ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

ROBIN S. ROSENBAUM, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court upon Defendant ASAP Transaction Processing Corporation, Ltd.'s Motion for Attorney's Fees [ECF No. 228], which was previously referred to the Honorable Patrick M. Hunt for a Report and Recommendation. See ECF No. 234. On May 12, 2014, Judge Hunt issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that Defendant's Motion be denied. ECF No. 242. In particular, Judge Hunt concluded that Defendant is not entitled to attorney's fees because it is not a "prevailing party" in the instant litigation. See id. Defendant has timely filed Objections to the Report and Recommendation. ECF No. 243. Upon review, the Court finds Judge Hunt's Report and Recommendation to be well reasoned and correct and concludes that Defendant's Motion must be denied for the reasons set forth therein.

On January 28, 2014, the Court granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss [ECF No. 195] and dismissed Plaintiff's Complaint as to Defendant ASAP for lack of personal jurisdiction. ECF No. 227. In particular, the Court found that the allegations in the Complaint failed to establish long-arm jurisdiction over Defendant under § 48.193(1)(a)(2), Fla. Stat. The Court also denied Plaintiff's request to engage in jurisdictional discovery because Plaintiff had not demonstrated that such discovery would be fruitful. As a result, the Court declined to allow Plaintiff to amend its jurisdictional allegations and dismissed the action "with prejudice."

As a result of this dismissal, Defendant now moves for attorney's fees pursuant to § 501.2105, Fla. Stat., and § 772.11, Fla. Stat., on the grounds that it is a prevailing party in this matter. Section 501.2105, Fla. Stat., which governs attorney's fees under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act, provides that "the prevailing party, after judgment in the trial court and exhaustion of all appeals, if any, may receive his or her reasonable attorney's fees and costs from the nonprevailing party." Similarly, § 772.11, Fla. Stat., which creates a cause of action for civil theft, allows a defendant to recover reasonable attorney's fees "upon a finding that the claimant raised a claim that was without substantial fact or legal support." The Court agrees with Judge Hunt that Defendant is not entitled to attorney's fees under either statute.

According to the plain language of § 501.2105, Fla. Stat., a party may recover attorney's fees only after a judgment has been entered. See Diamond Aircraft Indus., Inc. v. Horowitch, 107 So.3d 362, 368 (Fla. 2013) ("[T]o recover attorney's fees in a FDUTPA action, a party must prevail in the litigation; meaning that the party must receive a favorable judgment from a trial court with regard to the legal action, including the exhaustion of all appeals."); Black Diamond Props., Inc. v. Haines, 36 So.3d 819, 821 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010) ("[S]ection 501.2105(1) . . . requires that there be an entry of judgment before attorney's fees can be awarded."). Here, the Court dismissed the Complaint solely on jurisdictional grounds, and it is indisputable that no judgment has been entered in this case.1 Accordingly, Defendant is not entitled to attorney's fees under this provision.

An award of attorney's fees under § 772.11, Fla. Stat., requires a finding that Plaintiff's claims lacked substantial factual or legal support. As the Court addressed only Plaintiff's jurisdictional allegations and made no conclusion as to the merits of Plaintiff's substantive claims, the Court cannot make this required finding. Although Defendant insists that Plaintiff's failure to adequately plead jurisdiction satisfies this standard, Defendant's reasoning is flawed. Plaintiff's failure to allege sufficient facts supporting jurisdiction over Defendant has no bearing on whether Plaintiff's statutory civil-theft claim had merit. Because the Court has made no determination with respect to the sufficiency of Plaintiff's claims, Defendant's request for attorney's fees under § 772.11 must be denied.

For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows:

DONE and ORDERED.