JAMES D. WHITTEMORE, District Judge.
Defendants Robert G. Southey and Brian J. Kesneck served a subpoena duces tecum on John H. Dannecker, the mediator who facilitated the settlement agreement that is the subject of this action.
Dannecker requests that the subpoena be quashed and/or a protective order be issued shielding him from any discovery. Dannecker provides three grounds for his request: (1) communications made during the mediation are confidential and privileged; (2) the subpoena and the information it seeks is at odds with Federal Rule of Evidence 408; and (3) any testimony he may give is irrelevant.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 45 provides that a court "must quash or modify a subpoena that: . . . (iii) requires disclosure of privileged or other protected matter, if no exception or waiver applies." Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3)(A). Dannecker contends that communications made during the mediation are confidential and privileged, without exception in this case, relying on Florida Statutes section 44.405(1) and Local Rule 9.07(b).
Section 44.405(1) provides: "Except as provided in this section, all mediation communications shall be confidential. A mediation participant shall not disclose a mediation communication to a person other than another mediation participant or a participant's counsel." Fla. Stat. § 44.405(1). "Mediation communication" is defined as "an oral or written statement, or nonverbal conduct intended to make an assertion, by or to a mediation participant made during the course of a mediation, or prior to mediation if made in furtherance of a mediation." Fla. Stat. § 44.403(1). "Mediation participant" is defined as a "mediation party or a person who attends a mediation in person or by telephone, videoconference, or other electronic means." Fla. Stat. § 44.403(2).
By definition, the mediation privilege in § 44.405(1) protects disclosure of communications that were made during mediation to others outside the mediation process.
Moreover, mediation communications are not confidential or privileged if they are "[o]ffered for the limited purpose of establishing or refuting legally recognized grounds for voiding or reforming a settlement agreement reached during a mediation." Fla. Stat. § 44.405(4)(a)5. Under Florida law, "fraudulent inducement renders a contract voidable." Mazzoni Farms, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co., 761 So.2d 306, 313 (Fla. 2000).
Notwithstanding, the proponents of Dannecker's deposition do not oppose the motion. And given their position that Dannecker may not disclose anything that occurred at the mediation and that they will not ask him questions about what transpired, they have not made a sufficient showing of the need for the discovery. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
Accordingly, Non-Party John H. Dannecker's Objection, Motion to Quash, and/or Motion for Protective Order (Dkt. 43) is
Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges claims for breach of the settlement agreement, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, tortious interference, declaratory judgment, and breach of oral contract against Bankers, and fraud in the inducement and negligent misrepresentation against all defendants. (Dkt. 1). Bankers filed a breach of contract counterclaim against JGI. (Dkt. 9).
This rule also seems to contemplate disclosure of mediation communication to non-participants. And, although "local rules are valid and binding on the parties, their enforcement must be tempered with due consideration of the circumstances." Cohen v. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc., 782 F.2d 923, 924 (11th Cir. 1986).