there are no material facts in dispute. The Debtor had several lines of credit with the Credit Union, each cross-collateralized. On July 26, 2013 the Debtor signed a LoanLiner Credit Agreement (the "Credit Agreement"). The Addendum executed with the Credit Agreement notes that the Subaccount Name is "Education Line of Credit."2 The Credit Agreement had an initial variable interest rate of 10.75% and was secured by any accounts the Debtor had with the Credit Union and cross-collateralized with all other loans3 that the Debtor had with the Credit Union.

Although the Credit Agreement was called an Education Line of Credit, there was no requirement in the Credit Agreement that all or any advance be used for education purposes. Nevertheless, prior to bankruptcy the Debtor did take advances from the Education Line of Credit for expenses relating to education, including a $10,000 check made payable to Riviera Schools to pay tuition for his children, and seven checks totaling $3,730 to an entity called "Jackson Properties Inc." which the Debtor acknowledges was for rent for a child who is away at college.

The Debtor filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy case on April 8, 2015. The Credit Union timely filed a complaint seeking a determination that the Debtor's debt to the Credit Union in the amount of $14,892.31 is non-dischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(A)(ii). Section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) is part of the student loan exception to the bankruptcy discharge4 and states that a debt for "an obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit, scholarship or stipend" is not dischargeable in the absence of undue hardship.

ANALYSIS

The term "educational benefit" is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code. Thus, courts have been left to review the circumstances surrounding the debt in question to determine whether it falls within or without the exception to discharge. The Debtor argues that the obligation to the Credit Union is not a student loan, and therefore, does not fall within this exception to discharge, because the Credit Agreement clearly is not in the nature of a student loan (it has a high interest rate, it was clearly based on the creditworthiness of the Debtor, and was secured by collateral). Moreover, the Credit Agreement is an undifferentiated unqualified loan, the proceeds of which could have been used for anything.5

The Credit Union argues that the Debtor obtained an "Education Line of Credit" and that he used funds from the line of credit for that purpose, thus, the debt is an "obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit." In fact, the Credit Union argues, even if the Credit Agreement had not been called an "Education Line of Credit", because the advances were used to fund an educational benefit, the debt should be non-dischargeable.

Both the Bankruptcy Code and the case law regarding student loans and the bankruptcy discharge have gone through an evolution that has been criticized by many.6 Nonetheless, Congress has spoken, and what started as an exception limited in time and scope now has an unlimited time horizon and applies to educational loans provided by or supported by government programs, not-for-profit lenders, and for-profit lenders. In fact, while the majority of section 523(a)(8)(A)(ii) predates the 2005 enactment of BAPCPA,7 BAPCPA separated "obligation to repay funds received as an educational benefit" from the qualifier "loan made, insured or guaranteed by a governmental unit" and "program funded in whole or in part by a nonprofit institution".8 Thus, while educational benefit is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, it is clear that, as Congress has amended section 523(a)(8) over time, the meaning of educational benefit has become broader. See Liberty Bay Credit Union v. Belforte (In re Belforte), 2012 WL 4620987 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012); Rabbi Harry H. Epstein School, Inc. v. Goldstein (In re Goldstein), 2012 WL 7009707 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2012); Sensient Technologies Corp. v. Baiocchi (In re Baiocchi), 389 B.R. 828 (Bankr. E.D. Wisc. 2008). Courts have found debts nondischargeable as an educational benefit even when the Debtor does not receive the education. See Kidd v. Student Loan Xpress, Inc. (In re Kidd), 458 B.R. 612 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2011)(the debt was not dischargeable even though the helicopter training school closed before the Debtor finished her training); Rabbi Harry H. Epstein School, Inc. v. Goldstein, 2012 WL 7009707 (debt was incurred for schooling for the debtor's children).

Indeed, the Belforte case, cited by the Credit Union and the Debtor, is almost directly on point. Ms. Belforte, the debtor, had an unsecured line of credit with her credit union which was for an unspecified use. There was no oversight of Ms. Belforte's use of the funds. In 2008, several years after Ms. Belforte initially entered into her credit agreement with the creditor, Ms. Belforte requested an additional advance and an increase in the line of credit because she needed the money to pay for her children's tuition and books. The court rejected the debtor's argument that the funds were not received as an educational benefit because the funds were provided through a general unsecured line of credit, the credit union did not attempt to determine if she actually used the funds for the stated purpose, and the interest rate of 14% was more appropriate to a business purpose loan. Thus, the court held that a portion of the 2008 advance used for the tuition and books was excepted from discharge. Similarly, here, the funds advanced to or on behalf of the Debtor were for costs associated with his children's education, from a line of credit delineated for such use.

On the other hand, I do not agree that the changes to section 523(a)(8) are as far reaching as the Credit Union suggests. The Credit Union argues that even if the Credit Agreement had not been delineated as an education line of credit, the Debtor's use of the funds to pay for an educational benefit, ipso facto makes that portion of the debt non-dischargeable. This argument is far too broad. Courts have repeatedly upheld the principle that exceptions to discharge are to be strictly construed in favor of a debtor. See United States v. Mitchell (In re Mitchell), 633 F.3d 1419, 1327 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. Fegely (In re Fegely), 118 F.3d 979, 983 (3d Cir. 1997); Dalton v. IRS, 77 F.3d 1297, 1301 (10th Cir. 1996). Thus, while the definition of educational benefit, and the student loans subject to exception to discharge, may have expanded, there are still limitations.

Where, such as in this case, the delineated purpose of the loan is for education, whether that purpose is indicated by the title of the loan, or in the application for the loan or extension of credit, and the use of the funds is consistent with the delineated purpose, I hold that those funds do constitute "funds received for an educational benefit" and, in the absence of a showing of undue hardship, the debt is not dischargeable.9

Because undue hardship is not an issue in this case, I find summary judgment in favor of the Credit Union is appropriate. Accordingly, the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted; the Debtor's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied.

The Plaintiff's counsel is directed to submit a final judgment consistent with this opinion.