BETH BLOOM, District Judge.
Plaintiff Livingston Manners' ("Plaintiff") claims against Defendants stem from events that occurred on the night of June 24, 2014. That night, at approximately 2:30 a.m., Plaintiff was parked in a swale in front of the residence of Sylvester Petes ("Petes"), waiting to pick Petes up for work. See ECF Nos. [60] ¶¶ 1-23 ("City's Facts") ¶ 1; [81] ("Plaintiff's Additional Facts") ¶ 1 (collectively, "Undisputed Facts")
Plaintiff was acquitted of all charges brought against him in state court. See ECF No. [35] ("Second Amended Complaint") ¶ 62. He now brings claims against Cannella under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive use of force and malicious prosecution (Counts I and IV), against Sabillon under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive use of force (Count II), and against City for false arrest (Count V). See Second Amended Complaint. Officer Defendants and City filed their respective Motions on September 6 and 16, 2016. See ECF Nos. [58] and [60]. Plaintiff's Responses, and Defendants' Replies, timely followed. See ECF Nos. [71], [78], [80], [87].
A court may grant a motion for summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The parties may support their positions by citation to the record, including, inter alia, depositions, documents, affidavits, or declarations. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). An issue is genuine if "a reasonable trier of fact could return judgment for the non-moving party." Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 516 F.3d 1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)). A fact is material if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48). The Court views the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in the party's favor. See Davis v. Williams, 451 F.3d 759, 763 (11th Cir. 2006). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the [non-moving party's] position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which a jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party]." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. The Court does not weigh conflicting evidence. See Skop v. City of Atlanta, Ga., 485 F.3d 1130, 1140 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Carlin Comm'n, Inc. v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 802 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir. 1986)).
The moving party shoulders the initial burden to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Shiver v. Chertoff, 549 F.3d 1342, 1343 (11th Cir. 2008). If a movant satisfies this burden, "the nonmoving party `must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.'" Ray v. Equifax Info. Servs., L.L.C., 327 F. App'x 819, 825 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). Instead, "the non-moving party `must make a sufficient showing on each essential element of the case for which he has the burden of proof.'" Id. (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). The non-moving party must produce evidence, going beyond the pleadings, and by its own affidavits, or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designating specific facts to suggest that a reasonable jury could find in the non-moving party's favor. Shiver, 549 F.3d at 1343. But even where an opposing party neglects to submit any alleged material facts in controversy, a court cannot grant summary judgment unless it is satisfied that all of the evidence on the record supports the uncontroverted material facts that the movant has proposed. See Reese v. Herbert, 527 F.3d 1253, 1268-69, 1272 (11th Cir. 2008); United States v. One Piece of Real Prop. Located at 5800 S.W. 74th Ave., Miami, Fla., 363 F.3d 1099, 1103 n.6 (11th Cir. 2004).
Officer Defendants move for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. City moves for summary judgment, asserting probable cause as a complete defense. The Court addresses Defendants' arguments in turn.
"Qualified immunity . . . offers complete protection for individual government officials performing discretionary functions `insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'" Hill v. Cundiff, 797 F.3d 948, 978 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). "This formulation of the qualified immunity inquiry is intended to protect government officials `from undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability.'" Jordan v. Doe, 38 F.3d 1559, 1565 (11th Cir. 1994) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 806); see also Jackson v. Humphrey, 776 F.3d 1232, 1241-42 (11th Cir. 2015) ("The purpose for qualified immunity is to permit officials to act without fear of harassing litigation as long as they can reasonably anticipate before they act whether their conduct will expose them to liability."). "Qualified immunity is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense from liability," McClish v. Nugent, 483 F.3d 1231, 1237 (11th Cir. 2007), and "[e]ntitlement to immunity is the rule, rather than the exception." Samarco v. Neumann, 44 F.Supp.2d 1276, 1291 (S.D. Fla. 1999) (citing Lassiter v. Alabama A & M Univ., Bd. of Trustees, 28 F.3d 1146, 1149 (11th Cir. 1994) abrogated on other grounds by Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) ("That qualified immunity protects government actors is the usual rule; only in exceptional cases will government actors have no shield against claims made against them in their individual capacities.")). "`For qualified immunity to be surrendered, pre-existing law must dictate, that is, truly compel . . . the conclusion for every like-situated, reasonable government agent that what defendant is doing violates federal law in the circumstances.'" McMillian v. Johnson, 88 F.3d 1554, 1562 (11th Cir.), opinion amended on reh'g, 101 F.3d 1363 (11th Cir. 1996) (emphasis in original) (quoting Lassiter, 28 F.3d at 1150).
To enjoy qualified immunity, Officer Defendants must first establish that they acted within their discretionary authority during the incident in question. See Oliver v. Fiorino, 586 F.3d 898, 905 (11th Cir. 2009); see also O'Rourke v. Hayes, 378 F.3d 1201, 1205 (11th Cir. 2004) ("To be even potentially eligible for qualified immunity, the official has the burden of establishing that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority.") (citation omitted). "A government official proves that he acted within the purview of his discretionary authority by showing `objective circumstances which would compel the conclusion that his actions were undertaken pursuant to the performance of his duties and within the scope of his authority.'" Hutton v. Strickland, 919 F.2d 1531, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990) (quoting Rich v. Dollar, 841 F.2d 1558, 1564 (11th Cir. 1988)). As cautioned by the Eleventh Circuit, "[i]nstead of focusing on whether the acts in question involved the exercise of actual discretion," a court must "assess whether they are of a type that fell within the employee's job responsibilities." Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1265 (11th Cir. 2004). This requires the court to "ask whether the government employee was (a) performing a legitimate job-related function (that is, pursuing a job-related goal), (b) through means that were within his power to utilize." Id. (citing Hill v. Dekalb Reg'l Youth Det. Ctr., 40 F.3d 1176, 1185 n.17 (11th Cir. 1994)). As to the first prong, a court must look to the "general nature of the defendant's action, temporarily putting aside the fact that it may have been committed for an unconstitutional purpose, in an unconstitutional manner, to an unconstitutional extent, or under constitutionally inappropriate circumstances." Id. at 1266. Put another way, a court asks whether a defendant was "performing a function that, but for the alleged constitutional infirmity, would have fallen within his legitimate job description." Id. (emphasis in the original).
As police officers, Officer Defendants clearly had the authority to seize and arrest Plaintiff. In addition, the creation of a probable cause affidavit falls within Cannella's "legitimate job-related function[s]." Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1265. Plaintiff does not argue that Officer Defendants acted beyond the scope of their discretionary authority. Accordingly, the burden shifts to Plaintiff to show that qualified immunity should not apply because (1) Officer Defendants violated his constitutional right(s); and (2) the right(s) was clearly established at the time of the incident. See id. at 1267; Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 715 (11th Cir. 2010).
The Fourth Amendment affords Plaintiff the constitutional right to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985). Under established precedent, "all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force — deadly or not — in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other `seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its `reasonableness' standard." Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). Accordingly, to show that qualified immunity does not apply because Officer Defendants used excessive force, Plaintiff must establish "(1) that a seizure occurred; and (2) that the force used to effect the seizure was unreasonable." Troupe v. Sarasota Cty., Fla., 419 F.3d 1160, 1166 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing Evans v. Hightower, 117 F.3d 1318, 1320 (11th Cir. 1997)); see also Graham, 490 U.S. at 394 (citing Garner, 471 U.S. at 7-22). Plaintiff has established that a seizure occurred. See Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 596-97 (1989) (a seizure occurs "when there is a governmental termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied."). The question before the Court, therefore, is whether Plaintiff has sufficiently established that a reasonable jury could determine that Officer Defendants used unreasonable force to effect the seizure. See Troupe, 419 F.3d at 1166.
"When an officer lawfully arrests an individual for the commission of a crime, no matter how minor the offense, the officer is entitled under controlling Supreme Court precedent to effectuate a full custodial arrest." Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1196 (11th Cir. 2002) (citing Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 353-54 (2001)). "The right to make an arrest `necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.'" Bashir v. Rockdale Cty., Ga., 445 F.3d 1323, 1332 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). Plaintiff argues that under Bashir, "any force by Officers Cannella and Sabillon was excessive" because Cannella lacked probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. ECF No. [71] at 11. Plaintiff, however, misreads Bashir, as the Bashir Court rejected a similar argument and held that "where an excessive force claim is predicated . . . on allegations the arresting officer lacked the power to make an arrest, the excessive force claim is entirely derivative of, and is subsumed within, the unlawful arrest claim." 445 F.3d at 1332 (emphasis added). Plaintiff does not bring an unlawful arrest claim against Officer Defendants, basing his Section 1983 causes of action solely on the force utilized and his subsequent prosecution. See Second Amended Complaint. Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot overcome Officer Defendants' qualified immunity solely on the basis of the lawfulness (or lack thereof) of the arrest. Whether Cannella had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, however, is relevant to many of the issues presented in this case. As such, the Court addresses the matter.
Officer Defendants claim that Cannella had probable cause to stop and arrest Plaintiff because Plaintiff (1) did not fully stop at a stop sign; (2) fled and eluded Cannella before stopping at the gas station
Cannella claims that he pulled Plaintiff over because Plaintiff failed to stop at a stop sign. Specifically, Cannella testified that "a vehicle came flying past me and made a left turn disobeying the stop sign . . . After I passed through it, he passed through the stop sign behind me to make a left turn south." ECF No. [53-1] at 6:18-19, 21-22 ("Cannella Depo."). Cannella's Incident Report similarly documents that "[t]he defendant disobeyed the stop sign at south 26
Cannella has steadfastly stated that he witnessed Plaintiff drive through a stop sign without making a full stop. Even taking Plaintiff's version of the facts as true and assuming that Cannella was mistaken in his observation, "a `mistaken but reasonable [observation]'" is sufficient to establish the requisite probable cause to make an arrest. Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1233 (quoting Post v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 7 F.3d 1552 (11th Cir. 1993)); see Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1276 (11th Cir. 2004) ("That the tag light was working to an unknown extent during daylight does not directly contradict Reynolds's position that the registration plate was not clearly legible from fifty feet away on the night of the stop and is insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact in this record."); see also Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991) (officers who reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause exist are entitled to immunity). In this case, the street was dark and Cannella states that he observed Plaintiff through his rear-view mirror, circumstances Plaintiff does not challenge and that could have reasonably resulted in a mistaken observation. Unlike in Kingsland, relied upon heavily by Plaintiff, the record does not contain evidence of "conduct [that] creates factual issues as to [Cannella's] honesty and credibility." Id. To the contrary, the record shows that Cannella consistently testified and documented that Plaintiff failed to fully stop at the stop sign, going so far as to issue a traffic citation even after the incident had escalated beyond a mere stop sign violation. Plaintiff and his counsel's conclusory and unsubstantiated allegations constitute the only evidence in the record — circumstantial or otherwise — that Cannella fabricated the basis of the stop, and as such, the Court "need not entertain" the accusations.
Having determined that Cannella had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff, the Court moves to the issue of excessive force. While an officer may "use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect" an arrest, Bashir, 445 F.3d at 1332, determining the reasonableness of force used in a given case requires a careful balancing of the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's rights against government interests. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 8; Crosby v. Paulk, 187 F.3d 1339, 1351 (11th Cir. 1999). "[G]enerally no bright line exists for identifying when force is excessive." Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 926 (11th Cir. 2000). The use of force "must be judged on a case-by-case basis `from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.'" Post, 7 F.3d at 1559 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 394). "When making an arrest or stop, officers can use force that is `necessary in the situation at hand' but they violate a constitutional right if they use excessive force." Gomez v. Lozano, 839 F.Supp.2d 1309, 1317 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (Jordan, J.) (quoting Lee, 284 F.3d at 1197). While an officer's "subjective intent is irrelevant to the inquiry," an officer may not apply force that "exceed[s] the force a reasonable officer would believe is necessary under the circumstances." Samarco, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 1290 (citing Graham 490 U.S. at 397; Hutton, 919 F.2d at 1540); Gomez, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 1317 (citing Penley v. Eslinger, 605 F.3d 843, 849 (11th Cir. 2010)). As counseled by the Supreme Court, a reasonableness determination requires a court to analyze the totality of the circumstances, including a consideration of (1) the severity of the crime; (2) whether the suspect poses an immediate threat; and (3) whether the suspect is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight (hereinafter, "Graham test" or "Graham factors"). See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. A court should not apply these factors "with mathematical precision; rather, they must be evaluated within the context of how the seizure was carried out." Samarco, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 1285 (citing Ortega v. Schramm, 922 F.2d 684, 695 (11th Cir. 1991); see Buckley v. Haddock, 292 F. App'x 791, 798 (11th Cir. 2008) ("The circumstances that call on police to use some intermediate force — between no force and deadly force — remain the cases where the law of excessive force is most ambiguous.").
The parties tell two competing narratives of the arrest. As told by Defendants, after the vehicles stopped at the gas station, Plaintiff shouted at Cannella, exited his car, and refused to return to his vehicle despite multiple orders to do so. See Officers' Facts at 18, 20, 22-23; Cannella Depo. at 9:19-22. Cannella warned Plaintiff that he would be arrested if he did not return to his vehicle. After Plaintiff failed to comply, Cannella told Plaintiff to put his hands behind his back to be handcuffed. See Officers' Facts at 24-25; Cannella Depo. at 10:19-20, 12:15-20. Plaintiff refused and began to resist by "bracing and tensing his body." Officers' Facts at 26. Cannella attempted to place handcuffs on Plaintiff, but Plaintiff pulled away into his vehicle, requiring that Cannella "wrestle him onto his back in the front seat of his vehicle." Id. at 29. Plaintiff struck Cannella three or four times while in the vehicle, and after a few seconds, Cannella pulled Plaintiff out of the driver's-side door. See id. 31-32; Cannella Depo. at 13:11-12. Cannella brought Plaintiff to the ground in an attempt to handcuff him, but because Plaintiff resisted by stretching out his arms, Cannella punched him six or seven times. See Officers' Facts at 33, 35-37. Plaintiff began to scream and punch Cannella, at one point, even grabbing Cannella by the throat and choking him. See id. at 38-39; Cannella Depo. at 15:22-25. The parties continued to struggle and Plaintiff continued to resist, managing to wrap his legs around Cannella and grab hold of Cannella's wrists and arms. See Officers' Facts at 42-44. Cannella states that he momentarily lost consciousness, and that throughout the incident, he feared for his life. See Cannella Depo. at 22:5-7, 21-22. The struggle did not end until Sabillon arrived, at which point Cannella "got up" from his "straddling position" atop Plaintiff, and Sabillon deployed her Taser in stun mode. See Officers' Facts at 45; Cannella Depo. at 17:7-8; ECF No. [54-1] at 9:10-11 ("Sabillon Depo."). Because Plaintiff continued to resist arrest, Sabillon and Cannella deployed their Tasers three or four more times in the aggregate, and with the assistance of additional officers, eventually handcuffed and arrested Plaintiff. See Cannella Depo. at 17:17-25-18:1-6; Sabillon Depo. at 14:8-15, 16:3-25.
Plaintiff tells a different story. Pertinently, Plaintiff states that he never shouted at Cannella, but rather, asked Cannella whether he could "hurry things up," to which Cannella punched him in the face. Plaintiff's Facts at 63, 65; see Plaintiff's Depo. at 41:20-22; 69:16-23 ("Q: That was all that was said and then you were immediately punched? A: Yes ma'am. Q: All right. When you were immediately punched, what did you do next? A: I leaned back — as he was trying to — he was trying to put — he was telling me he was going to take me to jail. I leaned into the vehicle. . . ."), 70:25-71:1 ("I was already leaning back into the car. When he punched me, he was on top of me, punching me."). According to Plaintiff, Cannella never told him to return to his vehicle, and Plaintiff "complied with all of Officer Cannella's commands." Plaintiff's Facts at 67. During the struggle, Plaintiff threw out his arms, but did not brace his body to resist Cannella's attempt to handcuff him, and at no point did Plaintiff "choke, strike, or kick" Cannella or "resist Cannella's efforts to arrest him." See id. at 67, 68, 70; Plaintiff's Depo. at 442:6-7, 43:2 ("I never touched this guy."). Plaintiff admits, however, that he grabbed Cannella's wrists. See id. at 44.
If the record contained only this competing testimony, summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity may be improper. See Feliciano v. City of Miami Beach, 707 F.3d 1244, 1253-54 (11th Cir. 2013) ("As a general principle, a plaintiff's testimony cannot be discounted on summary judgment unless it is blatantly contradicted by the record, blatantly inconsistent, or incredible as a matter of law, meaning that it relates to facts that could not have possibly been observed or events that are contrary to the laws of nature." (citing Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380-81 (2007); Holley Equip. Co. v. Credit Alliance Corp., 821 F.2d 1531, 1537 (11th Cir. 1987); and United States v. Flores, 572 F.3d 1254, 1263 (11th Cir. 2009))). When, however, "opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Scott, 550 U.S. at 380. In the Eleventh Circuit, "exhibits govern" when they contradict a plaintiff's general and conclusory allegations. Crenshaw v. Lister, 556 F.3d 1283, 1292 (11th Cir. 2009). When videotape evidence contradicts a plaintiff's version of facts, a court properly views the facts "in the light depicted by the videotape." Scott, 550 U.S. at 381. Defendants in this case have produced an uncontested videotape that, while lacking audio, documents nearly the entire arrest. See ECF No. [51]. A review of that video reflects the following:
See also ECF No. [55-1] (still-frame photographs). As reflected above, the video materially contradicts large portions of Plaintiff's account, and supports many of the facts stated by Defendants. Rather than fully comply with Cannella, Plaintiff clearly behaves in a resistive, confrontational manner before Cannella attempts to place Plaintiff in handcuffs. By his own testimony, Plaintiff resisted Cannella's efforts to arrest him. See, e.g., Plaintiff's Depo. at 71:25-72:1-2 ("He tried to restrain me. At that time, I pulled away, pulled back into the car and asked him what he was doing").
Under these circumstance and applying the Graham factors, Officer Defendants applied a reasonable degree of force to effectuate Plaintiff's arrest. While the video does not depict the words uttered or their tone, Plaintiff clearly behaves in a hostile manner prior to Cannella's attempt to handcuff him. When Cannella attempts to handcuff Plaintiff, Plaintiff resists, and continues to resist for over three minutes, retreating into his car, pushing Cannella, outstretching his arms, rolling on the ground, wrapping his legs, and holding Cannella's wrists. Plaintiff does not stop holding Cannella until Sabillon arrives. Plaintiff's frustration notwithstanding, under Florida law, when a police officer attempts to effectuate an actual arrest, "[a] person is not justified in the use or threatened use of force to resist . . . if the law enforcement officer was acting in good faith." Fla. Stat. Ann. § 776.051(1); see Tillman v. State, 934 So.2d 1263, 1270 (Fla. 2006); see also Fernandez v. City of Cooper City, 207 F.Supp.2d 1371, 1378 (S.D. Fla. 2002). Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, Cannella was entitled to use a "degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect" the arrest. Bashir, 445 F.3d at 1332. While Cannella initially stopped Plaintiff based on a traffic violation, Cannella did not "exceed the force a reasonable officer would believe is necessary under the circumstances" that transpired. Gomez, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 1317. After Cannella and Plaintiff fell to the ground, Plaintiff clearly resisted physically, resulting in initial charges for attempted homicide, resisting arrest with violence, and battery on a law enforcement officer, all severe crimes under the Graham test.
Regarding the use of Tasers after Sabillon arrived on the scene, the Court finds that Officer Defendants' use did not violate Plaintiff's constitutionally established rights. Prior to the incident in question, the Eleventh Circuit held that a Taser's use against a suspect who is resisting arrest, even three times, does not constitute excessive force. See Hoyt v. Cooks, 672 F.3d 972, 980 (11th Cir. 2012); Floyd v. Corder, 426 F. App'x 790, 792 (11th Cir. 2011); see also Fils v. City of Aventura, 647 F.3d 1272, 1289 (11th Cir. 2011) ("Of course, the use of tasers or other weapons does not violate the Fourth Amendment per se. Such force could be appropriate where an officer reasonably believes the suspect is violent."). In fact, the Eleventh Circuit has found an officer's use of a Taser "reasonably proportionate to the difficult, tense and uncertain situation" faced during a traffic stop in which a suspect acted in a "hostile, belligerent, and uncooperative" manner, even though "(1) the suspect was not armed, (2) was not attempting to flee, and (3) there was no violence or report of violence concerning the suspect." Floyd, 426 F. App'x at 792 (quoting and describing the facts of Draper, 369 F.3d at 1272-74, 1278). In this case, Plaintiff did not stop holding Cannella's wrists until just before Sabillon applies her Taser. Plaintiff then continued to resist both officers' attempts to handcuff him. Under these circumstances, recognizing that "police officers make split-second decisions . . . in tough, tense situations," Gomez, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 1317, and cognizant of "the context of how the seizure was carried out," Samarco, 44 F. Supp. 2d at 1285, the Court finds that Cannella and Sabillon used an amount of force reasonably "`necessary in the situation at hand.'" Gomez, 839 F. Supp. 2d at 1317 (quoting Lee, 284 F.3d at 1197); see Zivojinovich v. Barner, 525 F.3d 1059, 1073 (11th Cir. 2008); see also Nolin v. Isbell, 207 F.3d 1253, 1255 (11th Cir. 2000) ("qualified immunity applies unless application of the standard would inevitably lead every reasonable officer in the position of the defendant officer to conclude the force was unlawful." (internal alteration and quotations omitted)). Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to establish that Officer Defendants used excessive force such that they violated a clearly established constitutional right. See Holloman, 370 F.3d at 1267. Officer Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to Counts I and II of the Second Amended Complaint.
Having largely rejected Plaintiff's version of events and conclusory allegations due to the video recording and other uncontested record evidence, the Court quickly dispenses with Plaintiff's remaining claims. "To establish a federal malicious prosecution claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove (1) the elements of the common law tort of malicious prosecution, and (2) a violation of [his] Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures." Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1234 (citing Wood v. Kesler, 323 F.3d 872, 881 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 879 (2003)). However, "the existence of probable cause defeats a § 1983 malicious prosecution claim." Grider v. City of Auburn, Ala., 618 F.3d 1240, 1256 (11th Cir. 2010). "To receive qualified immunity, an officer need not have actual probable cause, but only `arguable' probable cause," which "exists where `reasonable officers in the same circumstances and possessing the same knowledge as the Defendants could have believed that probable cause existed to arrest Plaintiff.'" Id. at 1257 (quoting Kingsland, 382 F.3d at 1232). In this case, the uncontroverted record shows that Cannella believed Plaintiff had failed to stop at the stop sign. The video evidence additionally shows that Plaintiff resisted arrest, and that Plaintiff arguably battered Cannella. Accordingly, Cannella had sufficient probable cause to arrest Plaintiff and the Court grants summary judgment in Cannella's favor as to Count IV of the Second Amended Complaint. For the same reason, the Court grants City's Motion as to Count V, Plaintiff's sole claim for false arrest.
For the reasons stated herein, it is
