Filed: Dec. 14, 2014
Latest Update: Dec. 14, 2014
Summary: ORDER ROY B. DALTON, Jr., District Judge. This cause is before the Court on the following: 1. Plaintiff's Motion for Remand (Doc. 23), filed November 24, 2014; and 2. Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Remand with Incorporated Memorandum of Law (Doc. 24), filed December 3, 2014. Upon consideration, the Court finds that the motion is due to be granted. At the time of removal, Plaintiff asserted claims against Defendant under the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. 26
Summary: ORDER ROY B. DALTON, Jr., District Judge. This cause is before the Court on the following: 1. Plaintiff's Motion for Remand (Doc. 23), filed November 24, 2014; and 2. Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Remand with Incorporated Memorandum of Law (Doc. 24), filed December 3, 2014. Upon consideration, the Court finds that the motion is due to be granted. At the time of removal, Plaintiff asserted claims against Defendant under the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. 260..
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ORDER
ROY B. DALTON, Jr., District Judge.
This cause is before the Court on the following:
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Remand (Doc. 23), filed November 24, 2014; and
2. Response in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Remand with Incorporated Memorandum of Law (Doc. 24), filed December 3, 2014.
Upon consideration, the Court finds that the motion is due to be granted.
At the time of removal, Plaintiff asserted claims against Defendant under the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, and the Florida Civil Rights Act ("FCRA"), Fla. Stat. § 760.01. The Court thus had federal-question jurisdiction over the FMLA claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and supplemental jurisdiction over the FCRA claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
In response to a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff amended his Complaint and voluntarily withdrew his FMLA claims. (See Doc. 21.) Plaintiff now moves to remand this case to state court (Doc. 23), and Defendant opposes (Doc. 24). Both parties agree that, despite the absence of a continuing federal question, the Court has discretion to continue to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's FCRA claims; they disagree as to whether the Court should exercise that jurisdiction. (See Doc. 23, pp. 2-3; Doc. 24, pp. 2-5.)
District courts have discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims after the anchoring federal claims have been withdrawn.1 See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). To determine whether doing so is appropriate, courts consider "judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity." Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988). Here, Plaintiff's FCRA claims, although modeled after Title VII, ultimately involve questions of state law that are best determined in a state court; additionally, this case is in its early stages, militating against the need to retain jurisdiction in order to conserve judicial resources and minimize inconvenience to the parties. The Carnegie-Mellon factors therefore favor remand. See id. at 350 n.7 (observing that, "in the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the balance of factors . . . will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims"). The Court therefore declines to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff's FCRA claims, and this case is due to be remanded.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED:
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Remand (Doc. 23) is GRANTED.
2. This case is REMANDED to the Circuit Court of the Eighteenth Judicial Circuit in and for Seminole County, Florida.
3. The Clerk is DIRECTED to terminate all pending deadlines and close the file.
DONE AND ORDERED.
