MEMORANDUM OPINION

REGGIE B. WALTON, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on defendant Kassim Tajideen's Motion for Pretrial Release ("Def.'s Mot."), ECF No. 58.1 Upon consideration of the parties' submissions2 and oral arguments presented at the motion hearing held on February 1, 2018, and at the status conference held on February 16, 2018, the Court concludes that it must deny the defendant's motion.3

I. BACKGROUND

In an eleven-count Superseding Indictment filed on February 15, 2018, the government charges the defendant with the federal offenses of (1) conspiracy to conduct unlawful transactions and cause United States persons to conduct unlawful transactions with a Specially-Designated Global Terrorist ("SDGT"), and to defraud the United States by dishonest means; (2) nine unlawful transactions with a SDGT and aiding and abetting and causing an act to be done; and (3) conspiracy to commit money laundering. See generally Superseding Indictment, ECF No. 89. In short, the defendant is charged with allegedly "continu[ing] to conduct business with [United States] entities through a large network of businesses with ever-changing names run by a relatively small group of personnel, effectively hiding his own involvement in the transactions," despite his designation as an SDGT by the United States Department of the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC"). Government's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Pretrial Release at 3, ECF No. 22.

The defendant, who is sixty-two years old, is purportedly "an extremely wealthy businessman with vast overseas holdings." Gov't's Opp'n at 3. According to the government, he is a citizen of Belgium, Sierra Leone, and Lebanon, and has no significant ties to the District of Columbia or the United States. See id. at 4. The government also represents that he has a "prior foreign felony conviction related to forgery of documents" and faces a "potential lengthy sentence" if convicted in this case. Id. at 2.

The defendant proposes the following pretrial release conditions: (1) the defendant "will post a two-million dollar cash bond," Def.'s Mot. at 7; (2) he is willing to "be fitted with a security bracelet and be subject to [the] Pretrial Service [Agency's] ("Pretrial Services") electronic home monitoring program," id. at 6; (3) he "will agree not to obtain a passport," id. at 7; and (4) his brother-in-law, who is a United States citizen, will "put up his home as security," id. at 5. The defendant also states that he "will agree to reside in an apartment that will be secured and monitored" by Guidepost Solutions LLC ("Guidepost"), a security company, id., and "will agree to travel from the secured residence only for court appearances or when otherwise approved in advance by [ ] Pretrial Services," id. at 6. In terms of the defendant's monitoring, Guidepost proposes the following surveillance measures: (1) monitoring of the defendant by two armed guards, id. at 5, "who will be inside the apartment [twenty-four] hours [per] day"; (2) monitoring of "[t]he apartment's exterior doors and windows. . . by sensors"; (3) monitoring by "two individuals outside the apartment [twelve] hours [per] day who will conduct counter-surveillance"; and (4) monitoring of the apartment "by a video feed that will be monitored and recorded," id. at 6. In addition, "Guidepost will not permit [the defendant to have] any visits that are not pre-approved" by Pretrial Services. Id. And, when the defendant is traveling, Guidepost will secure his travel by having: "(1) a third security professional . . . drive[] a security vehicle; (2) a fourth security professional [ ] remain behind at the residence to maintain a security presence . . .; (3) the vehicle [used to transport the defendant] be outfitted with GPS tracking; and (4) . . . [the defendant blocked from] access to communication devices." Id.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

"The Bail Reform Act requires release of a defendant prior to trial unless a judicial officer determines, after a hearing, that `no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person[.]'" United States v. Bikundi, 47 F.Supp.3d 131, 133 (D.D.C. 2014) (alteration in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1) (2012)); see also United States v. Hassanshahi, 989 F.Supp.2d 110, 113 (D.D.C. 2013) ("Our system of criminal justice embraces a strong presumption against detention. In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited exception." (first quoting United States v. Hanson, 613 F.Supp.2d 85, 87 (D.D.C. 2009); then quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987))). In evaluating whether any combination of conditions exists that will reasonably assure the defendant's appearance at trial, courts must consider "the available information concerning" the following four factors:

18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).

Because "the government seeks pretrial detention only on the ground that the defendant poses a flight risk, it must make that showing by a preponderance of the evidence." United States v. Hong Vo, 978 F.Supp.2d 41, 42 (D.D.C. 2013) (citing United States v. Xulam, 84 F.3d 441, 442 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). "That preponderance must, of course, go to the ultimate issue: that no combination of conditions—either those set out in the Bail Reform Act or any others that the. . . judge might find useful—can reasonably assure that the defendant will appear for trial." Xulam, 84 F.3d at 442 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

III. ANALYSIS

The government maintains that pretrial detention is required because "there are no conditions or combination of conditions that can reasonably assure the defendant's presence for trial in this matter." Gov't's Opp'n at 2. Specifically, the government contends that "[a]fter a review of [the defendant's] proposed conditions of release, an analysis of the [relevant] factors [identified in the Bail Reform Act] strongly favors the defendant's continued detention." Id. at 7. The Court agrees.

Initially, the Court finds no reason to disturb either its prior analysis of the § 3142(g) factors that it must consider in determining whether pretrial detention is appropriate or its conclusion that those factors favor the defendant's detention pending trial. See generally Transcript of Motions Hearing ("May 18, 2017 Mot. Tr.") (May 18, 2017), ECF No. 24. Based on the available information concerning those factors, the parties' briefing on the defendant's first motion for pretrial release, and the arguments made at the motion hearing held on May 18, 2017, the Court concluded that,

Id. at 27:5-17. In his pending motion for pretrial release, the defendant neither challenges nor asserts new arguments or facts that would alter the Court's prior conclusion. See generally Def.'s Mot.4 Therefore, the Court remains committed to its prior analysis of the § 3142(g) factors and its conclusion that those factors supports pretrial detention in this case.

Notwithstanding this determination, the defendant now argues that his new bail package "proposal satisfies every condition that the government states is necessary to guarantee his appearance, going well[ ]beyond the actual standard of providing a reasonable assurance." Def.'s Reply at 3 (emphasis removed). As the defendant concedes, however, his newly proposed bail package presents only two additional conditions that were not included in his prior bail package that the Court previously rejected. See id. at 3-5.5 Those two additional conditions are the posting of his brother-in-law's home as a security and the selection of Guidepost as an alternative security company to secure and monitor his detention, id. at 4, neither of which convinces the Court that there is a combination of conditions that would reasonably ensure the defendant's appearance for future proceedings.

"[T]he Court finds that the posting of [the defendant's brother-in-law's] home as security would not provide a reasonable assurance of [the defendant's] appearance at trial." United States v. Anderson, 384 F.Supp.2d 32, 41-42 (D.D.C. 2005). Although the Court is unaware of the value of the defendant's brother-in-law's home, the information before the Court gives it ample "reason to believe that [the defendant] has access to financial resources far in excess of the value of his [brother-in-law's] house, with which he might provide for [his brother-in-law] . . . in the event that [his] house is seized." Id. at 42; see also Gov't's Opp'n at 8 (asserting that the defendant's offer to post his brother-in-law's home "likely pales in comparison with the defendant's vast wealth, which allows him to offer to post a [two] million [dollar] bond to secure his own appearance"); Feb. 1, 2018 Mot. Tr. at 77:7-23 (the government representing that its investigation has "uncovered hundreds of millions of dollars in transactions that [the defendant's] companies transacted over a period of approximately five years"). Thus, while the support of his brother-in-law is commendable, "[t]he Court simply has no basis to conclude that the possible loss to [the defendant's brother-in-law] on the bond would impact [the defendant] sufficiently to ensure [his] presence at trial." Hong Vo, 978 F. Supp. 2d at 46 (discussing a defendant's new proposed condition of release of having her sister "post her condominium apartment . . ., in which [the defendant's] sister and niece live, and in which [the defendant's] sister ha[d] $50,000 in equity, as bond").

Furthermore, the defendant proposes using Guidepost as an alternative security company to monitor his pretrial activities in an agreed-upon apartment and to secure his appearance for trial and other court proceedings. See Def.'s Reply at 4 (noting that Guidepost was selected "specifically to address this Court's expressed concerns about accountability" regarding the first proposed security company). As support for why this condition would reasonable ensure his presence at trial, the defendant argues that

Id. at 4-5 (citations omitted). The government in response asserts that the defendant's proposal to use Guidepost as a third-party custodian to monitor and to secure his presence for court proceedings should be denied for two reasons. See generally Gov't's Supp. Primarily, the government contends that denial is warranted for the same reasons that other courts have rejected identical proposals by other defendants to use Guidepost to secure their appearances. See id. at 2-5.6 Additionally, according to the government, "Guidepost's repeated failures to enforce the [ ] security measures" imposed by a court that decided to grant pretrial release and place a defendant in that case in Guidepost's custody "should [not] give this Court confidence that this combination of conditions will reasonably assure this [d]efendant's presence at future proceedings." Id. at 6.

Although not addressed in this jurisdiction, other courts have considered whether the use of Guidepost and its security measures would present a set of conditions that would reasonably secure a defendant's presence at future court proceedings.7 The Court finds United States v. Zarrab, Crim. Action No. 15-867 (RMB), 2016 WL 3681423 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2016) particularly instructive. In Zarrab, the district court in the Southern District of New York considered the bail application of Mr. Zarrab, who was "charged with [ ] orchestrating and conducting a scheme to allow sanctioned entities, and the government of Iran, to access the international financial networks, and especially the United States financial networks . . . specifically for the purpose of evading sanctions." 2016 WL 3681423, at *1 (second omission in original). After considering the available information concerning the § 3142(g) factors, the court concluded "by a preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Zarrab," id. at *9, "a wealthy and successful international businessman[,] an experienced international traveler . . . [, and] a dual national of Turkey and Iran, . . . [with] no ties to New York or to the United States," id. at *1, was "a flight risk," id. at *9. The court then proceeded to "determine[] whether there [we]re bail conditions which w[ould] `reasonably assure [Mr. Zarrab's] appearance'" at trial, including Mr. Zarrab's proposal to use Guidepost's "`24/7' privately funded armed guard feature." Id. (citations omitted).

Ultimately, the court concluded that Mr. Zarrab's proposal to use Guidepost "d[id] not reasonably assure [Mr. Zarrab's] appearance . . . in future proceedings," id. at *10, for the following reasons. At the outset, the court acknowledged that Mr. Zarrab's "proposal d[id] not appear to contemplate `release' so much as it describe[d] a very expensive form of private jail or detention." Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142); see also id. ("There is nothing in the Bail Reform Act that would suggest that a defendant . . . has a statutory right to replicate or construct a private jail in a home or some other location. The Bail Reform Act address[es] conditions of release, not conditions of detention. Of course, the Act clearly allows for forms of home detention less restrictive than jail. However, once the home detention becomes so restrictive (including with the use of private security guards) that it simply replicates a jail, it is highly questionable whether the Bail Reform Act contemplates `release' in that context." (omission in original) (quoting United States v. Valerio, 9 F.Supp.3d 283, 293-94 (E.D.N.Y. 2014))). The court then reasoned that the proposed use of Guidepost "substitutes judicial oversight and management for (more appropriate) reliance upon trained, experienced, and qualified professionals from the [United States] Bureau of Prisons and the [United States] Marshals Service." Id.; see also id. at *11-12 (holding that "judicial involvement [was] inherent in the proposed privately funded armed guard regime" because the court could be asked to "decide whether the private security guards should be armed or unarmed[,] . . . determine the appropriate level of force that may be used to secure Mr. Zarrab . . . [, and] to make attorney/client determinations for Mr. Zarrab"). The court also found Mr. Zarrab's proposal to use Guidepost unreasonable because "it raise[d] serious issues of liability surrounding the use of force against [Mr. Zarrab] and persons who may interact with him." Id. at *12 (questioning whether signed "waivers from defendants permitting the `future use of reasonable force' against them" were valid, enforceable, and reasonable); see also id. ("There are some conditions that are simply not appropriate to be contracted out, and detention under armed guard would seem to be one of those." (quoting Valerio, 9 F. Supp. 3d at 295)). Lastly, the court determined that Mr. Zarrab's proposal to use a "privately funded armed [security company was] unreasonable because it helps to foster inequity and unequal treatment in favor of a very small cohort of criminal defendants who are extremely wealthy, such as Mr. Zarrab." Id. at *13 (citing cases for the proposition that distinguishing defendants based on their financial situations is entirely inapposite to long-standing legal precedent); see also id. ("[I]t is contrary to underlying principles of detention and release on bail that individuals otherwise ineligible for release should be able to buy their way out by constructing a private jail, policed by security guards not trained or ultimately accountable to the government, even if carefully selected." (quoting Borodin v. Ashcroft, 136 F.Supp.2d 125, 134 (E.D.N.Y. 2001))).8

Concurring with and adopting in full the rationale and analysis provided by the court in Zarrab, this Court likewise is not convinced that the defendant's bail proposal to include the engagement of Guidepost to monitor his pretrial activities and to secure his appearance at future court proceedings in this case qualifies as a combination of conditions that will reasonably ensure the defendant's presence at those proceedings.9 Although the defendant adamantly contends that he "should not be prevented from obtaining pre-trial release due to [his] wealth," Def.'s Mot. at 10; see also Def.'s Resp. at 4 ("The Bail Reform Act contains no bar on the use of personal resources to secure conditions of release."), the Court finds that permitting a vastly wealthy defendant "to basically buy [his] way out of pretrial detention by coming up with a plan consistent with what is being proposed here" to be wholly "inconsistent with [the purpose and] the reason for the adoption of the Bail Reform Act[,] which took the issue of money out of the equation as to whether someone should be detained or not," May 18, 2017 Mot. Tr. at 24:4-15; see also Allen v. United States, 386 F.2d 634, 637 (D.C. Cir. 1967) ("The Congress finds that— (2) Persons reasonably expected to appear at future proceedings should not be deprived of their liberty solely because of their financial inability to post bail; (3) Respect for law and order is diminished when the attainment of pretrial liberty depends solely upon the financial status of an accused. . . . The purpose of [the Bail Reform] Act is to revise the practices relating to bail to assure that all persons, regardless of their financial status, shall not needlessly be detained pending their appearance to answer charges, to testify, or pending appeal, when detention serves neither the ends of justice nor the public interest." (quoting the "findings of legislative intent" of the Bail Reform Act)).

Moreover, although the Bail Reform Act specifically removed from consideration a defendant's financial status in regards to the posting of bail to secure one's release, it explicitly requires courts to consider the defendant's financial resources in determining whether there is a set of conditions that would reasonable assure his appearance. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3)(A). Thus, contrary to the defendant's contention, see Def.'s Resp. at 4 ("[T]he government most certainly cannot whipsaw [him] by using his wealth to speculate that he has the resources to flee and then cry foul when he attempts to use the same wealth to alleviate the government's purported concerns."), it is more than appropriate for the Court to consider the defendant's vast wealth in determining the reasonableness of his proposal. And as the government aptly asserts, "the defendant's extreme wealth affords him opportunities and influence which make any pretrial release as proposed by the defendant problematic." Gov't's Opp'n at 5 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). During the February 1, 2018 motion hearing, a Guidepost representative informed the Court that the individuals selected to monitor the defendant's pretrial activities and to secure his appearance for future proceedings would work "somewhere between [thirty-six] to [forty-eight] to [sixty] hours [per] week," Feb. 1, 2018 Mot. Tr. at 68:22, and would be paid by the defendant at a rate of "probably [forty-nine] to [sixty dollars] [per] hour," id. at 65:18. While the Court has no reason to believe that the individuals selected for the defendant's security detail would intentionally violate federal law and assist the defendant in fleeing the Court's jurisdiction, it nonetheless is mindful of the power of money and its potential to corrupt or undermine laudable objectives. And although these realities cannot control the Court's ruling, they also cannot be absolutely discounted or ignored.

What is compelling is that the Court is not persuaded that the potential consequences Guidepost theorizes it would suffer if the defendant escaped its custody is sufficient to ensure the defendant's presence at further court proceedings. The defendant argues that Guidepost would face significant harm in the form of reputational damage and loss of future employment opportunities if it did not successfully secure his appearance at future court proceedings. See Def.'s Mot. at 9-10. While these potential adverse consequences are presumably real, they do not ensure that "somehow [the defendant would not be] able to make his escape" without any intentional or negligent conduct by Guidepost employees, and in that event, there is no way how Guidepost, a private security company, could be held accountable for the escape by the court or the government. May 18, 2017 Mot. Tr. at 8:16-17; see also id. at 11:9-16 ("[T]here would be no accountability for the defendant's own private security firm. There would also be almost no recourse for the United States if the defendant were to escape to Lebanon[,] which is his home[,] because there[ is] no [ ] extradition treaty with Lebanon. So in essence[,] if he can do that[,] he puts himself in almost exactly the same position as he was before he was brought to the United States.").10

In sum, all of the information available regarding the § 3142(g) factors weighs in favor of detention. See Gov't's Opp'n at 7-8 (noting the gravity of the offense charged, the lengthy prison term the defendant faces if convicted, the strength of the government's evidence, the defendant's immense wealth, his several foreign citizenships, including citizenship in a country that does not have an extradition agreements with the United States, the defendant's lack of meaningful ties to the District or anywhere else in the United States, and his prior foreign conviction involving the use of forged documents "militate strongly against the defendant's release"). And, the Court is not convinced, considering these factors, that the defendant's new bail package incorporating the additional posting of his brother-in-law's home and the use of Guidepost will reasonably assure his appearance at all future court proceedings.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concludes that the government has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that no combination of conditions can reasonably assure the defendant's presence for future court proceedings in this matter, and therefore, pretrial detention is required. Accordingly, the Court denies the defendant's motion for pretrial release.11

SO ORDERED.12